@techreport{asmithee-tls-dnssec-downprot-00,
    number =    {draft-asmithee-tls-dnssec-downprot-00},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-asmithee-tls-dnssec-downprot/00/},
    author =    {Paul Wouters and Viktor Dukhovni},
    title =     {{TLS Downgrade protection extension for TLS DNSSEC Authentication Chain Extension}},
    pagetotal = 5,
    year =      2018,
    month =     may,
    day =       15,
    abstract =  {This draft specifies a TLS extension that adds downgrade protection for another TLS extension, {[}dnssec-chain-extension{]}. Without the downgrade protection specified in this TLS extension, the only effect of deploying {[}dnssec-chain-extension{]} is to reduce TLS security from the standard "WebPKI security" to "WebPKI or DANE, whichever is weaker". This draft dictates that {[}dnssec-chain-extension{]} MUST only be used in combination with this TLS extension, whose only content is a two octet SupportLifetime value. A value of 0 prohibits the TLS client from unilaterally requiring ongoing use of both TLS extensions based on prior observation of their use (pinning). A non-zero value is the value in hours for which this TLS extension as well as {[}dnssec-chain-extension{]} MUST appear in subsequent TLS handshakes to the same TLS hostname and port. If this TLS extention or {[}dnssec-chain-extension{]} is missing from the TLS handshake within this observed pinning time, the TLS client MUST assume it is under attack and abort the TLS connection.},
}