Security Mechanisms and Key Refresh for P2PSIP Overlays
draft-birkos-p2psip-security-key-refresh-00
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
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|
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Authors | Konstantinos Birkos , Christos Papageorgiou , Panagiotis Galiotos , Tasos Dagiuklas , Christos Tselios , Stavros Kotsopoulos | ||
Last updated | 2010-03-01 | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document proposes security extensions that are applicable to P2PSIP overlays that follow the base protocol described in the WG leading drafts. The proposed extensions exploit symmetric/asymmetric cryptography and a key refresh mechanism to protect the signaling exchanged between the participating peers in order to enhance the robustness of the system against several types of attacks that are common to peer-to-peer networks. The refresh mechanism is either supervised by higher-level trusted peers or exclusively controlled by the members of the overlay.
Authors
Konstantinos Birkos
Christos Papageorgiou
Panagiotis Galiotos
Tasos Dagiuklas
Christos Tselios
Stavros Kotsopoulos
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)