DNS Response clarification.
draft-arends-dnsext-qr-clarification-00
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Roy Arends | ||
Last updated | 2004-10-14 | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document clarifies DNS response message interpretation to avoid denial of service attacks using DNS responses. In a recent DNS software assessment it has come to light that some implementations respond to DNS response messages. A loop occurs if the receiver of this response responds with a response. It was never explicitly stated that response messages must not be answered. This draft makes the statement explicit.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)