Unknown Key-Share Attacks on DNS-based Authentications of Named Entities (DANE)
draft-barnes-dane-uks-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Barnes , Martin Thomson , Eric Rescorla | ||
| Last updated | 2017-04-12 (Latest revision 2016-10-09) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Unknown key-share attacks are a class of attacks that allow an attacker to deceive one peer of a secure communication as to the identity of the remote peer. When used with traditional, PKI-based authentication, TLS-based applications are generally safe from unknown key-share attacks. DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE), however, proposes that applications perform a different set of checks as part of authenticating a TLS connection. As a result, DANE as currently specified is likely to lead to unknown key-share attacks when clients support DANE for authentication. We describe these risks and some simple mitigations.
Authors
Richard Barnes
Martin Thomson
Eric Rescorla
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)