IPsec profile of ACE
draft-aragon-ace-ipsec-profile-01

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ACE Working Group                                              S. Aragon
Internet-Draft                                                 M. Tiloca
Intended status: Standards Track                                 S. Raza
Expires: May 2, 2018                                        RISE SICS AB
                                                        October 29, 2017

                          IPsec profile of ACE
                   draft-aragon-ace-ipsec-profile-01

Abstract

   This document defines a profile of the ACE framework for
   authentication and authorization.  It uses the IPsec protocol suite
   and the IKEv2 protocol to ensure secure communication, server
   authentication and proof-of-possession for a key bound to an OAuth
   2.0 access token.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 2, 2018.

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   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Aragon, et al.             Expires May 2, 2018                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            IPsec profile of ACE              October 2017

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Methods for Setting Up SA Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  The "ipsec" Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Protocol Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Unauthorized Client to RS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Client to AS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.1.  Direct Provisioning of SA pairs . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.2.  SA Establishment Based on Symmetric Keys  . . . . . .   9
       3.2.3.  SA Establishment Based on Asymmetric Keys . . . . . .  11
     3.3.  Client to RS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.3.1.  SA Direct Provisioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.3.2.  Authenticated SA Establishment  . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.4.  RS to AS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.1.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.1.  CoAP-IPsec Profile registration . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.2.  Confirmation Methods registration . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       5.2.1.  IPsec field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       5.2.2.  Key Management Protocol field . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.3.  Key Management Protocol Methods Registry  . . . . . . . .  15
       5.3.1.  Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       5.3.2.  Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Appendix A.  Coexistence of OSCORE and IPsec  . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Appendix B.  SA Establishment with EDHOC  . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     B.1.  Client to AS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     B.2.  Client to RS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21

1.  Introduction

   The IPsec protocol suite [RFC4301] allows communications based on the
   Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] to fulfill a number
   of security goals at the network layer, i.e. integrity and IP
   spoofing protection, confidentiality of traffic flows, and message
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