Selecting Resolvers from a Set of Distributed DNS Resolvers
draft-arkko-abcd-distributed-resolver-selection-00

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Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                                M. Thomson
Expires: May 7, 2020                                             Mozilla
                                                               T. Hardie
                                                                  Google
                                                       November 04, 2019

      Selecting Resolvers from a Set of Distributed DNS Resolvers
           draft-arkko-abcd-distributed-resolver-selection-00

Abstract

   This memo discusses the use of a set of different DNS resolvers to
   reduce privacy problems related to resolvers learning the Internet
   usage patterns of their clients.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Arkko, et al.              Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       Distributed Resolver Selection        November 2019

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Operational Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Goals and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Query distribution strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Client-based  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.1.1.  Analysis of client-based selection  . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.1.2.  Enhancements to client-based selection  . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Name-based  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.2.1.  Name reduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Early conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Analysis conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  Poor distribution strategies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Effects of query distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.1.  Caching considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.2.  Consistency considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.3.  Resolver load distribution and failover . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.4.  Query performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.5.  Debugging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Further work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.3.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   The DNS [DNS] is a complex system with many different security
   issues, challenges, deployment models and usage patterns.  This
   document focuses on one narrow aspect within DNS and its security.

   Traditionally, systems are configured with a single DNS recursive
   resolver, or a set of primary and alternate recursive resolvers.
   Recursive resolver services are offered by organisations such as
   enterprises, ISPs, and global providers.  Even when clients use
   alternate recursive resolvers, they are typically all provided by the
   same organisation.

   The resolvers will learn the Internet usage patterns of their
   clients.  A client might decide to trust a particular recursive