TLS 1.3 Impact on Network-Based Security

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Flemming Andreasen  , Nancy Cam-Winget  , Eric Wang 
Last updated 2018-07-02
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Network Working Group                                       F. Andreasen
Internet-Draft                                             N. Cam-Winget
Intended status: Informational                                   E. Wang
Expires: January 3, 2019                                   Cisco Systems
                                                           July 02, 2018

                TLS 1.3 Impact on Network-Based Security


   Network-based security solutions are used by enterprises, public
   sector, and cloud service providers today in order to both complement
   and augment host-based security solutions.  TLS 1.3 introduces
   several changes to TLS 1.2 with a goal to improve the overall
   security and privacy provided by TLS.  However some of these changes
   have a negative impact on network-based security solutions.  While
   this may be viewed as a feature, there are several real-life use case
   scenarios that are not easily solved without such network-based
   security solutions.  In this document, we identify the TLS 1.3
   changes that may impact network-based security solutions and provide
   a set of use case scenarios that are not easily solved without such

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Andreasen, et al.        Expires January 3, 2019                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                     I-D                         July 2018

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1.  Introduction

   Enterprises, public sector, and cloud service providers need to
   defend their information systems from attacks originating from both
   inside and outside their networks.  Protection and detection are
   typically done both on end hosts and in the network.  Host agents
   have deep visibility on the devices where they are installed, whereas
   the network has broader visibility and provides homogenous security
   controls across heterogenous endpoints, covering devices for which no
   host monitoring is available (which is common today and is
   increasingly so in the Internet of Things).  This helps protect
   against unauthorized devices installed by insiders, and provides a
   fallback in case the infection of a host disables its security agent.
   Because of these advantages, network-based security mechanisms are
   widely used.  In fact, regulatory standards such as NERC CIP
   [NERCCIP] place strong requirements about network perimeter security
   and its ability to have visibility to provide security information to
   the security management and control systems.  At the same time, the
   privacy of employees, customers, and other users must be respected by
   minimizing the collection of personal data and controlling access to
   what data is collected.  These imperatives hold for both end host and
   network based security monitoring.

   Network-based security solutions such as Firewalls (FW) and Intrusion
   Prevention Systems (IPS) rely on network traffic inspection to
   implement perimeter-based security policies.  Depending on the
   security functions required, these middleboxes can either be deployed
   as traffic monitoring devices or active in-line devices.  A traffic
   monitoring middlebox may for example perform vulnerability detection,
   intrusion detection, crypto audit, compliance monitoring, etc.  An
   active in-line middlebox may for example prevent malware download,
   block known malicious URLs, enforce use of strong ciphers, stop data
   exfiltration, etc.  A significant portion of such security policies
   require clear-text traffic inspection above Layer 4, which becomes
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