Cryptographic protection of TCP Streams (tcpcrypt)
draft-bittau-tcp-crypt-03
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
Expired & archived
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| Authors | Andrea Bittau, Dan Boneh , Mike Hamburg , Mark J. Handley , David Mazieres , Quinn Slack | ||
| Last updated | 2013-03-11 (Latest revision 2012-09-03) | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | WG state | (None) | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired (IESG: Dead) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Wesley Eddy | ||
| Send notices to | draft-bittau-tcp-crypt@tools.ietf.org, bittau@cs.stanford.edu, dabo@cs.stanford.edu, mike@shiftleft.org, m.handley@cs.ucl.ac.uk, dm@uun.org, sqs@cs.stanford.edu, draft-bittau-tcp-crypt@tools.ietf.org |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document presents tcpcrypt, a TCP extension for cryptographically protecting TCP segments. Tcpcrypt maintains the confidentiality of data transmitted in TCP segments against a passive eavesdropper. It can be used to protect already established TCP connections against denial-of-service attacks involving injection of forged RST segments or desynchronizing of sequence numbers. Finally, applications that perform authentication can obtain end-to-end confidentiality and integrity guarantees by tying authentication to tcpcrypt Session ID values. The extension defines two new TCP options, CRYPT and MAC, which are designed to provide compatible interworking with TCPs that do not implement tcpcrypt. The CRYPT option allows hosts to negotiate the use of tcpcrypt and establish shared secret encryption keys. The MAC option carries a message authentication code with which hosts can verify the integrity of transmitted TCP segments. Tcpcrypt is designed to require relatively low overhead, particularly at servers, so as to be useful even in the case of servers accepting many TCP connections per second.
Authors
Andrea Bittau
Dan Boneh
Mike Hamburg
Mark J. Handley
David Mazieres
Quinn Slack
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)