Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite 2.0 Profile for Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
draft-becker-cnsa2-smime-profile-06
This document is an Internet-Draft (I-D).
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This I-D is not endorsed by the IETF and has no formal standing in the
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Alison Becker , Michael J. Jenkins | ||
| Last updated | 2026-11-06 (Latest revision 2026-10-30) | ||
| RFC stream | Independent Submission | ||
| Intended RFC status | Informational | ||
| Formats | |||
| IETF conflict review | conflict-review-becker-cnsa2-smime-profile | ||
| Stream | ISE state | Sent to the RFC Editor | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2026-08-18 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
| IANA action state | No IANA Actions | ||
| RFC Editor | RFC Editor status | Awaiting Reference Checker, formatting | |
| Details |
draft-becker-cnsa2-smime-profile-06
Network Working Group A. Becker
Internet-Draft
Obsoletes: 8755 (if approved) M. Jenkins
Intended status: Informational NSA-CCSS
Expires: 3 May 2027 30 October 2026
Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite 2.0 Profile for
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
draft-becker-cnsa2-smime-profile-06
Abstract
This document defines a base profile of S/MIME for use with the US
Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) 2.0 Suite, a
cybersecurity advisory published by the United States Government
which outlines quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm policy for
US national security applications.
This profile applies to the capabilities, configuration, and
operation of all components of US National Security Systems that
employ S/MIME. It is also appropriate for all other US Government
systems that process high-value information.
This memo is not an IETF standard, and has not been shown to have
IETF community consensus. This profile is made publicly available
for use by developers and operators of these and any other system
deployments.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 May 2027.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite . . . . . . 3
4. Requirements and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Message Digest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Digital Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.1. KEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.2. KDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.3. AES Key Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
This document specifies a profile of S/MIME [RFC8551] to comply with
the National Security Agency's (NSA) Commercial National Security
Algorithm (CNSA) 2.0 Suite [cnsafaq]. This profile applies to the
capabilities, configuration, and operation of all components of US
National Security Systems (NSS) [SP80059] that employ S/MIME. This
profile is also appropriate for all other US Government systems that
process high-value information, and is made publicly available for
use by developers and operators of these and any other system
deployments.
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This document does not define any cryptographic algorithm, and does
not specify how to use any cryptographic algorithm not currently
supported by S/MIME; instead, it profiles CNSA 2.0-compliant
conventions for S/MIME, and uses algorithms already specified for use
in S/MIME that are also allowed by the CNSA Suite 2.0. This document
applies to all CNSA Suite solutions that make use of S/MIME.
The reader is assumed to have familiarity with [RFC8551].
This memo is not an IETF standard, and does not represent IETF
community consensus.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. Normative language does not apply beyond
the scope of this profile.
This is a profile of S/MIME [RFC8551]. Therefore, the requirements
language in this memo may be different than that found in the
underlying standards.
All references to "CNSA" in this document refer to CNSA 2.0
[cnsafaq], unless otherwise stated.
3. The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite
The CNSA Suite is the set of approved commercial algorithms that can
be used by vendors and IT users to meet cybersecurity and
interoperability requirements for NSS. The initial suite of CNSA
Suite algorithms, Suite B, established a baseline for use of
commercial algorithms to protect classified information. The
following suite, CNSA 1.0, served as a bridge between the original
set and a fully quantum-resistant cryptographic capability. The
current suite, CNSA 2.0, seeks to provide fully quantum-resistant
protection [cnsafaq].
This profile uses CNSA 2.0 compliant algorithms: ML-DSA-87 [FIPS204]
for signing, and ML-KEM-1024 [FIPS203] for key establishment. ML-
DSA-87 and ML-KEM-1024 together with SHA-384, SHA-512, AES-256, LMS,
and XMSS comprise the CNSA Suite 2.0.
The CNSA Suite was selected by NSA for protection of US national
security information based on factors including security,
performance, data value and retention requirements, advanced threat
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actors, and certification process. This suite will not be
appropriate for all use cases; data owners are encouraged to perform
their own risk assessments and consult with their data protection
systems providers.
This memo provides updated guidance for using the CNSA 2.0 Suite in
certain IETF protocols. These RFCs can be used in conjunction with
other RFCs and cryptographic guidance (e.g., NIST Special
Publications) to properly protect Internet traffic and data-at-rest
for US Government NSS.
4. Requirements and Assumptions
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) values are generated using ASN.1
[X680] and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X690].
For key agreement, CNSA compliant implementations MUST use ML-KEM-
1024. Details provided in Section 7.
For digital signature, CNSA compliant implementations MUST use ML-
DSA-87.
For CNSA Suite applications, public key certificates used to verify
S/MIME signatures MUST be compliant with the CNSA Suite Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) profile specified in
[I-D.jenkins-cnsa2-pkix-profile].
Within the CMS signed-data content type, signature algorithm
identifiers are located in the signatureAlgorithm field of SignerInfo
structures contained within the SignedData. In addition, signature
algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field of countersignature attributes. Specific
requirements for digital signatures are given in Section 6; compliant
implementations MUST consider signatures not meeting these
requirements as invalid.
To prevent potential existential forgery attacks against the
SignedData content, signedAttrs MUST be present for each SignerInfo.
This document assumes that the required trust anchors have been
securely provisioned to the client.
All implementations MUST use SHA-384 or SHA-512 for hashing, AES-GCM
for content encryption, and AES-KWP for key encryption. The
requirements for these are given in the following sections.
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5. Message Digest
CNSA-compliant implementations MUST use either SHA-384 or SHA-512 for
message digest.
[RFC5754] specifies the conventions for using SHA-384 or SHA-512 with
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). CNSA-compliant S/MIME
implementations MUST follow the conventions in [RFC5754].
Within the CMS signed-data content type, message digest algorithm
identifiers are located in the SignedData digestAlgorithms field and
the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field.
The SHA-384 message digest algorithm is defined in FIPS 180 [SHS],
and the algorithm identifier for SHA-384 is defined in [RFC5754] as
follows:
id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 }
The SHA-512 message digest algorithm is defined in FIPS 180 [SHS],
and the algorithm identifier for SHA-512 is defined in [RFC5754] as
follows:
id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 }
[RFC5754] defines the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field as
OPTIONAL. Implementations MUST accept SHA-384 and SHA-512
AlgorithmIdentifiers with absent parameters, or with NULL parameters.
As specified in [RFC5754], implementations MUST generate SHA-384 or
SHA-512 AlgorithmIdentifiers with absent parameters.
6. Digital Signature
When an S/MIME message includes signed attributes (signedAttrs) in
the header, the input to the signing algorithm is signedAttrs, which
MUST include the messageDigest representation of the encapsulated
message, as described above.
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CNSA-compliant implementations MUST use ML-DSA-87 as the digital
signature algorithm in S/MIME, using the identifier defined in
[RFC9881]. The ML-DSA algorithm incorporates an internal hashing
function, so there is no need to apply a hashing algorithm before
signing. Where an application or implementation makes it more
efficient to perform hashing externally, the external-μ mechanism
described in Step 6 of Algorithm 7 of [FIPS204] and Section 8 of
[RFC9881] MAY be used. HashML-DSA is not permitted.
7. Key Establishment
7.1. KEM
CNSA-compliant implementations MUST use ML-KEM-1024 for key
agreement.
A CMS originator MUST implement the Encapsulate algorithm from ML-
KEM, and a CMS responder MUST implement the Decapsulate algorithm
from ML-KEM.
CNSA-compliant implementations MUST NOT support the user keying
material (ukm) field defined in [RFC9629], and therefore ukm MUST NOT
be included as input to the key-derivation function.
7.2. KDF
A CNSA compliant implementation MUST use HKDF as described in
[RFC9936] with SHA-384 or SHA-512 for KDF computation.
7.3. AES Key Wrap
Within the CMS enveloped-data content type, key wrap algorithm
identifiers are located in the KeyWrapAlgorithm parameters within the
EnvelopedData RecipientInfos KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.
For CNSA-compliant implementations, the KeyWrapAlgorithm MUST be
id-aes256-wrap-pad
The required algorithm identifier, specified in [RFC5649] is:
id-aes256-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistalgorithm(4) aes(1) 48 }
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8. Content Encryption
CNSA-compliant S/MIME implementations using the authenticated-
enveloped-data content type [RFC5083] MUST use AES [AES] in Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) [GCM] as the content authenticated encryption
algorithm and MUST follow the conventions for using AES-GCM with the
CMS defined in [RFC5084].
Within the CMS authenticated-enveloped-data content type, content
authenticated-encryption algorithm identifiers are located in the
AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm
field. The content-encryption algorithm is used to encipher the
content located in the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo
encryptedContent field.
The AES-GCM content authenticated-encryption algorithm is described
in [AES] and [GCM]. The algorithm identifier for AES-256 in GCM mode
is:
id-aes256-GCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistalgorithm(4) aes(1) 46 }
The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the
parameters field must contain GCMParameters:
GCMParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
aes-nonce OCTET STRING,
aes-ICVlen AES-GCM-ICVlen DEFAULT 12 }
The authentication tag length (aes-ICVlen) SHALL be 16 (indicating a
tag length of 128 bits).
The initialization vector (aes-nonce) MUST be 12 bytes in length and
MUST be generated in accordance with Section 8.2 of [GCM]. AES-GCM
loses security catastrophically if a nonce is reused with a given key
on more than one distinct set of input data. Therefore, a fresh
content encryption key MUST be generated for each message.
9. Security Considerations
Most of the security considerations for this document are described
in [RFC8551] and [RFC9629]. Additional security considerations for
the use of ML-KEM and ML-DSA in S/MIME can be found in [RFC9936] and
[RFC9882], respectively.
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Public-key certificates MUST be properly validated according to
[RFC5280], including timely revocation checking against Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRL) or by On-line Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) [RFC6960].
10. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
11. Acknowledgements
Alison Becker was the primary editor and contributed significantly to
this document while she was employed at the National Security
Agency's Center for Cybersecurity Standards.
We appreciate all who reviewed and provided feedback on this profile,
especially the extensive comments provided by Andrew Benhase, Santosh
Chokhani, Scott Fluhrer, Jonathan Hammell, John Mattsson, Mike
Ounsworth, and Francois Rousseau.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES)",
FIPS 197, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.197, November 2001,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/
NIST.FIPS.197.pdf>.
[cnsafaq] National Security Agency, "The Commercial National
Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 and Quantum Computing FAQ",
December 2024, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/
Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/0/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF>.
[FIPS203] National Institute of Standards and Technology (2024),
"Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism
Standard", (Department of Commerce, Washington,
D.C.), Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication (FIPS), NIST FIPS 203,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203>.
[FIPS204] National Institute of Standards and Technology (2024),
"Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard",
(Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS), NIST
FIPS 204, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204>.
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[GCM] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST
Special Publication 800-38D, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38D,
November 2007,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf>.
[I-D.jenkins-cnsa2-pkix-profile]
Jenkins, M. J., "Commercial National Security Algorithm
(CNSA) Suite 2.0 Profile for Certificates and Certificate
Revocation Lists", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-jenkins-cnsa2-pkix-profile-05, 5 July 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jenkins-
cnsa2-pkix-profile-05>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5083] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5083, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5083>.
[RFC5084] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated
Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 5084, DOI 10.17487/RFC5084, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5084>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5649] Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5649, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5649>.
[RFC5754] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", RFC 5754, DOI 10.17487/RFC5754, January
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5754>.
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[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8551] Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0
Message Specification", RFC 8551, DOI 10.17487/RFC8551,
April 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551>.
[RFC9629] Housley, R., Gray, J., and T. Okubo, "Using Key
Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) Algorithms in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 9629,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9629, August 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9629>.
[RFC9881] Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B. E.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure --
Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital
Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)", RFC 9881,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9881, October 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9881>.
[RFC9882] Salter, B., Raine, A., and D. Van Geest, "Use of the ML-
DSA Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 9882, DOI 10.17487/RFC9882, October
2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9882>.
[RFC9935] Turner, S., Kampanakis, P., Massimo, J., and B. E.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -
Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Key-
Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)", RFC 9935,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9935, March 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9935>.
[RFC9936] Prat, J., Ounsworth, M., and D. Van Geest, "Use of ML-KEM
in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 9936,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9936, March 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9936>.
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[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4,
FIPS PUB 180-4, August 2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.
12.2. Informative References
[SP80059] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Guideline
for Identifying an Information System as a National
Security System", Special Publication 59, DOI
10.6028/NIST.SP.800-59, August 2003,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-59/
final>.
[X680] ITU-T, "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)", ITU-T
Recommendation X.680 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680-X.693-202102-I/en>.
[X690] ITU-T, "ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690 2021, <https://www.https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-
X.690-202102-I/en>.
Authors' Addresses
Alison Becker
Email: alison.elaine90@gmail.com
Michael Jenkins
NSA Center for Cybersecurity Standards
Email: mjjenki@cyber.nsa.gov
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