Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning

The information below is for an older proposed charter
Document Proposed charter Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning WG (teep) Snapshot
Title Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning
Last updated 2017-11-03
State Not currently under review
WG State Active
IESG Responsible AD Benjamin Kaduk
Charter Edit AD (None)
Send notices to (None)


The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a secure area of a processor.
The TEE provides security features, such as isolated execution, integrity of
Trusted Applications along with confidentiality of their assets. In general
terms, the TEE offers an execution space that provides a higher level of
security than a "rich" operating system and more functionality than a
secure element. For example, implementations of the TEE concept have been
developed by ARM, and Intel using the TrustZone and the SGX technology,

To programmatically install, update, and delete applications running in the
TEE, this protocol runs between a service running within the TEE, a relay
application or service access point on the device's network stack and a
server-side infrastructure that interacts with and optionally maintains the
applications. Some tasks are security sensitive and the server side requires
information about the device characteristics in form of attestation and the
device-side may require information about the server.

Privacy considerations have to be taken into account with authentication
features and attestation.

This working group aims to develop an application layer protocol providing TEEs
with the following functionality, * lifecycle management of trusted
applications, and * security domain management.

A security domain allows a service provider's applications to be isolated
so that one security domain cannot be influenced by another, unless it exposes
an API to allow it.

The solution approach must take a wide range of TEE and relevant technologies
into account and will focus on the use of public key cryptography.

The group will produce the following deliverables. First, an architecture
document describing the involved entities, their relationships, assumptions,
the keying framework and relevant use cases. Second, a solution document that
describes the above-described functionality. The choice of encoding format(s)
will be decided in the working group. The group may document several
attestation technologies considering the different hardware capabilities,
performance, privacy and operational properties.

The group will maintain a close relationship with the GlobalPlatform, Trusted
Computing Group,  and other relevant standards to ensure proper use of existing
TEE-relevant application layer interfaces.