TLS 1.3 Impact on Network-Based Security

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Flemming Andreasen  , Nancy Cam-Winget  , Eric Wang 
Last updated 2019-03-10
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Network Working Group                                       F. Andreasen
Internet-Draft                                             N. Cam-Winget
Intended status: Informational                                   E. Wang
Expires: September 11, 2019                                Cisco Systems
                                                          March 10, 2019

                TLS 1.3 Impact on Network-Based Security


   Network-based security solutions are used by enterprises, public
   sector, and cloud service providers today in order to both complement
   and enhance host-based security solutions.  TLS 1.3 introduces
   several changes to TLS 1.2 with a goal to improve the overall
   security and privacy provided by TLS.  However some of these changes
   have a negative impact on network-based security solutions and
   deployments that adopt a multi-layered approach to security.  While
   this may be viewed as a feature, there are several real-life use case
   scenarios where the same functionality and security can not be
   offered without such network-based security solutions.  In this
   document, we identify the TLS 1.3 changes that may impact such use

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Andreasen, et al.      Expires September 11, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                     I-D                        March 2019

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1.  Introduction

   Enterprises, public sector, and cloud service providers need to
   defend their information systems from attacks originating from both
   inside and outside their networks.  Protection and detection are
   typically done both on end hosts and in the network.  Host agents
   have deep visibility on the devices where they are installed, whereas
   the network has broader visibility.  With such network and security
   devices in the network, it can provide, among other functions,
   homogenous security controls across heterogenous endpoints, covering
   devices for which no host monitoring is available (which is common
   today and is increasingly so in the Internet of Things).  This helps
   protect against unauthorized devices installed by insiders, and
   provides a fallback in case the infection of a host disables its
   security agent.  Because of these advantages, network-based security
   mechanisms are widely used.  In fact, regulatory standards such as
   NERC CIP [NERCCIP] place strong requirements about network perimeter
   security and its ability to have visibility to provide security
   information to the security management and control systems.  At the
   same time, the privacy of employees, customers, and other users must
   be respected by minimizing the collection of personal data and
   controlling access to what data is collected.  These imperatives hold
   for both end host and network based security monitoring.

   Network-based security solutions such as Firewalls (FW) and Intrusion
   Prevention Systems (IPS) rely on some level of network traffic
   inspection to implement perimeter-based security policies.  In many
   use cases, only the metadata or visible aspects of the network
   traffic is inspected.  Depending on the security functions required,
   these middleboxes can either be deployed as traffic monitoring
   devices or active in-line devices.  A traffic monitoring middlebox
   may for example perform vulnerability detection, intrusion detection,
   crypto audit, compliance monitoring, etc.  An active in-line
   middlebox may for example prevent malware download, block known
   malicious URLs, enforce use of strong ciphers, stop data
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