Host Identification: Use Cases
draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios-02

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INTAREA Working Group                                       M. Boucadair
Internet-Draft                                                  D. Binet
Intended status: Informational                                  S. Durel
Expires: June 6, 2013                                     France Telecom
                                                                T. Reddy
                                                                   Cisco
                                                             B. Williams
                                                            Akamai, Inc.
                                                        December 3, 2012

                     Host Identification: Use Cases
          draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios-02

Abstract

   This document describes a set of scenarios in which host
   identification is required.

Status of this Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 6, 2013.

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Use Case 1: CGN  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Use Case 2: A+P  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  Use Case 3: Application Proxies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   6.  Use Case 4: Open Wi-Fi or Provider Wi-Fi . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   7.  Use Case 5: Policy and Charging Control Architecture . . . . .  7
   8.  Use Case 6: Cellular Networks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   9.  Use Case 7: Femtocells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   10. Use Case 8: Overlay Network  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   11. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   12. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   13. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   14. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

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1.  Introduction

   The ultimate goal of this document is to enumerate scenarios which
   encounter the issue of uniquely identifying a host among those
   sharing the same IP address.  Examples of encountered issues are:
   o  Blacklist a misbehaving host without impacting all hosts sharing
      the same IP address.
   o  Enforce a per-subscriber/per-UE policy (e.g., limit access to the
      service based on some counters such as volume-based service
      offering); enforcing the policy will have impact on all hosts
      sharing the same IP address.
   o  If invoking a service has failed (e.g., wrong login/passwd), all
      hosts sharing the same IP address may not be able to access that
      service.
   o  Need to correlate between the internal address:port and external
      address:port to generate and therefore to enforce policies.

   It is out of scope of this document to list all the encountered
   issues as this is already covered in [RFC6269].

   The generic concept of host identifier, denoted as HOST_ID, is
   defined in [I-D.ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis].

   The analysis of the use cases listed in this document indicates two
   root causes for the host identification issue:
   1.  Presence of address sharing (NAT, A+P, application proxies,
       etc.).
   2.  Use of tunnels between two administrative domains.
   3.  Combination of NAT and presence of tunnels in the path.

   The following use cases are identified so far:
   (1)  Section 3: Carrier Grade NAT (CGN)
   (2)  Section 4: A+P (e.g., MAP )
   (3)  Section 5: Application Proxies
   (4)  Section 6: Provider Wi-Fi
   (5)  Section 7: Policy and Charging Architectures
   (6)  Section 8: Cellular Networks
   (7)  Section 9: Femtocells
   (8)  Section 10: Overlay Networks (e.g., CDNs)

2.  Scope

   It is out of scope of this document to argue in favor or against the
   use cases listed in the following sub-sections.  The goal is to
   identify scenarios the authors are aware of and which share the same
   issue of host identification.

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   This document does not include any solution-specific discussion.
   This document can be used as a tool to design solution(s) mitigating
   the encountered issues.  Having a generic solution which would solve
   the issues encountered in these use cases is preferred over designing
   a solution for each use case.  Describing the use case allows to
   identify what is common between the use cases and then would help
   during the solution design phase.

   The first version of the document does not elaborate whether explicit
   authentication is enabled or not.

3.  Use Case 1: CGN

   Several flavors of stateful CGN have been defined.  A non-exhaustive
   list is provided below:

   1.  NAT44

   2.  DS-Lite NAT44 [RFC6333]

   3.  NAT64 [RFC6146]

   4.  NPTv6 [RFC6296]

   As discussed in [I-D.ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis], remote
   servers are not able to distinguish between hosts sharing the same IP
   address (Figure 1).
    +-----------+
    |  HOST_1   |----+
    +-----------+    |        +--------------------+      +------------+
                     |        |                    |------|  server 1  |
    +-----------+  +-----+    |                    |      +------------+
    |  HOST_2   |--| CGN |----|      INTERNET      |            ::
    +-----------+  +-----+    |                    |      +------------+
                      |       |                    |------|  server n  |
    +-----------+     |       +--------------------+      +------------+
    |  HOST_3   |-----+
    +-----------+

                    Figure 1: CGN: Architecture Example

4.  Use Case 2: A+P

   A+P [RFC6346] denotes a flavor of address sharing solutions which
   does not require any additional NAT function be enabled in the

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   service provider's network.  A+P assumes subscribers are assigned
   with the same IPv4 address together with a port set.  Subscribers
   assigned with the same IPv4 address should be assigned non
   overlapping port sets.  Devices connected to an A+P-enabled network
   should be able to restrict the IPv4 source port to be within a
   configure range of ports.  To forward incoming packets to the
   appropriate host, a dedicated entity called PRR (Port Range Router,
   [RFC6346]) is needed (Figure 2).

   Similar to the CGN case, the same issue to identify hosts sharing the
   same IP address is encountered by remote servers.

    +-----------+
    |  HOST_1   |----+
    +-----------+    |        +--------------------+      +------------+
                     |        |                    |------|  server 1  |
    +-----------+  +-----+    |                    |      +------------+
    |  HOST_2   |--| PRR |----|      INTERNET      |            ::
    +-----------+  +-----+    |                    |      +------------+
                      |       |                    |------|  server n  |
    +-----------+     |       +--------------------+      +------------+
    |  HOST_3   |-----+
    +-----------+

                    Figure 2: A+P: Architecture Example

5.  Use Case 3: Application Proxies

   This scenario is similar to the CGN scenario.  Remote servers are not
   able to distinguish hosts located behind the PROXY.  Applying
   policies on the perceived external IP address as received from the
   PROXY will impact all hosts connected to that PROXY.

   Figure 3 illustrates a simple configuration involving a proxy.  Note
   several (per-application) proxies may be deployed.

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    +-----------+
    |  HOST_1   |----+
    +-----------+    |        +--------------------+      +------------+
                     |        |                    |------|  server 1  |
    +-----------+  +-----+    |                    |      +------------+
    |  HOST_2   |--|PROXY|----|      INTERNET      |            ::
    +-----------+  +-----+    |                    |      +------------+
                      |       |                    |------|  server n  |
    +-----------+     |       +--------------------+      +------------+
    |  HOST_3   |-----+
    +-----------+

                         Figure 3: Proxy: Overview

6.  Use Case 4: Open Wi-Fi or Provider Wi-Fi

   In the context of Provider Wi-Fi, a dedicated SSID can be configured
   and advertised by the RG (Residential Gateway) for visiting
   terminals.  These visiting terminals can be mobile terminals, PCs,
   etc.

   Several deployment scenarios are envisaged:

   1.  Deploy a dedicated node in the service provider's network which
       will be responsible to intercept all the traffic issued from
       visiting terminals (see Figure 4).  This node may be co-located
       with a CGN function if private IPv4 addresses are assigned to
       visiting terminals.  Similar to the CGN case discussed in
       Section 3, remote servers may not be able to distinguish visiting
       hosts sharing the same IP address (see [RFC6269]).

   2.  Unlike the previous deployment scenario, IPv4 addresses are
       managed by the RG without requiring any additional NAT to be
       deployed in the service provider's network for handling traffic
       issued from visiting terminals.  Concretely, a visiting terminal
       is assigned with a private IPv4 address from the pool managed by
       the RG.  Packets issued form a visiting terminal are translated
       using the public IP address assigned to the RG (see Figure 5).
       This deployment scenario induces the following identification
       concerns:

       *  The provider is not able to distinguish the traffic belonging
          to the visiting terminal from the traffic of the subscriber
          owning the RG.  This is needed to apply some policies such as:
          accounting, DSCP remarking, black list, etc.

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       *  Similar to the CGN case Section 3, a misbehaving visiting
          terminal is likely to have some impact on the experienced
          service by the customer owning the RG (e.g., some of the
          issues are discussed in [RFC6269]).

                +-------------+
                |Local_HOST_1 |----+
                +-------------+    |
                                   |     |
                +-------------+  +-----+ |  +-----------+
                |Local_HOST_2 |--| RG  |-|--|Border Node|
                +-------------+  +-----+ |  +----NAT----+
                                    |    |
                +-------------+     |    |  Service Provider
                |Visiting Host|-----+
                +-------------+

            Figure 4: NAT enforced in a Service Provider's Node

                +-------------+
                |Local_HOST_1 |----+
                +-------------+    |
                                   |     |
                +-------------+  +-----+ |  +-----------+
                |Local_HOST_2 |--| RG  |-|--|Border Node|
                +-------------+  +-NAT-+ |  +-----------+
                                    |    |
                +-------------+     |    |  Service Provider
                |Visiting Host|-----+
                +-------------+

                      Figure 5: NAT located in the RG

7.  Use Case 5: Policy and Charging Control Architecture

   This issue is related to the framework defined in [TS.23203] when a
   NAT is located between the PCEF (Policy and Charging Enforcement
   Function) and the AF (Application Function) as shown in Figure 6.

   The main issue is: PCEF, PCRF and AF all receive information bound to
   the same UE but without being able to correlate between the piece of
   data visible for each entity.  Concretely,

   o  PCEF is aware of the IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber
      Identity) and an internal IP address assigned to the UE.

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   o  AF receives an external IP address and port as assigned by the NAT
      function.

   o  PCRF is not able to correlate between the external IP address/port
      assigned by the NAT and the internal IP address and IMSI of the
      UE.

                             +------+
                             | PCRF |-----------------+
                             +------+                 |
                                |                     |
                 +----+      +------+   +-----+    +-----+
                 | UE |------| PCEF |---| NAT |----|  AF |
                 +----+      +------+   +-----+    +-----+

                                 Figure 6

   This scenario can be generalized as follows (Figure 7):

   o  Policy Enforcement Point (PEP, [RFC2753])

   o  Policy Decision Point (PDP, [RFC2753])

                             +------+
                             | PDP  |-----------------+
                             +------+                 |
                                |                     |
                 +----+      +------+   +-----+    +------+
                 |Host|------| PEP  |---| NAT |----|Server|
                 +----+      +------+   +-----+    +------+

                                 Figure 7

   A similar issue is encounterd when the NAT is located before the PEP
   function (see Figure 8):

                                        +------+
                                        | PDP  |------+
                                        +------+      |
                                           |          |
                 +----+      +------+   +-----+    +------+
                 |Host|------| NAT  |---| PEP |----|Server|
                 +----+      +------+   +-----+    +------+

                                 Figure 8

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8.  Use Case 6: Cellular Networks

   Cellular operators allocate private IPv4 addresses to mobile
   customers and deploy NAT44 function, generally co-located with
   firewalls, to access to public IP services.  The NAT function is
   located at the boundaries of the PLMN.  IPv6-only strategy,
   consisting in allocating IPv6 prefixes only to customers, is
   considered by various operators.  A NAT64 function is also considered
   in order to preserve IPv4 service continuity for these customers.

   These NAT44 and NAT64 functions bring some issues very similar to
   those mentioned in Figure 1 and Section 7.  This issue is
   particularly encountered if policies are to be applied on the Gi
   interface: a private IP address may be assigned to several UEs, no
   correlation between the internal IP address and the address:port
   assigned by the NAT function, etc.

9.  Use Case 7: Femtocells

   This issue is discussed in [I-D.so-ipsecme-ikev2-cpext].  This use
   case can be seen as a combination of the use cases described in
   Section 6 and Section 7.

   The reference architecture, originally provided in
   [I-D.so-ipsecme-ikev2-cpext], is shown in Figure 8.

    +---------------------------+
    | +----+ +--------+  +----+ |   +-----------+  +-------------------+
    | | UE | | Stand- |<=|====|=|===|===========|==|=>+--+ +--+        |
    | +----+ | alone  |  | RG | |   |           |  |  |  | |  | Mobile |
    |        |  FAP   |  +----+ |   |           |  |  |S | |F | Network|
    |        +--------+  (NAPT) |   | Broadband |  |  |e | |A |        |
    +---------------------------+   |   Fixed   |  |  |G |-|P | +-----+|
                                    |  Network  |  |  |W | |G |-| Core||
    +---------------------------+   |   (BBF)   |  |  |  | |W | | Ntwk||
    | +----+ +------------+     |   |           |  |  |  | |  | +-----+|
    | | UE | | Integrated |<====|===|===========|==|=>+--+ +--+        |
    | +----+ | FAP (NAPT) |     |   +-----------+  +-------------------+
    |        +------------+     |
    +---------------------------+

        <=====>   IPsec tunnel
        CoreNtwk  Core Network
        FAPGW     FAP Gateway
        SeGW      Security Gateway

                 Figure 9: Femtocell: Overall Architecture

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   UE is connected to the FAP at the residential gateway (RG), routed
   back to 3GPP Evolved Packet Core (EPC).  UE is assigned IPv4 address
   by the Mobile Network.  Mobile operator's FAP leverages the IPSec
   IKEv2 to interconnect FAP with the SeGW over the BBF network.  Both
   the FAP and the SeGW are managed by the mobile operator which may be
   a different operator for the BBF network.

   An investigated scenario is the mobile network to pass on its mobile
   subscriber's policies to the BBF to support remote network
   management.  But most of today's broadband fixed networks are relying
   on the private IPv4 addressing plan (+NAPT) to support its attached
   devices including the mobile operator's FAP.  In this scenario, the
   mobile network needs to:

   o  determine the FAP's public IPv4 address to identify the location
      of the FAP to ensure its legitimacy to operate on the license
      spectrum for a given mobile operator prior to the FAP be ready to
      serve its mobile devices.

   o  determine the FAP's pubic IPv4 address together with the
      translated port number of the UDP header of the encapsulated IPsec
      tunnel for identifying the UE's traffic at the fixed broadband
      network.

   o  determine the corresponding FAP's public IPv4 address associated
      with the UE's inner-IPv4 address which is assigned by the mobile
      network to identify the mobile UE to allow the PCRF to retrieve
      the UE's policy (e.g., QoS) to be passed onto the Broadband Policy
      Control Function (BPCF) at the BBF network.

   SecGW would have the complete knowledge of such mapping, but the
   reasons for unable to use SecGW for this purpose is explained in
   "Problem Statements" (section 2 of [I-D.so-ipsecme-ikev2-cpext]).

   This use case makes use of PCRF/BPCF but it is valid in other
   deployment scenarios making use of AAA servers.

   The issue of correlating the internal IP address and the public IP
   address is valid even if there is no NAT in the path.

10.  Use Case 8: Overlay Network

   An overlay network is a network of machines distributed throughout
   multiple autonomous systems within the public Internet that can be
   used to improve the performance of data transport (see Figure 10).
   IP packets from the sender are delivered first to one of the machines
   that make up the overlay network.  That machine then relays the IP

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   packets to the receiver via one or more machines in the overlay
   network, applying various performance enhancement methods.

                     +------------------------------------+
                     |                                    |
                     |              INTERNET              |
                     |                                    |
      +-----------+  |  +------------+                    |
      |  HOST_1   |-----| OVRLY_IN_1 |-----------+        |
      +-----------+  |  +------------+           |        |
                     |                           |        |
      +-----------+  |  +------------+     +-----------+  |  +--------+
      |  HOST_2   |-----| OVRLY_IN_2 |-----| OVRLY_OUT |-----| SERVER |
      +-----------+  |  +------------+     +-----------+  |  +--------+
                     |                           |        |
      +-----------+  |  +------------+           |        |
      |  HOST_3   |-----| OVRLY_IN_3 |-----------+        |
      +-----------+  |  +------------+                    |
                     |                                    |
                     +------------------------------------+

                        Figure 10: Overlay Network

   Data transport using an overlay network requires network address
   translation for both the source and destination addresses in such a
   way that the public IP addresses of the true endpoint machines
   involved in data transport are invisible to each other (see
   Figure 11).  In other words, the true sender and receiver use two
   completely different pairs of source and destination addresses to
   identify the connection on the sending and receiving networks.

             ip hdr contains:               ip hdr contains:
   SENDER -> src = sender   --> OVERLAY --> src = overlay2  --> RECEIVER
             dst = overlay1                 dst = receiver

              Figure 11: NAT operations in an Overlay Network

   This scenario is similar to the CGN (Section 3) and proxy (Section 5)
   scenarios.  The remote server is not able to distinguish among hosts
   using the overlay for transport.  In addition, the remote server is
   not able to determine the overlay ingress point being used by the
   host, which can be useful for diagnosing host connectivity issues.

   More details about this use case are provided in
   [I-D.williams-overlaypath-ip-tcp-rfc].

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11.  Security Considerations

   This document does not define an architecture nor a protocol; as such
   it does not raise any security concern.

12.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not require any action from IANA.

13.  Acknowledgments

   Many thanks to F. Klamm for the review.

   Figure 8 and part of the text in Section 9 are inspired from
   [I-D.so-ipsecme-ikev2-cpext].

14.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis]
              Boucadair, M., Touch, J., Levis, P., and R. Penno,
              "Analysis of Solution Candidates to Reveal a Host
              Identifier (HOST_ID) in Shared Address Deployments",
              draft-ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis-04 (work in
              progress), August 2012.

   [I-D.so-ipsecme-ikev2-cpext]
              So, T., "IKEv2 Configuration Payload Extension for Private
              IPv4 Support for Fixed Mobile Convergence",
              draft-so-ipsecme-ikev2-cpext-02 (work in progress),
              June 2012.

   [I-D.williams-overlaypath-ip-tcp-rfc]
              Williams, B., "Overlay Path Option for IP and TCP",
              draft-williams-overlaypath-ip-tcp-rfc-02 (work in
              progress), September 2012.

   [RFC2753]  Yavatkar, R., Pendarakis, D., and R. Guerin, "A Framework
              for Policy-based Admission Control", RFC 2753,
              January 2000.

   [RFC6146]  Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
              NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
              Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, April 2011.

   [RFC6269]  Ford, M., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and P.

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              Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
              June 2011.

   [RFC6296]  Wasserman, M. and F. Baker, "IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix
              Translation", RFC 6296, June 2011.

   [RFC6333]  Durand, A., Droms, R., Woodyatt, J., and Y. Lee, "Dual-
              Stack Lite Broadband Deployments Following IPv4
              Exhaustion", RFC 6333, August 2011.

   [RFC6346]  Bush, R., "The Address plus Port (A+P) Approach to the
              IPv4 Address Shortage", RFC 6346, August 2011.

   [TS.23203]
              3GPP, "Policy and charging control architecture",
              September 2012.

Authors' Addresses

   Mohamed Boucadair
   France Telecom
   Rennes,   35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com

   David Binet
   France Telecom
   Rennes,
   France

   Email: david.binet@orange.com

   Sophie Durel
   France Telecom
   Rennes
   France

   Email: sophie.durel@orange.com

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   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli
   Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560103
   India

   Email: tireddy@cisco.com

   Brandon Williams
   Akamai, Inc.
   Cambridge,   MA
   USA

   Phone:
   Fax:
   Email: brandon.williams@akamai.com
   URI:

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