DNS privacy problem statement
draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy-01

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2013-12-17
Replaced by rfc7626, draft-ietf-dprive-problem-statement
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Network Working Group                                      S. Bortzmeyer
Internet-Draft                                                     AFNIC
Intended status: Informational                         December 17, 2013
Expires: June 20, 2014

                     DNS privacy problem statement
                 draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy-01

Abstract

   This document describes the privacy issues associated with the use of
   the DNS by Internet users.  It is intended to be mostly a problem
   statement and it does not prescribe solutions.

   Discussions of the document should take place on the dnsop mailing
   list [dnsop].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 20, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Data in the DNS request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  On the wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  In the servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.3.1.  In the resolvers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.3.2.  In the authoritative name servers . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.3.3.  Rogue servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Actual "attacks"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Legalities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   The Domain Name System is specified in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035].  It
   is one of the most important infrastructure components of the
   Internet and one of the most often ignored or misunderstood.  Almost
   every activity on the Internet starts with a DNS query (and often
   several).  Its use has many privacy implications and we try to give
   here a comprehensive and accurate list.

   Let us start with a small reminder of the way the DNS works (with
   some simplifications).  A client, the stub resolver, issues a DNS
   query to a server, the resolver (also called caching resolver or full
   resolver or recursive name server).  For instance, the query is "What
   are the AAAA records for www.example.com?".  AAAA is the qtype (Query
   Type) and www.example.com the qname (Query Name).  To get the answer,
   the resolver will query first the root nameservers, which will, most
   of the times, send a referral.  Here, the referral will be to .com
   nameservers.  In turn, they will send a referral to the example.com
   nameservers, which will provide the answer.  The root name servers,

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   the name servers of .com and those of example.com are called
   authoritative name servers.  It is important, when analyzing the
   privacy issues, to remember that the question asked to all these name
   servers is always the original question, not a derived question.
   Unlike what many "DNS for dummies" articles say, the question sent to
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