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IETF conflict review for draft-ovsienko-babel-hmac-authentication
conflict-review-ovsienko-babel-hmac-authentication-00

Document history

Date Rev. By Action
2014-04-15
00 Amy Vezza
The following approval message was sent
From: The IESG
To: "Nevil Brownlee" , draft-ovsienko-babel-hmac-authentication@tools.ietf.org
Cc: The IESG , , 
Subject: Results of IETF-conflict review for …
The following approval message was sent
From: The IESG
To: "Nevil Brownlee" , draft-ovsienko-babel-hmac-authentication@tools.ietf.org
Cc: The IESG , , 
Subject: Results of IETF-conflict review for draft-ovsienko-babel-hmac-authentication-08

The IESG has completed a review of
draft-ovsienko-babel-hmac-authentication-08 consistent with RFC5742.


The IESG has no problem with the publication of 'Babel HMAC Cryptographic
Authentication'  as an
Experimental RFC.



The IESG has concluded that there is no conflict between this document
and IETF work.



The IESG would also like the RFC-Editor to review the comments in the
datatracker related to this document and determine whether or not they
merit incorporation into the document. Comments may exist in both the
ballot and the history log.

The IESG review is documented at:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/conflict-review-ovsienko-babel-hmac-authentication/

A URL of the reviewed Internet Draft is:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ovsienko-babel-hmac-authentication/

The process for such documents is described at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/indsubs.html

Thank you,

The IESG Secretary



2014-04-15
00 Amy Vezza IESG has approved the conflict review response
2014-04-15
00 Amy Vezza Closed "Approve" ballot
2014-04-15
00 Amy Vezza Conflict Review State changed to Approved No Problem - announcement sent from Approved No Problem - announcement to be sent
2014-04-10
00 Amy Vezza Conflict Review State changed to Approved No Problem - announcement to be sent from IESG Evaluation
2014-04-10
00 Jari Arkko [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Jari Arkko
2014-04-10
00 Kathleen Moriarty [Ballot comment]
I'm in agreement with Stephen's comments.
2014-04-10
00 Kathleen Moriarty [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Kathleen Moriarty
2014-04-09
00 Joel Jaeggli [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Joel Jaeggli
2014-04-09
00 Richard Barnes [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Richard Barnes
2014-04-09
00 Ted Lemon [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Ted Lemon
2014-04-09
00 Martin Stiemerling [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Martin Stiemerling
2014-04-08
00 Alissa Cooper [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alissa Cooper
2014-04-08
00 Pete Resnick [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Pete Resnick
2014-04-08
00 Spencer Dawkins [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Spencer Dawkins
2014-04-08
00 Adrian Farrel [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Adrian Farrel
2014-04-08
00 Brian Haberman [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Brian Haberman
2014-04-07
00 Barry Leiba [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Barry Leiba
2014-04-07
00 Stephen Farrell
[Ballot comment]

Note that these comments are just my review and are
intended for the authors and ISE to consider however they
wish. Happy to …
[Ballot comment]

Note that these comments are just my review and are
intended for the authors and ISE to consider however they
wish. Happy to chat about them if someone wants to though.

- p4, 2nd para: this seems to end abruptl

- 2.1, RIPEMD-160 and SHA-1 are odd choices for MTI these
days.  One would expect that SHA-256 perhaps plus a SHA-3
finalist would be more likely as a modern MTI HMAC choice
for an experimental RFC, or if there are reasons to prefer
a shorter output that those might be stated.

- 2.1, which of the combinations mentioned have known weak
keys? Could that be a hangover from old DES based stuff?

- 2.2, I'm not clear why you need padding before doing
HMAC. Ah - I got it at the end of 2.2 - you don't mean what
a cryptographer would call padding but rather you mean
preparing a canonical input for HMAC.

- 2.4, why oh why do routing people feel the need to
replicate text from RFC 2104 ;-) I think just referring to
the HMAC RFC would be better here.

- 4.3, the length field is in octets and not bits I assume?
Might be a (tiny bit;-) better to say that explicitly.

- 4.3, "Digest" isn't a great name, since those bits are
not actually a digest but an HMAC output. (Authenticator
would be a more common term maybe.)

- 4.3, While this is just about HMAC, with an eight bit
length field and 2 octet KeyID that would only allow a max
of 2038 bits of "Digest" which is not enough for an RSA
2048 signature. Up to you if you think that's important or
not. If you did, using another Type for signatures would be
fine, or a 16 bit Length. Maybe another Type would be
better in this case.

- Section 8: Nice! Thanks for that.

- Section 9: It wasn't clear to me whether or not any
reflection attacks might be possible, nor if use of private
addresses (e.g. Net10) might mean that some odd form of
replay might be doable.
2014-04-07
00 Stephen Farrell Ballot comment text updated for Stephen Farrell
2014-04-07
00 Stephen Farrell New version available: conflict-review-ovsienko-babel-hmac-authentication-00.txt
2014-04-07
00 Stephen Farrell [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Stephen Farrell
2014-04-07
00 Stephen Farrell Created "Approve" ballot
2014-04-07
00 Stephen Farrell Conflict Review State changed to IESG Evaluation from AD Review
2014-03-24
00 Stephen Farrell Telechat date has been changed to 2014-04-10 from 2014-03-27
2014-03-23
00 Stephen Farrell Shepherding AD changed to Stephen Farrell
2014-03-23
00 Stephen Farrell Conflict Review State changed to AD Review from Needs Shepherd
2014-03-21
00 Cindy Morgan Placed on agenda for telechat - 2014-03-27
2014-03-21
00 Nevil Brownlee IETF conflict review requested