Request-Tag option
draft-amsuess-core-request-tag-00

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Last updated 2017-03-27
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CoRE Working Group                                            C. Amsuess
Internet-Draft                               Energy Harvesting Solutions
Intended status: Standards Track                          March 27, 2017
Expires: September 28, 2017

                           Request-Tag option
                   draft-amsuess-core-request-tag-00

Abstract

   This memo describes an optional extension to the Constrained
   Application Protocol (CoAP, [RFC7252] and [RFC7959]) that allows
   matching of request blocks.  This primarily serves to transfer the
   security properties that Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP,
   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]) provides for single requests to
   blockwise transfers.  The security of blockwise transfer in OSCOAP is
   reflected on in a dedicated section.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  The Request-Tag option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  For inclusion in OSCOAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Security properties of blockwise transfer . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Blockwise transfer cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Attack scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.1.  "Promote Valjean" (on blockwise case SN)  . . . . . .   9
       3.2.2.  "Free the hitman" (blockwise case SN or SS) . . . . .  10
   4.  Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix A.  Use of Request-Tag by proxies  . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix B.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     B.1.  OSCOAP inner-blockwise  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     B.2.  Use by proxies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   The OSCOAP protocol provides a security layer for CoAP that, given a
   security context shared with a peer, provides

   o  encryption of payload and some options,

   o  integrity protection of the encrypted data and some more message
      options,

   o  protection against replays once a request has reached the server,
      and

   o  protected matching between request and response messages.

   It does not (and should not) provide sequential delivery.  In
   particular, it does not protect against requests being delayed; the
   corresponding attack and mitigation is described in
   [I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators].

   The goal of this memo is to provide protection to the bodies of a
   blockwise fragmented request/response pair that is equivalent to the
   protection that would be provided if the complete request and

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