DTN Bundle Protocol Security COSE Security Contexts
draft-bsipos-dtn-bpsec-cose-01
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Brian Sipos | ||
| Last updated | 2020-06-27 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-cose | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-bsipos-dtn-bpsec-cose-01
Delay-Tolerant Networking B. Sipos
Internet-Draft RKF Engineering
Intended status: Standards Track June 26, 2020
Expires: December 28, 2020
DTN Bundle Protocol Security COSE Security Contexts
draft-bsipos-dtn-bpsec-cose-01
Abstract
This document defines an integrity security context and a
confidentiality security context suitable for using CBOR Object
Signing and Encryption (COSE) algorithms within Bundle Protocol
Security (BPSec) blocks. A profile of COSE is also defined for BPSec
interoperation.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 28, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. BPSec Security Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. COSE Integrity Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. COSE Confidentiality Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. COSE Profile for BPSec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Interoperability Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. Threat: BPSec Block Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Threat: Unidentifiable Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3. Threat: Algorithm Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. BPSec Security Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.1. Symmetric Key COSE_Mac0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.2. RSA Keypair COSE_Sign1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.3. Symmetric Key COSE_Encrypt0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
The Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec) Specification
[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec] defines structure and encoding for Block
Integrity Block (BIB) and Block Confidentiality Block (BCB) types but
does not specify any security contexts to be used by either of the
security block types. The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)
specification [RFC8152] defines a structure, encoding, and algorithms
to use for cryptographic signing and encryption.
This document describes how to use the algorithms and encodings of
COSE within BPSec blocks to apply those algorithms to Bundle security
in Section 3. A bare minimum of interoperability algorithms and
algorithm parameters is specified by this document in Section 4.
This document does not address how those COSE algorithms are intended
to be used within a larger security context.
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. BPSec Security Contexts
Rather than defining a single security context for both integrity and
confidentiality blocks, this document specifies two separate security
contexts which are analogous to the two BPSec block types. Each
security context allows a specific set of BPSec Result IDs.
The existing COSE message-marking tags in Section 2 of [RFC8152]
SHALL be used as BPSec Result ID values for all COSE security
contexts (see Table 1 and Table 2). This avoids the need for value-
mapping between code points of the two registries.
When embedding COSE messages, the CBOR-tagged form SHALL NOT be used.
The Result ID values already provide the same information as the COSE
tags.
3.1. COSE Integrity Context
The COSE Integrity Context has a Security Context ID of TBD-CI.
The integrity context SHALL allow only the Result IDs from Table 1.
Each integrity context result value SHALL consist of the COSE message
indicated by Table 1 in its decoded form.
+-----------+----------------+
| Result ID | Result Message |
+-----------+----------------+
| 97 | COSE_Mac |
| | |
| 17 | COSE_Mac0 |
| | |
| 98 | COSE_Sign |
| | |
| 18 | COSE_Sign1 |
+-----------+----------------+
Table 1: COSE Integrity Results
Each integrity result SHALL use the "detached" payload form with nil
payload value. The integrity result for COSE_Mac and COSE_Mac0
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
messages are computed by the procedure in Section 6.3 of [RFC8152].
The integrity result for COSE_Sign and COSE_Sign1 messages are
computed by the procedure in Section 4.4 of [RFC8152].
[NOTE: This differs from base BPSec in that the entire block and the
bundle primary is signed] The COSE "payload" used to generate a
signature or MAC result SHALL be the canonically serialized target
block, including the canonical block array structure. The COSE
"protected attributes from the application" used to generate a
signature or MAC result SHALL be either:
For a primary block target: An empty byte string.
For a canonical block target: The canonically serialized primary
block of the bundle.
3.2. COSE Confidentiality Context
The COSE Confidentiality Context has a Security Context ID of TBD-CC.
The confidentiality context SHALL allow only the Result IDs from
Table 2. Each confidentiality context result value SHALL consist of
the COSE message indicated by Table 2 in its decoded form.
+-----------+----------------+
| Result ID | Result Message |
+-----------+----------------+
| 96 | COSE_Encrypt |
| | |
| 16 | COSE_Encrypt0 |
+-----------+----------------+
Table 2: COSE Confidentiality Results
Only algorithms which support Authenticated Encryption with
Authenticated Data (AEAD) SHALL be usable in the first (content)
layer of a confidentiality result. Because COSE encryption with AEAD
appends the authentication tag with the ciphertext, the size of the
block-type-specific-data will grow after an encryption operation.
Each confidentiality result SHALL use the "detached" payload form
with nil payload value. The COSE plaintext and ciphertext correspond
exactly with the target block-type-specific-data. The
confidentiality result for COSE_Encrypt and COSE_Encrypt0 messages
are computed by the procedure in Section 5.3 of [RFC8152].
[NOTE: This differs from base BPSec in that AAD from the block and
the bundle primary is used] The COSE "plaintext" used to generate an
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
encrypt result SHALL be the block-type-specific-data of the target
block, the decoded byte string itself (not including the encoded CBOR
item header). The COSE "protected attributes from the application"
used to generate an encrypt result SHALL be the concatenation of the
following:
1. The canonically serialized primary block of the bundle.
2. The canonically serialized augmented target block, which has its
block-type-specific-data substituted with an empty byte string.
4. COSE Profile for BPSec
This section contains requirements which apply to the use of COSE
within BPSec across any security context use.
When used in a BPSec result, each COSE message SHALL contain an
explicit algorithm identifier in the lower (content) layers. A BPSec
security operation always occurs within the context of the immutable
primary block and its parameters. When available and not implied by
the bundle source, a COSE message SHOULD contain a key identifier in
the highest layer. When a key identifier is not available, BPSec
acceptors SHOULD use the Security Source (if available) and the
Bundle Source to imply which keys can be used for security
operations.
The algorithms required by this profile focuses on networks using
shared symmetric-keys, with recommended algorithms for Elliptic Curve
(EC) keypairs and RSA keypairs. The focus of this profile is to
enable interoperation between security sources and acceptors on an
open network, where more explicit COSE parameters make it easier for
BPSec acceptors to avoid assumptions and avoid out-of-band
parameters. The requirements of this profile still allow the use of
potentially not-easily-interoperable algorithms and message/recipient
configurations for use by private networks, where message size is
more important than explicit COSE parameters.
4.1. Interoperability Algorithms
[NOTE: The required list is identical to the
[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec-interop-sc] list.] The set of integrity
algorithms needed for interoperability is listed here. The full set
of COSE algorithms available is managed at [IANA-COSE].
Implementations conforming to this specification SHALL support the
symmetric keyed algorithms of Table 3. Implementations capable of
doing so SHOULD support the asymmetric keyed and key-encryption
algorithms of Table 3.
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
+------------------+--------+-------------+------+------------------+
| BPSec Block | COSE | Name | Code | Implementation |
| | Layer | | | Requirements |
+------------------+--------+-------------+------+------------------+
| Integrity | 1 | HMAC | 5 | Required |
| | | 256/256 | | |
| | | | | |
| Integrity | 1 | ES256 | -7 | Recommended |
| | | | | |
| Integrity | 1 | PS256 | -37 | Recommended |
| | | | | |
| Confidentiality | 1 | A256GCM | 3 | Required |
| | | | | |
| Confidentiality | 2 | A256KW | -5 | Recommended |
| | | | | |
| Integrity or | 2 | ECDH-ES + | -31 | Recommended |
| Confidentiality | | A256KW | | |
| | | | | |
| Integrity or | 2 | RSAES-OAEP | -41 | Recommended |
| Confidentiality | | w/ SHA-256 | | |
+------------------+--------+-------------+------+------------------+
Table 3: Interoperability Algorithms
The following are recommended key and recipient uses within COSE/
BPSec:
Symmetric Key Integrity: When generating a BIB result from a
symmetric key, implementations SHOULD use either a COSE_Mac0 or a
COSE_Mac using the private key directly. When a COSE_Mac is used
with a direct key, the recipient layer SHOULD include a key
identifier.
EC Keypair Integrity: When generating a BIB result from an EC
keypair, implementations SHOULD use either a COSE_Sign1 or a
COSE_Sign using the private key directly or a COSE_Mac from a
symmetric key with a layer-2 encryption of the symmetric key.
When a COSE_Sign or COSE_Mac is used with EC keypair, the
recipient layer SHOULD include a public key identifier.
RSA Keypair Integrity: When generating a BIB result from an RSA
keypair, implementations SHOULD use either a COSE_Sign1 or a
COSE_Sign using the private key directly or a COSE_Mac from a
symmetric key with a layer-2 key-wrap of the symmetric key. When
a COSE_Sign or COSE_Mac is used with RSA keypair, the recipient
layer SHOULD include a public key identifier. When a COSE_Sign or
COSE_Sign1 is used with RSA keypair, the signature uses a maximum-
length PSS salt in accordance with [RFC8230].
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
Symmetric Key Confidentiality: When generating a BCB result from an
symmetric key, implementations SHOULD use a COSE_Encrypt message
with a recipient containing a key-wrapped CEK. When generating a
BCB result from a symmetric key, implementations SHOULD NOT use
COSE_Encrypt0 or COSE_Encrypt with direct content encryption key
(CEK). Doing so risks key overuse and the vulnerabilities
associated with large amount of ciphertext from the same key.
EC Keypair Confidentiality: When generating a BCB result from an EC
keypair, implementations SHOULD use a COSE_Encrypt message with a
recipient containing a key-wrapped CEK.
RSA Keypair Confidentiality: When generating a BCB result from an
RSA keypair, implementations SHOULD use a COSE_Encrypt message
with a recipient containing a key-wrapped CEK.
5. Implementation Status
[NOTE to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before
publication, as well as the reference to [RFC7942] and
[github-dtn-bpsec-cose].]
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations can
exist.
An example implementation of COSE over Blocks has been created as a
GitHub project [github-dtn-bpsec-cose] and is intended to use as a
proof-of-concept and as a possible source of interoperability
testing. This example implementation only handles CBOR encoding/
decoding and cryptographic functions, it does not construct actual
BIB or BCB and does not integrate with a BP Agent.
6. Security Considerations
This section separates security considerations into threat categories
based on guidance of BCP 72 [RFC3552].
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
All of the security considerations of the underlying BPSec
[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec] apply to these new security contexts.
6.1. Threat: BPSec Block Replay
The bundle's primary block contains fields which uniquely identify a
bundle: the Source Node ID, Creation Timestamp, and fragment
parameters (see Section 4.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis]). These same
fields are used to correlate Administrative Records with the bundles
for which the records were generated. Including the primary block in
the AAD for BPSec integrity and confidentiality binds the
verification of the secured block to its parent bundle and disallows
replay of any block with its BIB or BCB.
This profile of COSE limits the encryption algorithms to only AEAD in
order to include the context of the encrypted data as AAD. If an
agent mistakenly allows the use of non-AEAD encryption when
decrypting and verifying a BCB, the possibility of block replay
attack is present.
6.2. Threat: Unidentifiable Key
The profile in Section 4.1 recommends key identifiers when possible.
If the application using a COSE Integrity or COSE Confidentiality
context leaves out key identification data (in a COSE recipient
structure), the security acceptor for those BPSec blocks only has the
primary block available to use when verifying or decrypting the
target block. This leads to a situation, identified in BPSec
Security Considerations, where a signature is verified to be valid
but not from the expected Security Source.
6.3. Threat: Algorithm Vulnerabilities
Because this use of COSE leaves the specific algorithms chosen for
BIB and BCB use up to the applications securing bundle data, it is
important to use only COSE algorithms which are marked as recommended
in the IANA registry [IANA-COSE].
7. IANA Considerations
Registration procedures referred to in this section are defined in
[RFC8126].
7.1. BPSec Security Contexts
Within the "Bundle Protocol" registry [IANA-BUNDLE], the following
entry has been added to the "BPSec Security Context Identifiers" sub-
registry.
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
+--------+----------------------+---------------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+--------+----------------------+---------------------+
| TBD-CI | COSE Integrity | This specification. |
| | | |
| TBD-CC | COSE Confidentiality | This specification. |
+--------+----------------------+---------------------+
8. Acknowledgments
The interoperability minimum algorithms and parameters are based on
the draft [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec-interop-sc].
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec]
Birrane, E. and K. McKeever, "Bundle Protocol Security
Specification", draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-22 (work in
progress), March 2020.
[IANA-BUNDLE]
IANA, "Bundle Protocol",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/bundle/>.
[IANA-COSE]
IANA, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
[RFC8230] Jones, M., "Using RSA Algorithms with CBOR Object Signing
and Encryption (COSE) Messages", RFC 8230,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8230, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8230>.
9.2. Informative References
[github-dtn-bpsec-cose]
Sipos, B., "DTN Bundle Protocol Security COSE Security
Contexts",
<https://github.com/BSipos-RKF/dtn-bpsec-cose/>.
[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis]
Burleigh, S., Fall, K., and E. Birrane, "Bundle Protocol
Version 7", draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-25 (work in progress),
May 2020.
[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec-interop-sc]
Birrane, E., "BPSec Interoperability Security Contexts",
draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-interop-sc-01 (work in progress),
February 2020.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
Appendix A. Examples
A.1. Symmetric Key COSE_Mac0
This is an example of a MAC with implied recipient (and its key
material). The two provided figures are CBOR diagnostic notation
[RFC7049] of the target block being signed and the Abstract Security
Block (which will itself be enveloped within a BIB).
The 256-bit key used is shown below.
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
/ signing key /
h'13bf9cead057c0aca2c9e52471ca4b19ddfaf4c0784e3f3e8e3999dbae4ce45c'
Symmetric Key
[
7, / BP version /
0, / flags /
0, / CRC type /
[1, '//dst/'], / destination /
[1, '//src/'], / source /
[1, '//src/'], / report-to /
[0, 40], / timestamp /
1000000 / lifetime /
]
Figure 1: Primary block CBOR diagnostic
[
7, / type code - bundle age /
2, / block num /
0, / flags /
0, / CRC type /
h'19012c' / type-specific-data:
300 \ age \
/
]
Figure 2: Target block CBOR diagnostic
The external_aad is the encoded primary block. The payload is the
encoded target block.
[
'MAC0', / context /
h'a10105', / protected /
h'880700008201462f2f6473742f8201462f2f7372632f8201462f2f7372632f820018
281a000f4240', / external_aad /
h'85070200004319012c' / payload /
]
Figure 3: MAC_structure CBOR diagnostic
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
[
[2], / targets /
0, / security context TBD /
0, / flags /
[
[ / target block #2 /
[ / result /
17, / COSE_Mac0 tag /
[
h'a10105' / protected {
\ alg \ 1:5 \ HMAC 256//256 \
} / ,
{ / unprotected /
/ kid / 4:'mykey'
},
null, / payload /
h'd98308918d36dc4190a93f84c8d857015b75b78edea3360282555257c3be
f847' / tag /
]
]
]
]
]
Figure 4: Abstract Security Block CBOR diagnostic
A.2. RSA Keypair COSE_Sign1
This is an example of a signature with implied recipient (and its key
material). The two provided figures are CBOR diagnostic notation
[RFC7049] of the target block being signed and the Abstract Security
Block (which will itself be enveloped within a BIB).
The 512-bit private key used is below. It is not supposed to be a
secure configuration, only intended to explain the procedure. This
signature uses zero-length salt for deterministic output, which
differs from the parameter specified by [RFC8230] and is not
recommended for normal use.
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIBOwIBAAJBAN21GdS0faAYgacepRmbr7TAT0wEuahjrBfAO0Dg1M5d37O9Tx9H
vZw2OEcLq2WTvf0Kja1JWpqdoJm17LghhPkCAwEAAQJBAMgkJo9n6EhQFyrgdTZq
3vES8gKz+U3TvJUsSdFFpZYsZhUaLKP9oxyIxl3IvK5iS0oAsW0nqI7aMcBoPmxZ
pQECIQDuyd5uzvS0wnrsDWoDhiTm6O+PJoMQix9yH99HBUhWKQIhAO2wDP7e/Nnr
A7rDSgM6+REGmt8I00NglFwShBUi4HJRAiAiJrLuTCEJXSsxaXW5DU1nzPa+FXb3
Pb6Alvha8vF2iQIgbC7WK2dJBNKv9uCOHlxIItSzxtIYfjFGNYYD8i7Wo5ECIQDp
5++fp04AMVAnE0uqNEnITkTWb91hAS8IjaYCqLGyEA==
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
[
7, / BP version /
0, / flags /
0, / CRC type /
[1, '//dst/'], / destination /
[1, '//src/'], / source /
[1, '//src/'], / report-to /
[0, 40], / timestamp /
1000000 / lifetime /
]
Figure 5: Primary block CBOR diagnostic
[
7, / type code - bundle age /
2, / block num /
0, / flags /
0, / CRC type /
h'19012c' / type-specific-data:
300 \ age \
/
]
Figure 6: Target block CBOR diagnostic
The external_aad is the encoded primary block. The payload is the
encoded target block.
[
'Signature1', / context /
h'a1013824', / protected /
h'880700008201462f2f6473742f8201462f2f7372632f8201462f2f7372632f820018
281a000f4240', / external_aad /
h'85070200004319012c' / payload /
]
Figure 7: Sig_structure CBOR diagnostic
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
[
[2], / targets /
0, / security context TBD /
0, / flags /
[
[ / target block #2 /
[ / result /
18, / COSE_Sign1 tag /
[
h'a1013824' / protected {
\ alg \ 1:-37 \ PS256 \
} / ,
{ / unprotected /
/ kid / 4:'mykey'
},
null, / payload /
h'1a35746072396c74275fd7b443a0d7391a0f92012a53e0accc543daa51ae
6faae551a4843a0bc7c3bf808e3638ddc381355b54cc60f4ca9dea15923b
5986e758' / signature /
]
]
]
]
]
Figure 8: Abstract Security Block CBOR diagnostic
A.3. Symmetric Key COSE_Encrypt0
This is an example of an encryption with implied recipient (and its
direct content encryption key). The provided figures are CBOR
diagnostic notation [RFC7049] of the target block being encrypted,
the Abstract Security Block (which will itself be enveloped within a
BCB), and the resulting target block.
This example uses a single shared content encryption key, which is
not recommended for normal use. The 256-bit key used is shown below.
A random IV is generated for this operation and is indicated in a
standard way in the unprotected header.
/ content encryption key /
h'13bf9cead057c0aca2c9e52471ca4b19ddfaf4c0784e3f3e8e3999dbae4ce45c'
Symmetric Keys
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
[
7, / BP version /
0, / flags /
0, / CRC type /
[1, '//dst/'], / destination /
[1, '//src/'], / source /
[1, '//src/'], / report-to /
[0, 40], / timestamp /
1000000 / lifetime /
]
Figure 9: Primary block CBOR diagnostic
[
7, / type code - bundle age /
2, / block num /
0, / flags /
0, / CRC type /
h'19012c' / type-specific-data:
300 \ age \
/
]
Figure 10: Initial Target block CBOR diagnostic
The external_aad is a concatenation of the encoded primary block and
the encoded augmented target block (its block data removed).
[
'Encrypt0', / context /
h'a10103', / protected /
h'880700008201662f2f6473742f8201662f2f7372632f8201662f2f7372632f820018
281a000f4240850702000040' / external_aad /
]
Figure 11: Enc_structure CBOR diagnostic
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft DTN BPSec COSE June 2020
[
[2], / targets /
0, / security context TBD /
0, / flags /
[
[ / target block #2 /
[ / result /
16, / COSE_Encrypt0 tag /
[
h'a10103', / protected {
\ alg \ 1:3 \ A256GCM \
} /
{ / unprotected /
/ kid / 4:'mykey',
/ iv / 5: h'6f3093eba5d85143c3dc484a'
},
null / payload /
]
]
]
]
]
Figure 12: Abstract Security Block CBOR diagnostic
[
7, / type code - bundle age /
2, / block num /
0, / flags /
0, / CRC type /
h'63bb16685ef432a0e6f1d404da71959081a715' / ciphertext /
]
Figure 13: Encrypted Target block CBOR diagnostic
Author's Address
Brian Sipos
RKF Engineering Solutions, LLC
7500 Old Georgetown Road
Suite 1275
Bethesda, MD 20814-6198
United States of America
Email: BSipos@rkf-eng.com
Sipos Expires December 28, 2020 [Page 16]