BGP Security Tracking
draft-beck-bgp-security-tracking-00

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SIDR Working Group                                             J. Beck
Internet-Drafts                                                A. Gray
Intended status: Standards Track                               Charter
Expires: Oct 1, 2019                                          Mar 2019

                    BGP Security Tracking
                  draft-beck-bgp-security-tracking-00

Abstract

   This document describes the BGP Path Security Tracking attribute, an
   extension to BGP-4. This attribute provides a transitive means for
   networks to indicate BGP security checks in place to upstream 
   networks. Upstream networks can optionally use that information to 
   modify the path selection algorithm giving preference to paths 
   reporting better security where the prefix length is the same and 
   as-path length is similar. Effectively reporting no security would 
   be treated the same as prepending the announcement once and reporting 
   strong security would be treated the same as not prepending. The net 
   result of using the information to influence path selection is that 
   more secured paths would be preferred over less secured paths. 

  

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on Oct 1, 2019.

Beck, et al.              Expires Oct 1, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            BGP Security Tracking               Nov 2018

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................2
   2. Requirements Language ...........................................3
   3. BGP Security Tracking Attribute .................................3
   4. Canonical Representation.........................................4
   5. Cost Value of Security Methods Used..............................4
   6. Modifying Path Selection Algorithm...............................5
   7. Error Handling...................................................5
   8. Security Considerations .........................................5
   9. IANA Considerations .............................................6
   10. References .....................................................6
      10.1. Normative References ......................................6
      10.2. Informative References ....................................6
   Acknowledgments ....................................................7
   Contributors .......................................................7
   Authors' Addresses .................................................8

1.  Introduction

   Securing BGP from unauthorized prefix leaks is important. There are
   multiple measures available to validate inbound route announcements 
   but most are only locally significant within an autonomous system 
   (AS).The BGP Security tracking attribute allows a BGP speaking router
   to optionally mark the validation steps that were performed on a 
   prefix with an attribute after accepting the prefix as valid for the 
   purpose of transparency and allowing that information to influence 
   the BGP path selection process. A router that learns of a prefix 
   equal in length from multiple sources may optionally choose a path 
   with better advertised security practices over a less secured one. 

   The intent is to encourage better security practices and partially 
   limit the radius and impact of unauthorized route announcements. 
   Functionally the path selection is modified by assigning a cost 
   based security practices implemented. A network with no ingress 
   security would have a cost of 1 and a network with good ingress 
   security would have a cost of 0. The BGP path selection algorithm 
   would then be modified to evaluate the sum of ASN's in AS_PATH 
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