TLS Downgrade protection extension for TLS DNSSEC Authentication Chain Extension
draft-asmithee-tls-dnssec-downprot-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Paul Wouters , Viktor Dukhovni | ||
| Last updated | 2018-11-16 (Latest revision 2018-05-15) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This draft specifies a TLS extension that adds downgrade protection for another TLS extension, [dnssec-chain-extension]. Without the downgrade protection specified in this TLS extension, the only effect of deploying [dnssec-chain-extension] is to reduce TLS security from the standard "WebPKI security" to "WebPKI or DANE, whichever is weaker". This draft dictates that [dnssec-chain-extension] MUST only be used in combination with this TLS extension, whose only content is a two octet SupportLifetime value. A value of 0 prohibits the TLS client from unilaterally requiring ongoing use of both TLS extensions based on prior observation of their use (pinning). A non-zero value is the value in hours for which this TLS extension as well as [dnssec-chain-extension] MUST appear in subsequent TLS handshakes to the same TLS hostname and port. If this TLS extention or [dnssec-chain-extension] is missing from the TLS handshake within this observed pinning time, the TLS client MUST assume it is under attack and abort the TLS connection.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)