IETF conflict review for draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh
conflict-review-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh-01
Yes
Francesca Palombini
Éric Vyncke
No Objection
Erik Kline
Murray Kucherawy
Roman Danyliw
Zaheduzzaman Sarker
(Alvaro Retana)
(Martin Duke)
(Robert Wilton)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 00 and is now closed.
Ballot question: "Is this the correct conflict review response?"
Francesca Palombini
Yes
Éric Vyncke
Yes
Erik Kline
No Objection
Murray Kucherawy
No Objection
Roman Danyliw
No Objection
Zaheduzzaman Sarker
No Objection
Benjamin Kaduk Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
(2022-02-17)
Sent
This looks like the right conflict-review response. A few comments that might be of use for the authors: Section 4.1 The URI Template MUST contain both the "targethost" and "targetpath" variables exactly once, and MUST NOT contain any other variables. The variables MUST be within the path component of the URI. Clients The first example given seems to put the variables in the query component, which would violate "MUST be within the path component". NITS While DoH can prevent eavesdroppers from directly reading the contents of DNS exchanges, clients cannot send DNS queries and receive answers from servers without revealing their local IP address "send queries to" As with DoH, DNS messages exchanged over Oblivious DoH are fully- formed DNS messages. Clients that want to receive answers that are relevant to the network they are on without revealing their exact IP address can thus use the EDNS Client Subnet option [RFC7871], "EDNS0"
Alvaro Retana Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Not sent
Martin Duke Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Not sent
Robert Wilton Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Not sent