Skip to main content

Web Packaging
charter-ietf-wpack-01

Yes

(Alexey Melnikov)

No Objection

Éric Vyncke
(Adam Roach)
(Alissa Cooper)
(Alvaro Retana)
(Barry Leiba)
(Deborah Brungard)
(Magnus Westerlund)
(Martin Vigoureux)
(Suresh Krishnan)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 00-09 and is now closed.

Ballot question: "Do we approve of this charter?"

Roman Danyliw
No Objection
Comment (2020-03-05 for -00-16) Sent
I agree with Ben Kaduk the goal of "Address[ing] the threat model of a website compromised after a user first uses the site." requires clarification.
Éric Vyncke
No Objection
Alexey Melnikov Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -00-10) Not sent

                            
Adam Roach Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-16) Not sent

                            
Alissa Cooper Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2020-02-26 for -00-12) Sent for earlier

                            
Alvaro Retana Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-09) Not sent

                            
Barry Leiba Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-09) Not sent

                            
Benjamin Kaduk Former IESG member
(was Block) No Objection
No Objection (2020-02-26 for -00-14) Sent for earlier
It's not entirely clear to me whether "low latency to load a subresource" fits better
as a primary or secondary goal.

We say we'll try to have security and privacy properties "as close as practical to
TLS 1.3".  Do we have a sense for how much distance we are willing to accept
(vs. conceding that we cannot uphold our security and privacy requirements
and produce something that satisfies the  key goals) and still publish?

When we say that we will try to "address the threat model of a website compromised
after a user first uses the site", I'm not entirely clear on which properties we're trying
to preserve in the face of such threats.

Regarding the "automatic discovery" non-goal, does this preclude a way for a website
to indicate how to retrieve an offline-usable version of a resource when that resource
is being fetched "on-line"?

Are there other IETF WGs (in addition to W3C and WHATWG) that might have some
knowledge about security and privacy models for the web?
Deborah Brungard Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-09) Not sent

                            
Magnus Westerlund Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-11) Not sent

                            
Martin Vigoureux Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-16) Not sent

                            
Mirja Kühlewind Former IESG member
(was Block) No Objection
No Objection (2020-03-04 for -00-16) Sent
Thanks for addressing and clarifying my block points on any transport-related potential touch points! The charter seem fine to me now to move on. I think my old comments below are still valid though (for the record mainly).

One editorial comment: I find the chosen form of listing goals rather than writing text that describes the scope of the work not very reader-friendly (at least more the main/key goals). I think text instead of quite short bullet points would be more meaningful and would probably have avoided some of the discussion/confusion we had about this charter.

Further I agree with Ben that this part is not very clear and could be better scoped:
"Security and privacy properties of using authenticated bundles as close as
practical to TLS 1.3 transport of the same resources."
Suresh Krishnan Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-16) Not sent