BGP Security Tracking
draft-beck-bgp-security-tracking-00
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Jody Beck , Andrew Gray | ||
Last updated | 2019-09-02 (Latest revision 2019-03-01) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes the BGP Path Security Tracking attribute, an extension to BGP-4. This attribute provides a transitive means for networks to indicate BGP security checks in place to upstream networks. Upstream networks can optionally use that information to modify the path selection algorithm giving preference to paths reporting better security where the prefix length is the same and as-path length is similar. Effectively reporting no security would be treated the same as prepending the announcement once and reporting strong security would be treated the same as not prepending. The net result of using the information to influence path selection is that more secured paths would be preferred over less secured paths.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)