Use of the IPv6 Flow Label as a Transport-Layer Nonce to Defend Against Off-Path Spoofing Attacks
draft-blake-ipv6-flow-label-nonce-02

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2009-10-26
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-blake-ipv6-flow-label-nonce-02.txt

Abstract

TCP and other transport-layer protocols are vulnerable to spoofing attacks from off-path hosts. These attacks can be prevented through the use of cryptographic authentication. However, it is difficult to use cryptographic authentication in all circumstances. A variety of obfuscation techniques -- such as initial sequence number randomization and source port randomization -- increase the effort required of an attacker to successfully guess the packet header fields which uniquely identify a transport connection. This memo proposes the use of the IPv6 Flow Label field as a random, per- connection nonce value, to add entropy to the set of packet header fields used to identify a transport connection. This mechanism is easily implementable, allows for incremental deployment, and is fully compliant with the rules for Flow Label use defined in RFC 3697.

Authors

Steven Blake (sblake@extremenetworks.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)