Using attack bandwidth in signal channel
draft-chen-dots-attack-bandwidth-expansion-01

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DOTS                                                             M. Chen
Internet-Draft                                                    Li. Su
Intended status: Informational                                 Jin. Peng
Expires: September 12, 2019                                         CMCC
                                                          March 11, 2019

                Using attack bandwidth in signal channel
             draft-chen-dots-attack-bandwidth-expansion-01

Abstract

   This document describes a DDoS Mitigation Request parameter used in
   the Signal Channel request, as an expansion of the signal channel for
   mitigating DDoS attack accurately with target-bandwidth.  The
   proposed parameter will help to choose the appropriate mitigator or
   mitigators for mitigation, When An attack occurs that is greater than
   the maximum clean capability, this paramter can decide to be
   blackhole directly or to be drainaged for clean.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Chen, et al.           Expires September 12, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            dots attack bandwidth               March 2019

   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Mitigation Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  directly discard attack flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Optimal device selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Optimum path for disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Request Mitigation expansion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a type of resource-consuming
   attack, which exploits a large number of attack resources and uses
   standard protocols to attack target objects.  DDoS attacks consume a
   large amount of target object network resources or server resources
   (including computing power, storage capacity, etc.) of the target
   object, so that the target object cannot provide network services
   normally.  At present, DDoS attack is one of the most powerful and
   indefensible attacks on the Internet, and due to the extensive use of
   mobile devices and IoT devices in recent years, it is easier for DDoS
   attackers to attack with real attack sources (broilers).

   Volume based distributed denial-of-service attack bring huge amount
   of attack traffic on the link, and the peaks keep hitting new highs,
   the economic loss that causes is bigger also.  For the service
   providers to immediately protect their network services from DDoS
   attacks, DDoS mitigation needs to be automated.

   DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) is a protocol to standardize real-
   time signaling, threat-handling
   requests[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], when attack target is under
   attack, dots client send mitigation request to dots server for help,
   If the mitigation request contains enough messages of the attack,
   then the mitigator can respond very effectively.
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