Defeating DNS/UDP Fragmentation Attacks
draft-andrews-dnsop-defeat-frag-attack-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Mark P. Andrews | ||
| Last updated | 2020-01-03 (Latest revision 2019-07-02) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
It is possible to force a DNS server to fragment its response such that a fragmentation reassembly attack can insert records into the response. This document uses TSIG with a well known key to defeat such attacks.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)