Perfect-Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' PFS)
draft-arkko-eap-aka-pfs-04
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(candidate for emu WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Jari Arkko , Karl Norrman , Vesa Torvinen | ||
| Last updated | 2019-07-25 (Latest revision 2019-01-21) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Call For Adoption By WG Issued | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Many different attacks have been reported as part of revelations associated with pervasive surveillance. Some of the reported attacks involved compromising smart cards, such as attacking SIM card manufacturers and operators in an effort to compromise shared secrets stored on these cards. Since the publication of those reports, manufacturing and provisioning processes have gained much scrutiny and have improved. However, the danger of resourceful attackers for these systems is still a concern. This specification is an optional extension to the EAP-AKA' authentication method which was defined in RFC 5448 (to be superseded by draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis). The extension, when negotiated, provides Perfect Forward Secrecy for the session key generated as a part of the authentication run in EAP-AKA'. This prevents an attacker who has gained access to the long-term pre-shared secret in a SIM card from being able to decrypt all past communications. In addition, if the attacker stays merely a passive eavesdropper, the extension prevents attacks against future sessions. This forces attackers to use active attacks instead.
Authors
Jari Arkko
Karl Norrman
Vesa Torvinen
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)