DMARC verification without record definitions
draft-akagiri-dmarc-virtual-verification-02

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Last updated 2017-07-27
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Applications Area Working Group                              G. Yasutaka
Internet-Draft                                             Rakuten, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                                T. Akagiri
Expires: January 29, 2018                                   Regumi, Inc.
                                                               D. Kodama
                                                            BIGLOBE Inc.
                                                                K. Okada
                                                        Lepidum Co. Ltd.
                                                           July 28, 2017

             DMARC verification without record definitions
            draft-akagiri-dmarc-virtual-verification-02.txt

Abstract

   While DMARC is a powerful architecture to protect email users from
   malicious email activities, its deployment is still a work in
   progress.  To encourage further adoption of DMARC, in this draft we
   propose an incremental deployment procedure.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 29, 2018.

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   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Yasutaka, et al.        Expires January 29, 2018                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         DMARC virtual verification              July 2017

   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  DMARC verification without DMARC records. . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  The Virtual DMARC Record  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Use cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security consideration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Privacy consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Discussion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     10.1.  01 revision  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   Currently, there are several email sender validation technologies
   such as SPF and DKIM, which are independent from each other.  There
   is also a need for email verification frameworks to handle the email
   authentication results provided by those validation technologies in a
   unified manner.  DMARC is one of the technologies that provides such
   a capability.

   Although DMARC is an effective technology to protect email users from
   malicious activities such as phishing or malware, at this moment its
   deployment is a work in progress.  A survey[ReturnPath] indicates
   that by the end of 2015, less than 30% of top global companies have
   published DMARC records.  To validate incoming emails properly on the
   receiving MTA side, it is desirable that more domains publish DMARC
   records.

   At the same time, the adoption of SPF and DKIM is widespread, and,
   especially for email receivers, it is valuable to utilize the
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