Problem Statement and Requirements for a TCP Authentication Option
draft-bellovin-tcpsec-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual in tsv area)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Steven M. Bellovin | ||
| Last updated | 2015-10-14 (Latest revision 2007-07-12) | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | WG state | (None) | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired (IESG: Dead) | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Lars Eggert | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The TCP-MD5 option is commonly used to secure BGP sessions between routers, although it is known to have many serious deficiencies. This memo presents requirements for a TCP segment authentication mechanism that is intended to replace TCP-MD5. While TCP-MD5 was designed to protect TCP sessions whose payload is BGP, the applicability of the mechanism described herein is broader. This mechanism can be applied to any TCP connection, regardless of payload.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)