Recommendations for DNS Privacy Client Applications
draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients-00

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Network Working Group                                         V. Bertola
Internet-Draft                                              Open-Xchange
Intended status: Informational                            March 10, 2019
Expires: September 11, 2019

          Recommendations for DNS Privacy Client Applications
                    draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients-00

Abstract

   This document presents operational, policy and security
   considerations for the authors and publishers of client applications
   that choose to implement DNS resolution through any of the protocols
   that provide private, encrypted connections between the application
   itself and the DNS resolver.  As these protocols, depending on
   implementation choices and deployment models, may impact the Internet
   significantly at the architectural, legal and policy levels, the
   document records the current consensus on how these protocols should
   be used by applications, especially user-facing applications meant
   for mass usage by non-technical consumers.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

Bertola                Expires September 11, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     DNS Privacy Client Recommendations         March 2019

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Architectures for Name Resolution Services  . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Issues and Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Trust Model and User Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Namespace Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.4.  Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.5.  Content Access Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.6.  Security and Network Management . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.7.  Jurisdiction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.8.  Disaster Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.9.  User Support  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   6.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  Human Rights Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   As a reaction to growing concerns about widespread "pervasive
   monitoring" activities, the IETF declared these practices to be an
   attack [RFC7258] and started work to promote the encryption of the
   transport of information across the Internet.

   The Domain Name System [RFC1034] is a fundamental element of the
   Internet, as almost any online activity starts with one or more DNS
   queries, which can be used to track the services and the content that
   the user is accessing, and even to redirect or disallow such access;
   DNS traffic deriving from the activity of human beings constitutes
   sensitive and valuable personal information.  Section 2.4.1 of
   [I-D.bortzmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis] describes the risks created by
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