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Analysis of the 64-bit Boundary in IPv6 Addressing

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Authors Brian E. Carpenter , Tim Chown , Fernando Gont , Sheng Jiang , Alexandre Petrescu , Andrew Yourtchenko
Last updated 2014-01-05
Replaced by draft-ietf-6man-why64, RFC 7421
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6MAN                                                   B. Carpenter, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                         Univ. of Auckland
Intended status: Informational                                  T. Chown
Expires: July 10, 2014                              Univ. of Southampton
                                                                 F. Gont
                                                  SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
                                                                S. Jiang
                                            Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
                                                             A. Petrescu
                                                               CEA, LIST
                                                          A. Yourtchenko
                                                         January 6, 2014

           Analysis of the 64-bit Boundary in IPv6 Addressing


   The IPv6 unicast addressing format includes a separation between the
   prefix used to route packets to a subnet and the interface identifier
   used to specify a given interface connected to that subnet.
   Historically the interface identifier has been defined as 64 bits
   long, leaving 64 bits for the prefix.  This document discusses the
   reasons for this fixed boundary and the issues involved in treating
   it as a variable boundary.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 10, 2014.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Scenarios for prefixes longer than /64  . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Insufficient address space delegated  . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Concerns over ND cache exhaustion . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Interaction with IPv6 specifications  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Possible areas of breakage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Experimental observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Privacy issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Implementation and deployment issues  . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   11. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   12. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   The IPv6 addressing architecture [RFC4291] specifies that a unicast
   address is divided into n bits of subnet prefix followed by (128-n)
   bits of interface identifier (IID).  Since IPv6 routing is entirely
   based on variable length subnet masks, there is no architectural
   assumption that n has any particular fixed value.  However, RFC 4291
   also describes a method of forming interface identifiers from IEEE
   EUI-64 hardware addresses [IEEE802] and this does specify that such
   interface identifiers are 64 bits long.  Various other methods of
   forming interface identifiers also specify a length of 64 bits.  This
   has therefore become the de facto length of almost all IPv6 interface

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   identifiers.  One exception is documented in [RFC6164], which
   standardises 127-bit prefixes for inter-router links.

   Recently it has been clarified that the bits in an IPv6 interface
   identifier have no particular meaning and should be treated as opaque
   values [I-D.ietf-6man-ug].  Therefore, there are no bit positions in
   the currently used 64 bits that need to be preserved.

   The question is often asked why the boundary is set rigidly at /64.
   This limits the length of a routing prefix to 64 bits, whereas
   architecturally, and from the point of view of routing protocols, it
   could be anything (in theory) between /1 and /128 inclusive.  Here,
   we only discuss the question of a shorter IID, allowing a longer
   routing prefix.

   The purpose of this document is to analyse the issues around this
   question.  We make no proposal for change, but we do analyse the
   possible effects of a change.

2.  Scenarios for prefixes longer than /64

   In this section we describe existing scenarios where prefixes longer
   than /64 have been used or proposed.

2.1.  Insufficient address space delegated

   A site may not be delegated a sufficiently large prefix from which to
   allocate a /64 prefix to all of its internal subnets.  In this case
   the site may either determine that it does not have enough address
   space to number all its network elements and thus, at the very best,
   be only partially operational, or it may choose to use internal
   prefixes longer than /64 to allow multiple subnets and the hosts
   within them to be configured with addresses.

   In this case, the site might choose, for example, to use a /80 per
   subnet, in combination with hosts using either manually configured
   addressing or DHCPv6.

   It should be noted that the homenet architecture text
   [I-D.ietf-homenet-arch] states that a CPE should consider the lack of
   sufficient address space to be an error condition, rather than using
   prefixes longer than /64 internally.

2.2.  Concerns over ND cache exhaustion

   A site may be concerned that it is open to neighbour discovery (ND)
   cache exhaustion attacks, whereby an attacker sends a large number of
   messages in rapid succession to a series of (most likely inactive)

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   host addresses within a specific subnet, in an attempt to fill a
   router's ND cache with ND requests pending completion, in so doing
   denying correct operation to active devices on the network.

   An example would be to use a /120 prefix, limiting the number of
   addresses in the subnet to be similar to an IPv4 /24 prefix, which
   should not cause any concerns for ND cache exhaustion.  Note that the
   prefix does need to be quite long for this scenario to be valid.  The
   number of theoretically possible ND cache slots on the segment needs
   to be of the same order of magnitude as the actual number of hosts.
   Thus small increases from the /64 prefix length do not have a
   noticeable impact: even 2^32 potential entries, a factor of two
   billion decrease compared to 2^64, is still more than enough to
   exhaust the memory on current routers.

   As in the previous scenario, hosts would likely be manually
   configured with addresses, or use DHCPv6.

3.  Interaction with IPv6 specifications

   The precise 64-bit length of the Interface ID is widely mentioned in
   numerous RFCs describing various aspects of IPv6.  It is not
   straightforward to distinguish cases where this has normative impact
   or affects interoperability.

   First and foremost, the RFCs describing the architectural aspects of
   IPv6 addressing explicitly state, refer and repeat this apparently
   immutable value: Addressing Architecture [RFC4291], Reserved
   Interface Identifiers [RFC5453], ILNP [RFC6741].  Customer Edge
   routers impose /64 for their interfaces [RFC7084].  Only the IPv6
   Subnet Model [RFC5942] refers to the assumption of /64 prefix length
   as a potential implementation error.

   Numerous IPv6-over-foo documents make mandatory statements with
   respect to the 64-bit length of the Interface ID to be used during
   the Stateless Autoconfiguration.  These documents are [RFC2464]
   (Ethernet), [RFC2467] (FDDI), [RFC2470] (Token Ring), [RFC2492]
   (ATM), [RFC2497] (ARCnet), [RFC2590] (Frame Relay), [RFC3146] (IEEE
   1394), [RFC4338] (Fibre Channel), [RFC4944] (IEEE 802.15.4),
   [RFC5072] (PPP), [RFC5121] [RFC5692] (IEEE 802.16),
   [I-D.ietf-6lowpan-btle], [I-D.ietf-6man-6lobac],

   To a lesser extent, the address configuration RFCs themselves may in
   some way assume the 64-bit length of an Interface ID (SLAAC for the
   link-local addresses, DHCPv6 for the potentially assigned
   EUI-64-based IP addresses, Default Router Preferences [RFC4191] for
   its impossibility of Prefix Length 4, Optimistic Duplicate Address

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   Detection [RFC4429] which computes 64-bit-based collision

   The MLDv2 protocol [RFC3810] mandates all queries be sent with the
   fe80::/64 link-local source address prefix and subsequently bases the
   querier election algorithm on the link-local subnet prefix length of
   length /64.

   The IPv6 Flow Label Specification [RFC6437] gives an example of a
   20-bit hash function generation which relies on splitting an IPv6
   address in two equally-sized 64bit-length parts.

   IPv6 transition mechanisms such as NAT64 and NPTv6, as well as Basic
   transition and Teredo rely on the use of IIDs of length 64.

   The proposed method [I-D.ietf-v6ops-64share] of extending an assigned
   /64 prefix from a smartphone's cellular interface to its WiFi link
   relies on prefix length, and implicitely on the length of the
   Interface ID, to be valued at 64.

   The HBA, CGA and SeND RFCs rely on the 64bit identifier length, as do
   the Privacy extensions and some examples in IKEv2bis.

   464XLAT [RFC6877] explicitly mentions acquiring /64 prefixes.
   However, it also discusses the possibility of using the interface
   address on the device as the endpoint for the traffic, thus
   potentially removing this dependency.

   [RFC2526] reserves a number of subnet anycast addresses by reserving
   some anycast IIDs.  An anycast IID so reserved cannot be less than 7
   bits long.  This means that a subnet prefix length longer than /121
   is not possible, and a subnet of exactly /121 would be useless since
   all its identifiers are reserved.  It also means that half of a /120
   is reserved for anycast.  This could of course be fixed in the way
   described for /127 in [RFC6164], i.e., avoiding the use of anycast
   within a /120 subnet.

   Other RFCs refer to mandatory alignment on 64-bit boundaries, 64-bit
   data structures, 64-bit counters in MIB, 64-bit sequence numbers and
   cookies in security.  Finally, the 64 number may be considered
   'magic' in some RFCs, (e.g., 64k limits in DNS and Base64 encodings
   in MIME) but this of course has no influence on the length of the
   IID.  All the same, a programmer might be lulled into assuming a
   comfortable rule of thumb that an IID is always length 64.

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4.  Possible areas of breakage

   This section discusses several specific aspects of IPv6 where we can
   expect operational breakage with subnet prefixes other than /64.

   o  Multicast: [RFC3306] defines a method for generating IPv6
      multicast group addresses based on unicast prefixes.  This method
      assumes a longest network prefix of 64 bits.  If a longer subnet
      is used, there is no way to generate a specific multicast group
      address using this method.  In such cases the administrator would
      need to use a shorter prefix from within their allocation (a /64
      or shorter) from which to generate the group address.

      Similarly [RFC3956], which specifies Embedded-RP, allowing IPv6
      multicast rendezvous point addresses to be embedded in the
      multicast group address, would also fail, as the scheme assumes a
      maximum prefix length of 64 bits.

   o  CGA: The Cryptographically Generated Address format (CGA,
      [RFC3972]) is heavily based on a /64 interface identifier.
      [RFC3972] has defined a detailed algorithm how to generate 64-bit
      interface identifier from a public key and a 64-bit subnet prefix.
      Breaking the /64 boundary would certainly break the current CGA
      definition.  However, CGA might benefit in a redefined version if
      more bits are used for interface identifier (which means shorter
      prefix length).  For now, 59 bits are used for cryptographic
      purposes.  The more bits are available, the stronger CGA could be.
      Conversely, longer prefixes would weaken CGA.

   o  NAT64: Both stateless [RFC6052] NAT64 and stateful NAT64 [RFC6146]
      are flexible for the prefix length.  [RFC6052] has defined
      multiple address formats for NAT64.  In Section 2 "IPv4-Embedded
      IPv6 Prefix and Format" of [RFC6052], the network-specific prefix
      could be one of /32, /40, /48, /56, /64 and /96.  The remaining
      part of the IPv6 address is constructed by a 32-bit IPv4 address,
      a 8-bit u byte and a variable length suffix (there is no u byte
      and suffix in the case of 96-bit Well-Known Prefix).  NAT64 is
      therefore OK with a boundary out to /96, but not longer.

   o  NPTv6: IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix Translation [RFC6296] is also
      bound to /64 boundary.  NPTv6 maps a /64 prefix with other /64
      prefix.  When the NPTv6 Translator is configured with a /48 or
      shorter prefix, the 64-bit interface identifier is kept unmodified
      during translation.  However, the /64 boundary might be broken as
      long as the "inside" and "outside" prefix has the same length.

   o  ILNP: Identifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP) [RFC6741] is
      designed around the /64 boundary, since it relies on locally

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      unique 64-bit interface identifiers.  While a re-design to use
      longer prefixes is not inconceivable, this would need major
      changes to the existing specification for the IPv6 version of

   o  shim6: The Multihoming Shim Protocol for IPv6 (shim6) [RFC5533] in
      its insecure form treats IPv6 address as opaque 128-bit objects.
      However, to secure the protocol against spoofing, it is essential
      to either use CGAs (see above) or Hash-Based Addresses (HBA)
      [RFC5535].  Like CGAs, HBAs are generated using a procedure that
      assumes a 64-bit identifier.  Therefore, in effect, secure shim6
      is affected by the /64 boundary exactly like CGAs.

   o  others?

   It goes without saying that if prefixes longer than /64 are to be
   used, all hosts must be capable of generating IIDs shorter than 64
   bits, in order to follow the auto-configuration procedure correctly
   [RFC4862].  There is however the rather special case of the link-
   local prefix.  While RFC 4862 is careful not to define any specific
   length of link-local prefix within fe80::/10, operationally there
   would be a problem unless all hosts on a link use IIDs of the same
   length to configure a link-local address during reboot.  Typically
   today the choice of /64 for the link-local prefix length is hard-
   coded per interface.  There might be no way to change this except
   conceivably by manual configuration, which will be impossible if the
   host concerned has no local user interface.

5.  Experimental observations

   Still to be written - some experiments are underway, and more input
   is welcomed.  Some points made earlier on the v6ops list can be
   incorporated here.

6.  Privacy issues

   The length of the interface identifier has implications for privacy
   [I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy].  In any case in
   which the value of the identifier is intended to be hard to guess,
   whether or not it is cryptographically generated, it is apparent that
   more bits are better.  For example, if there are only 20 bits to be
   guessed, at most just over a million guesses are needed, today well
   within the capacity of a low cost attack mechanism.  It is hard to
   state in general how many bits are enough to protect privacy, since
   this depends on the resources available to the attacker, but it seems
   clear that a privacy solution needs to resist an attack requiring
   billions rather than millions of guesses.  Trillions would be better,
   suggesting that at least 40 bits should be available.  Thus we can

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   argue that subnet prefixes longer than say /80 might raise privacy
   concerns by making the IID guessable.

   A prefix long enough to limit the number of addresses comparably to
   an IPv4 subnet, such as /120, would create exactly the same situation
   for privacy as IPv4.

7.  Implementation and deployment issues

   Still to be written - suggestions welcome.  Some points made earlier
   on the v6ops list can be incorporated here.

8.  Conclusion

   Summary of pros and cons; risks (write this bit last!)

9.  Security Considerations

   In addition to the privacy issues mentioned in Section 6, and the
   issues mentioned with CGAs and HBAs in Section 4, the length of the
   subnet prefix affects the matter of defence against scanning attacks
   [RFC5157].  Assuming the attacker has discovered or guessed the
   prefix length, a longer prefix reduces the space that the attacker
   needs to scan, e.g., to only 256 addresses if the prefix is /120.  On
   the other hand, if the attacker has not discovered the prefix length
   and assumes it to be /64, routers can trivially discard attack
   packets that do not fall within an actual subnet.

   However, assume that an attacker finds one valid address A and then
   starts a scanning attack by scanning "outwards" from A, by trying
   A+1, A-1, A+2, A-2, etc.  This attacker will easily find all hosts in
   any subnet with a long prefix, because they will have addresses close
   to A. We therefore conclude that any prefix containing densely packed
   valid addresses is vulnerable to a scanning attack, without the
   attacker needing to guess the prefix length.  Therefore, to preserve
   IPv6's advantage over IPv4 in resisting scanning attacks, it is
   important that subnet prefixes are short enough to allow sparse
   allocation of identifiers within each subnet.  The considerations are
   similar to those for privacy, and we can again argue that prefixes
   longer than say /80 might significantly increase vulnerability.
   Ironically, this argument is exactly converse to the argument for
   longer prefixes to resist an ND cache attack, as described in
   Section 2.2.

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10.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests no action by IANA.

11.  Acknowledgements

   Valuable comments were received from Stig Venaas, ...  and other
   participants in the IETF.

   This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629].

12.  Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]

   draft-carpenter-6man-why64-00: original version, 2014-01-06.

13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

              Carpenter, B. and S. Jiang, "Significance of IPv6
              Interface Identifiers", draft-ietf-6man-ug-06 (work in
              progress), December 2013.

   [RFC2464]  Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet
              Networks", RFC 2464, December 1998.

   [RFC2467]  Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over FDDI
              Networks", RFC 2467, December 1998.

   [RFC2470]  Crawford, M., Narten, T., and S. Thomas, "Transmission of
              IPv6 Packets over Token Ring Networks", RFC 2470, December

   [RFC2492]  Armitage, G., Schulter, P., and M. Jork, "IPv6 over ATM
              Networks", RFC 2492, January 1999.

   [RFC2497]  Souvatzis, I., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over ARCnet
              Networks", RFC 2497, January 1999.

   [RFC2526]  Johnson, D. and S. Deering, "Reserved IPv6 Subnet Anycast
              Addresses", RFC 2526, March 1999.

   [RFC2590]  Conta, A., Malis, A., and M. Mueller, "Transmission of
              IPv6 Packets over Frame Relay Networks Specification", RFC
              2590, May 1999.

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   [RFC3146]  Fujisawa, K. and A. Onoe, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets
              over IEEE 1394 Networks", RFC 3146, October 2001.

   [RFC3306]  Haberman, B. and D. Thaler, "Unicast-Prefix-based IPv6
              Multicast Addresses", RFC 3306, August 2002.

   [RFC3810]  Vida, R. and L. Costa, "Multicast Listener Discovery
              Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, June 2004.

   [RFC3956]  Savola, P. and B. Haberman, "Embedding the Rendezvous
              Point (RP) Address in an IPv6 Multicast Address", RFC
              3956, November 2004.

   [RFC3972]  Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
              RFC 3972, March 2005.

   [RFC4191]  Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and
              More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, November 2005.

   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.

   [RFC4338]  DeSanti, C., Carlson, C., and R. Nixon, "Transmission of
              IPv6, IPv4, and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Packets
              over Fibre Channel", RFC 4338, January 2006.

   [RFC4429]  Moore, N., "Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
              for IPv6", RFC 4429, April 2006.

   [RFC4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
              Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.

   [RFC4944]  Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
              "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
              Networks", RFC 4944, September 2007.

   [RFC5072]  Varada, S., Haskins, D., and E. Allen, "IP Version 6 over
              PPP", RFC 5072, September 2007.

   [RFC5121]  Patil, B., Xia, F., Sarikaya, B., Choi, JH., and S.
              Madanapalli, "Transmission of IPv6 via the IPv6
              Convergence Sublayer over IEEE 802.16 Networks", RFC 5121,
              February 2008.

   [RFC5157]  Chown, T., "IPv6 Implications for Network Scanning", RFC
              5157, March 2008.

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   [RFC5453]  Krishnan, S., "Reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers", RFC
              5453, February 2009.

   [RFC5533]  Nordmark, E. and M. Bagnulo, "Shim6: Level 3 Multihoming
              Shim Protocol for IPv6", RFC 5533, June 2009.

   [RFC5535]  Bagnulo, M., "Hash-Based Addresses (HBA)", RFC 5535, June

   [RFC5692]  Jeon, H., Jeong, S., and M. Riegel, "Transmission of IP
              over Ethernet over IEEE 802.16 Networks", RFC 5692,
              October 2009.

   [RFC5942]  Singh, H., Beebee, W., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Subnet
              Model: The Relationship between Links and Subnet
              Prefixes", RFC 5942, July 2010.

   [RFC6052]  Bao, C., Huitema, C., Bagnulo, M., Boucadair, M., and X.
              Li, "IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6 Translators", RFC 6052,
              October 2010.

   [RFC6146]  Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
              NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
              Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, April 2011.

   [RFC6164]  Kohno, M., Nitzan, B., Bush, R., Matsuzaki, Y., Colitti,
              L., and T. Narten, "Using 127-Bit IPv6 Prefixes on Inter-
              Router Links", RFC 6164, April 2011.

   [RFC6296]  Wasserman, M. and F. Baker, "IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix
              Translation", RFC 6296, June 2011.

   [RFC6437]  Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme,
              "IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437, November 2011.

   [RFC6741]  Atkinson,, RJ., "Identifier-Locator Network Protocol
              (ILNP) Engineering Considerations", RFC 6741, November

   [RFC7084]  Singh, H., Beebee, W., Donley, C., Stark, B., 
              "Basic Requirements for IPv6 Customer Edge
              Routers", RFC 7084, November 2013.

13.2.  Informative References

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              Brandt, A. and J. Buron, "Transmission of IPv6 packets
              over ITU-T G.9959 Networks", draft-brandt-6man-lowpanz-02
              (work in progress), June 2013.

              Nieminen, J., Savolainen, T., Isomaki, M., Patil, B.,
              Shelby, Z., and C. Gomez, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets
              over BLUETOOTH Low Energy", draft-ietf-6lowpan-btle-12
              (work in progress), February 2013.

              Lynn, K., Martocci, J., Neilson, C., and S. Donaldson,
              "Transmission of IPv6 over MS/TP Networks", draft-ietf-
              6man-6lobac-01 (work in progress), March 2012.

              Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Privacy
              Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms",
              draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy-00 (work
              in progress), October 2013.

              Chown, T., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and J. Weil,
              "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles", draft-
              ietf-homenet-arch-11 (work in progress), October 2013.

              Byrne, C., Drown, D., and V. Ales, "Extending an IPv6 /64
              Prefix from a 3GPP Mobile Interface to a LAN link", draft-
              ietf-v6ops-64share-09 (work in progress), October 2013.

   [IEEE802]  IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
              Networks: Overview and Architecture", IEEE Std 802-2001
              (R2007), 2007.

   [RFC2629]  Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
              June 1999.

   [RFC6741]  Atkinson,, RJ., "Identifier-Locator Network Protocol
              (ILNP) Engineering Considerations", RFC 6741, November

   [RFC6877]  Mawatari, M., Kawashima, M., and C. Byrne, "464XLAT:
              Combination of Stateful and Stateless Translation", RFC
              6877, April 2013.

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Authors' Addresses

   Brian Carpenter (editor)
   Department of Computer Science
   University of Auckland
   PB 92019
   Auckland  1142
   New Zealand


   Tim Chown
   University of Southampton
   Southampton, Hampshire  SO17 1BJ
   United Kingdom


   Fernando Gont
   SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
   Evaristo Carriego 2644
   Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires  1706


   Sheng Jiang
   Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
   Q14, Huawei Campus
   No.156 Beiqing Road
   Hai-Dian District, Beijing  100095
   P.R. China


   Alexandru Petrescu
   CEA Saclay
   Gif-sur-Yvette, Ile-de-France  91190


Carpenter, et al.         Expires July 10, 2014                [Page 13]
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   Andrew Yourtchenko
   7a de Kleetlaan
   Diegem  1830


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