Encoding DNS-over-TLS (DoT) Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) in Name Server name
draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name-00

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Last updated 2019-03-11
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Network Working Group                                        M. Bretelle
Internet-Draft                                                  Facebook
Intended status: Standards Track                          March 11, 2019
Expires: September 12, 2019

   Encoding DNS-over-TLS (DoT) Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) in Name
                              Server name
              draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name-00

Abstract

   This document describes a mechanism to exchange the Subject Public
   Key Info (SPKI) ([RFC5280] Section 4.1.2.7) fingerprint associated
   with a DNS-over-TLS (DoT [RFC7858]) authoritative server by encoding
   it as part of its name.  The fingerprint can thereafter be used to
   validate the certificate received from the DoT server as well as
   being able to discover support for DoT on the server.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Validating a remote DoT server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Encoding data in a domain name label  . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     4.1.  Formatting DoT SPKI in name server name.  . . . . . . . .   4
       4.1.1.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Handling by the recursive servers . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       4.2.1.  Servers supporting this specification . . . . . . . .   4
       4.2.2.  Servers not supporting this specification . . . . . .   5
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   This document describes a mechanism to exchange the Subject Public
   Key Info (SPKI) ([RFC5280] Section 4.1.2.7) fingerprint associated
   with a DNS-over-TLS (DoT [RFC7858]) authoritative server by encoding
   it as part of its name.  The fingerprint can thereafter be used to
   validate the certificate received from the DoT server as well as
   being able to discover support for DoT on the server.

2.  Terminology

   A server that supports DNS-over-TLS is called a "DoT server" to
   differentiate it from a "DNS Server" (one that provides DNS service
   over any other protocol), likewise, a client that supports this
   protocol is called a "DoT client"

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

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3.  Validating a remote DoT server

   While DoT provides protection against eavesdropping and on-path
   tampering of the DNS queries exchanged with an authoritative server,
   a recursive server that is talking to a remote DoT server needs a
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