IANA Rules for the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
The information below is for an old version of the document that is already published as an RFC.
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 5872.
|Authors||Jari Arkko , Alper E. Yegin|
|Last updated||2015-10-14 (Latest revision 2010-02-16)|
|RFC stream||Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)|
|IESG||IESG state||RFC 5872 (Proposed Standard)|
|Responsible AD||Ralph Droms|
|Send notices to||(None)|
Network Working Group J. Arkko Internet-Draft Ericsson Updates: 5191 (if approved) A. Yegin Intended status: Standards Track Samsung Expires: August 20, 2010 February 16, 2010 IANA Rules for PANA (Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access) draft-arkko-pana-iana-02 Abstract This document relaxes the IANA rules for the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA). Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 20, 2010. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents Arkko & Yegin Expires August 20, 2010 [Page 1] Internet-Draft PANA IANA Rules February 2010 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the BSD License. 1. Introduction This document relaxes the IANA rules for the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) [RFC5191]. Rules for the following protocol fields, all defined in [RFC5191], are affected: o Message Type o Message Flags o Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) Flags o Result-Code AVP Value o Termination-Cause AVP Value The rationale for this update is that there can be situations where it makes sense to grant an allocation under special circumstances. At the time of writing this, one such allocation is currently in the approval process at the IETF. By changing the current IANA rules to allow also for IESG Approval [RFC5226], it becomes possible for the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) to consider an allocation request, even if it does not fulfill the default rule. For instance, an experimental protocol extension could perhaps deserve an allocation from a field of reserved bits, as long as a sufficient number of bits still remains for other purposes, and the PANA community is happy with such an allocation. 2. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to updated the registries related to PANA Message Types, Message Flags, AVP Flags, Result-Code AVP Values, and Termination-Cause AVP Values as specified below. All other PANA IANA registries are to remain unchanged. 2.1. Message Type The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Message Type 0 is not used and is not assigned by IANA. The range of values 1 - 65,519 are for permanent, standard message types, Arkko & Yegin Expires August 20, 2010 [Page 2] Internet-Draft PANA IANA Rules February 2010 allocated by IETF Review or IESG approval [RFC5226]. Previously, the rule for this range was allocation by IETF Review only. [RFC5191] defined the range of values 1 - 4. The same Message Type is used for both the request and the answer messages, except for type 1. The Request bit distinguishes requests from answers. The range of values 65,520 - 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfff0 - 0xffff) are reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for interoperability between the communicating PANA Client (PaC) and PANA Authentication Agent (PAA) using experimental commands, as outlined in [RFC3692]. 2.2. Message Flags There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA message header. Section 6.2 of [RFC5191] assigned bit 0 ('R'), 1 ('S'), 2 ('C'), 3 ('A'), 4 ('P'), and 5 ('I'). Allocations from the remaining free bits in the PANA header Flag field are done via Standards Action or IESG Approval [RFC5226]. Previously, the rule for these bits was allocation by Standards Action only. 2.3. AVP Flags There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined in Section 6.3 of [RFC5191]. That RFC also assigned bit 0 ('V'). The remaining bits are assigned via a Standards Action or IESG Approval [RFC5226]. Previously, the rule for these bits was allocation by Standards Action only. 2.4. Result-Code AVP Values As defined in Section 8.7 of [RFC5191], the Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 7) defines the values 0-2. All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Review or IESG Approval [RFC5226]. Previously, the rule for these bits was allocation by IETF Review only. 2.5. Termination-Cause AVP Values As defined in Section 8.9 of [RFC5191], the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 9) defines the values 1, 4, and 8. All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Review or IESG Approval [RFC5226]. Previously, the rule for these bits was allocation by IETF Review only. Arkko & Yegin Expires August 20, 2010 [Page 3] Internet-Draft PANA IANA Rules February 2010 3. Security Considerations This specification does not change the security properties of PANA. However, a few words are necessary about the use of the experimental code points defined in Section 2.1. Potentially harmful side-effects from the use of the experimental values needs to be carefully evaluated before deploying any experiment across networks that the owner of the experiment does not entirely control. Guidance given in [RFC3692] about the use of experimental values needs to be followed. 4. References 4.1. Normative References [RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008. [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, May 2008. 4.2. Informative References [RFC3692] Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004. Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5191 This document changes the IANA rules for the Message Type, Message Flags, AVP Flags, Result-Code AVP Value, and Termination-Cause AVP Value. Appendix B. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Yoshihiro Ohba, Ralph Droms, Magnus Westerlund, and Alfred Hoenes for reviews and comments on this topic. Arkko & Yegin Expires August 20, 2010 [Page 4] Internet-Draft PANA IANA Rules February 2010 Authors' Addresses Jari Arkko Ericsson Jorvas 02420 Finland Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Alper Yegin Samsung Istanbul Turkey Email: email@example.com Arkko & Yegin Expires August 20, 2010 [Page 5]