Attestation Event Stream Subscription
draft-birkholz-rats-network-device-subscription-00
RATS Working Group H. Birkholz
Internet-Draft Fraunhofer SIT
Intended status: Standards Track E. Voit
Expires: December 26, 2020 Cisco
W. Pan
Huawei
June 24, 2020
Attestation Event Stream Subscription
draft-birkholz-rats-network-device-subscription-00
Abstract
This document defines how to subscribe to a stream of attestation
related Evidence on TPM-based network devices.
Status of This Memo
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Birkholz, et al. Expires December 26, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RATS Subscription June 2020
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Operational Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Sequence Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Continuously Verifying Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. TPM 1.2 Quote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. TPM 2 Quote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Remote Attestation Event Stream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Subscription to the <attestation> Event Stream . . . . . 7
4.2. Replaying a history of previous TPM extend operations . . 7
4.2.1. TPM2 Heartbeat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. YANG notifications placed on the <attestation> Event
Stream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.1. tpm-extend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.2. tpm12-attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.3. tpm20-attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. Filtering Evidence at the Attester . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.5. Replaying previous PCR Extend events . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.6. Configuring the <attestation> Event Stream . . . . . . . 12
5. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.1. Open Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction
[RATS-Device] and [RATS-YANG] define the operational prerequisites
and a YANG Model for the acquisition of Evidence from a TPM-based
network device. However, there is a limitation inherent in the
challenge-response interaction models upon which these documents are
based. This limitation is that it is up to the Verifier to request
Evidence. The result is that the interval between the occurrence of
a security event, and the event's visibility within the Relying Party
can be unacceptably long.
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