Properties of AEAD algorithms
draft-bozhko-cfrg-aead-properties-00
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| Authors | Andrey Bozhko , Lilia Akhmetzyanova , Evgeny Alekseev , Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev | ||
| Last updated | 2022-10-13 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-properties, draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-properties | ||
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draft-bozhko-cfrg-aead-properties-00
Crypto Forum Research Group A.A. Bozhko, Ed.
Internet-Draft L.R. Akhmetzyanova
Intended status: Informational E.K. Alekseev
Expires: 16 April 2023 S.V. Smyshlyaev
CryptoPro
13 October 2022
Properties of AEAD algorithms
draft-bozhko-cfrg-aead-properties-00
Abstract
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms
provide confidentiality and integrity of data. The extensive use of
AEAD algorithms in different high-level applications has caused the
need for AEAD algorithms with non-standard properties and motivated
research in the area. This document gives definitions for the most
common of those properties intending to improve consistency in the
field.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 April 2023.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. AEAD properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Security properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.2. Data integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.3. Blockwise security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.4. Key Dependent Messages (KDM) security . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.5. Key commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.6. Leakage resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.7. Multi-user security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.8. Nonce misuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.8.1. Nonce misuse resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.8.2. Nonce misuse resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.9. Reforgeability resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.10. Release of unverified plaintext (RUP) security . . . 6
3.2. Implementation properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. Inverse-free . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2. Lightweight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.3. Online . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.4. Parallelizable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.5. Single pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.6. ZK-friendly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Additional functionality properties . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.1. Incremental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.2. Nonce-hiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.3. Remotely-keyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. Introduction
An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm is
an extension of authenticated encryption, which provides
confidentiality for the plaintext to be encrypted and integrity for
the plaintext and some Associated Data (sometimes called Header).
AEAD algorithms are used in numerous applications and have become an
important field in cryptographic research.
1.1. Background
AEAD algorithms are formally defined in [RFC5116]. The main benefit
of AEAD algorithms is that they provide both data confidentiality and
data integrity and have a simple unified interface.
The importance of the AEAD algorithms is mainly explained by their
exploitation simplicity: they have a unified interface, easy-to-
understand security guarantees, and are much easier to implement
properly than MAC and encryption schemes separately. Thereof their
embedding into high-level schemes and protocols is highly
transparent, since, for example, there is no need for additional key
diversification procedures. Apart from that, when using the AEAD
algorithm it is possible to reduce the key size, state size, and
improve the data processing speed. For instance, the use of such
algorithms is mandatory in TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], IPsec ESP [RFC4303]
[RFC8221], QUIC [RFC9000]. Hence, the research and standardization
efforts in the field are extremely active. Most AEAD algorithms
usually come with security guarantees, formal proofs, usage
guidelines, and reference implementations.
Even though providing standard properties of AEAD algorithms is
enough for use in many applications, some environments require other
unusual cryptographic properties which commonly require additional
analysis and research. With the growing number of non-standard
properties and research papers, misunderstanding and confusion
inevitably appear. Some properties might be understood in different
ways, for some only non-trivial formal security notions are provided,
others require modification or extension of the standard AEAD
interface to support additional functionality. Therefore, the risk
of misuse of AEAD algorithms increases which can lead to security
problems.
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1.2. Scope
In the following document, we provide a short overview of the most
common properties of AEAD algorithms, by giving high-level and non-
formal but clear definitions of these properties in Section 3. The
document aims to improve clarity and establish a common language in
the field.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. AEAD properties
3.1. Security properties
3.1.1. Confidentiality
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm guarantees that data is available
only to those authorized to obtain it. That property is one of the
two required for the AEAD algorithm to be called secure.
_Synonyms._ Privacy.
_Further reading._ [R2002], [BN2000]
3.1.2. Data integrity
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm guarantees that data is available
only to those authorized to obtain it. That property is one of the
two required for the AEAD algorithm to be called secure.
_Synonyms._ Message authentication.
_Further reading._ [R2002], [BN2000]
3.1.3. Blockwise security
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm provides security even if an
adversary can adaptively choose the next block of a plaintext
(ciphertext) depending on already computed blocks of the ciphertext
(plaintext) during an encryption (decryption) operation.
_Further reading._ [JMV2002], [FJMV2004]
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3.1.4. Key Dependent Messages (KDM) security
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm provides security even when key-
dependent plaintexts are encrypted.
_Notes._ KDM-security is achievable only if nonces are chosen
randomly and associated data is key-independent.
_Further reading._ [BK2011]
3.1.5. Key commitment
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm guarantees that it is difficult to
find such tuple of nonce, associated data and ciphertext, that it can
be decrypted correctly with more than one key.
_Synonyms._ Key-robustness, key collision resistance.
_Further reading._ [FOR17], [LGR21], [GLR17]
3.1.6. Leakage resistance
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm provides its security even if an
additional information about computations of an encryption (and may
be decryption) operation is obtained via side-channel leakages.
_Further reading._ [GPPS19], [B20]
3.1.7. Multi-user security
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm security level degrades sublinearly
in a number of users. Here the level of security is understood in
the sense of Authenticated Encryption advantage (AEA) as given in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits].
_Further reading._ [BT16]
3.1.8. Nonce misuse
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm provides security (resilience or
resistance) even if an adversary can repeat nonces in its encryption
queries.
3.1.8.1. Nonce misuse resilience
_Definition._ Security is provided only for messages encrypted with
unique nonces.
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_Further reading._ [ADL17], [RS06]
3.1.8.2. Nonce misuse resistance
_Definition._ Security is provided for all messages.
_Further reading._ [RS06]
3.1.9. Reforgeability resilience
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm guarantees that once a successful
forgery for the algorithm has been found, it is still hard to find
any subsequent forgery.
_Further reading._ [BC09], [FLLW17]
3.1.10. Release of unverified plaintext (RUP) security
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm provides its security even if a
plaintext is released for every ciphertext including those with
failed integrity verification.
_Further reading._ [A14]
3.2. Implementation properties
3.2.1. Inverse-free
_Definition._ A blockcipher-based AEAD algorithm can be securely
implemented without any evaluation of the block cipher inverse.
3.2.2. Lightweight
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm can be efficiently and securely
implemented on resource-constrained devices. Particularly, it meets
the criteria, required in the NIST Lightweight Cryptography
competition [MBTM17].
_Further reading._ [MBTM17]
3.2.3. Online
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm encryption (decryption) algorithm can
be implemented with a constant memory and a single one-direction pass
over the plaintext (ciphertext), writing out the result during that
pass.
_Further reading._ [HRRV15] [FJMV2004]
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3.2.4. Parallelizable
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm can fully exploit the parallel
computation infrastructure. In other words, with unlimited number of
threads, computation time remains constant in an input length.
_Further reading._ [C20]
3.2.5. Single pass
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm encryption (decryption) operation can
be implemented with a single pass over the plaintext (ciphertext).
3.2.6. ZK-friendly
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm operates on binary and prime fields
with a low number of non-linear operations (often referred to as the
multiplicative complexity). Thus, allows efficient implementation
using a domain specific language (DSL) for writing zk-SNARKs
circuits.
_Synonyms._ ZK-focused, Arithmetization-oriented, Low Multiplicative
Complexity
_Further reading._ [DGGK21]
3.3. Additional functionality properties
3.3.1. Incremental
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm design allows to encrypt a message,
which only partly differs from some other previously encrypted
message, faster than encrypting the whole message with the encryption
operation.
_Further reading._ [SY16], [BKY02]
3.3.2. Nonce-hiding
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm decryption operation doesn't need the
nonce value to perform the decryption. Thus, the algorithm provides
privacy for the nonce value.
_Further reading._ [BNT19]
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3.3.3. Remotely-keyed
_Definition._ An AEAD algorithm can be securely implemented with most
of the operations in encryption/decryption performed by an insecure
(i.e. it leaks all intermediate values) device, which has no access
to the key, while operations involving the key are performed by
another secure device.
_Further reading._ [BFN98], [DA03]
4. Security Considerations
This document defines the properties of AEAD algorithms. However,
the document does not describe any concrete mechanisms providing
these properties, neither it describes how to achieve them. In fact,
one can claim that an AEAD algorithm provides any of the defined
properties only if its formal analysis in the relevant models was
carried out.
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
6.2. Informative References
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[A14] Forler, C., List, E., Forler, C., List, E., List, E., and
E. List, "How to Securely Release Unverified Plaintext in
Authenticated Encryption", Advances in Cryptology –
ASIACRYPT 2014. ASIACRYPT 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol 8873. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8_6, 2014,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8_6>.
[ADL17] Ashur, T., Dunkelman, O., and A. Luykx, "Boosting
Authenticated Encryption Robustness with Minimal
Modifications", Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2017.
CRYPTO 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10403.
Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_1, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_1>.
[B20] Bellizia, D., Bronchain, O., Cassiers, G., Grosso, V.,
Guo, C., Momin, C., Pereira, O., Peters, T., and FX.
Standaert, "Mode-Level vs. Implementation-Level Physical
Security in Symmetric Cryptography: A Practical Guide
Through the Leakage-Resistance Jungle", Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2020. CRYPTO 2020. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 12170. Springer, Cham,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_13, 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_13>.
[BC09] Forler, C. and E. List, "MAC Reforgeability", Fast
Software Encryption. FSE 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol 5665. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9_21, 2009,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9_21>.
[BFN98] Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., and M. Naor, "A formal
treatment of remotely keyed encryption", Advances in
Cryptology — EUROCRYPT'98. EUROCRYPT 1998. Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, vol 1403. Springer, Berlin,
Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/BFb0054131, 1998,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0054131>.
[BK2011] Bellare, M. and S. Keelveedhi, "Authenticated and Misuse-
Resistant Encryption of Key-Dependent Data", Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2011. CRYPTO 2011. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 6841. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_35, 2011,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_35>.
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[BKY02] Buonanno, E., Katz, J., and M. Yung, "Incremental
Unforgeable Encryption", Fast Software Encryption. FSE
2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2355.
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/3-540-45473-X_9,
2002, <https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45473-X_9>.
[BN2000] Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated Encryption:
Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic
Composition Paradigm", Proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2000,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 531-545,
DOI 10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x, 2000,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x>.
[BNT19] Bellare, M., Ng, R., and B. Tackmann, "Nonces Are Noticed:
AEAD Revisited", Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019.
CRYPTO 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11692.
Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9, 2019,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9>.
[BT16] Bellare, M. and B. Tackmann, "The Multi-User Security of
Authenticated Encryption: AES-GCM in TLS 1.3", Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016. CRYPTO 2016. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 9814. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_10, 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_10>.
[C20] Chakraborti, A., Datta, N., Jha, A., Mancillas-López, C.,
Nandi, M., and Y. Sasaki, "INT-RUP Secure Lightweight
Parallel AE Modes", IACR Transactions on Symmetric
Cryptology, 2019(4), 81–118,
DOI 10.13154/tosc.v2019.i4.81-118, 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2019.i4.81-118>.
[DA03] Dodis, Y. and JH. An, "Concealment and Its Applications to
Authenticated Encryption", Advances in Cryptology —
EUROCRYPT 2003. EUROCRYPT 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol 2656. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/3-540-39200-9_19, 2003,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39200-9_19>.
[DGGK21] Dobraunig, C., Grassi, L., Guinet, G., and K. Kuijsters,
"CIMINION: Symmetric Encryption Based on Toffoli-Gates
over Large Finite Fields", Advances in Cryptology –
EUROCRYPT 2021. EUROCRYPT 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science(), vol 12697. Springer, Cham,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_1, 2021,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_1>.
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[FJMV2004] Valette, PA., Joux, A., Martinet, G., and F. Valette,
"Authenticated On-Line Encryption", Selected Areas in
Cryptography. SAC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol 3006. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-24654-1_11, 2004,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24654-1_11>.
[FLLW17] Forler, C., List, E., Lucks, S., and J. Wenzel,
"Reforgeability of Authenticated Encryption Schemes",
Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2017. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol 10343. Springer, Cham,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_2, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_2>.
[FOR17] Farshim, P., Orlandi, C., and R. Rosie, "Authenticated and
Misuse-Resistant Encryption of Key-Dependent DataSecurity
of Symmetric Primitives under Incorrect Usage of Keys",
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2017(1),
449–473., DOI 10.13154/tosc.v2017.i1.449-473, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2017.i1.449-473>.
[GLR17] Grubbs, P., Lu, J., and T. Ristenpart, "Message Franking
via Committing Authenticated Encryption.", Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2017. CRYPTO 2017. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 10403. Springer, Cham,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_3, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_3>.
[GPPS19] Guo, C., Pereira, O., Peters, T., and FX. Standaert,
"Authenticated Encryption with Nonce Misuse and Physical
Leakages: Definitions, Separation Results and Leveled
Constructions", Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019.
LATINCRYPT 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol
11774. Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_8,
2019, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_8>.
[HRRV15] Hoang, VT., Reyhanitabar, R., Rogaway, P., and D. Vizár,
"Online Authenticated-Encryption and its Nonce-Reuse
Misuse-Resistance", Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2015.
CRYPTO 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9215.
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<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_24>.
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[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]
Günther, F., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood, "Usage Limits on
AEAD Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-05, 11 July 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
aead-limits-05>.
[JMV2002] Joux, A., Martinet, G., and F. Valette, "Blockwise-
Adaptive Attackers Revisiting the (In)Security of Some
Provably Secure Encryption Modes: CBC, GEM, IACBC",
Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2002. CRYPTO 2002. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol 2442. Springer, Berlin,
Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/3-540-45708-9_2, 2002,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45708-9_2>.
[LGR21] Len, J., Grubbs, P., and T. Ristenpart, "Partitioning
Oracle Attacks", 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 21), 195--212, 2021.
[MBTM17] McKay, K., Bassham, L., Turan, MS., and N. Mouha, "Report
on Lightweight Cryptography", DOI 10.6028/NIST.IR.8114,
2017, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8114>.
[R2002] Rogaway, P., "Authenticated-encryption with associated-
data.", Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer
and communications security (CCS '02), Association for
Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 98–107,
DOI 10.1145/586110.586125, 2002,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/586110.586125>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC8221] Wouters, P., Migault, D., Mattsson, J., Nir, Y., and T.
Kivinen, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 8221,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8221, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8221>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
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[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
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Appendix A. Contributors
Authors' Addresses
Andrey Bozhko (editor)
CryptoPro
Email: andbogc@gmail.com
Lilia Akhmetzyanova
CryptoPro
Email: ahmzliliya@gmail.com
Evgeny Alekseev
CryptoPro
Email: ekalekseev@gmail.com
Stanislav Smyshlyaev
CryptoPro
Email: smyshsv@gmail.com
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