Integrity of In-situ OAM Data Fields
draft-brockners-ippm-ioam-data-integrity-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Frank Brockners  , Shwetha Bhandari  , Tal Mizrahi 
Last updated 2021-02-21
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ippm                                                        F. Brockners
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Informational                               S. Bhandari
Expires: August 25, 2021                                     Thoughtspot
                                                              T. Mizrahi
                                                                  Huawei
                                                       February 21, 2021

                  Integrity of In-situ OAM Data Fields
              draft-brockners-ippm-ioam-data-integrity-01

Abstract

   In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) records
   operational and telemetry information in the packet while the packet
   traverses a path between two points in the network.  This document is
   to assist the IPPM WG in designing a solution for those deployments
   where the integrity of IOAM data fields is a concern.  This document
   proposes several methods to ensure the integrity of IOAM data fields.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2021.

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   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

Brockners, et al.        Expires August 25, 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         IOAM Data Fields Integrity          February 2021

   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Modification: IOAM Data Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Modification: IOAM Option-Type Headers  . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Injection: IOAM Data Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Injection: IOAM Option-Type Headers . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.5.  Replay  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.6.  Management and Exporting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.7.  Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.8.  Threat Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Methods of providing integrity to IOAM data fields  . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Method 1: Using asymmetric keys for signing node trace
           data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.1.  Overhead consideration for Method 1 . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Method 2: Using symmetric keys for signing node trace
           data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.2.1.  Overhead consideration for Method 2 . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Method 3: Space optimized symmetric key based signing of
           trace data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.3.1.  Overhead consideration for Method 3 . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.4.  Method 4: Dynamic symmetric keys based signing of trace
           data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.4.1.  Overhead consideration for Method 4 . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.5.  Method 5: Leverage IP Authentication Header . . . . . . .  14
       4.5.1.  Overhead consideration for Method 5 . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
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