DOTS client carry ddos attack information in signal channel
draft-chen-dots-attack-informations-00

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DOTS                                                             M. Chen
Internet-Draft                                                    Li. Su
Intended status: Informational                                 Jin. Peng
Expires: January 8, 2020                                            CMCC
                                                           July 07, 2019

      DOTS client carry ddos attack information in signal channel
                 draft-chen-dots-attack-informations-00

Abstract

   This document describes DDoS attack information which can be obtained
   by DOTS client when the enterprise suspects it is under DDoS attack,
   these informations will be send from DOTS client to DOTS server using
   Signal channel within Mitigation Request.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2020.

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Chen, et al.             Expires January 8, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           DDoS attack information               July 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Key Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Mitigation Use Case 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  directly discard attack flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Optimal device selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Optimum path for disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.4.  Mitigation request parameter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Mitigation Use Case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  classified disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Standard of Attack Type Definition  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Mitigation Use Case 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Mitigation alarm baseline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Mitigation request optional parameters  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Mitigation response parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   10. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a type of resource-consuming
   attack, which exploits a large number of attack resources and uses
   standard protocols to attack target objects.  DDoS attacks consume a
   large amount of target network resources or server resources
   (including computing power, storage capacity, etc.).  At present,
   DDoS attack is one of the most powerful and indefensible attacks on
   the Internet, and due to the extensive use of mobile devices and IoT
   devices in recent years, it is easier for DDoS attackers to attack
   with real attack sources (broilers).

   The IETF is specifying the DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
   [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]architecture, where a DOTS client can
   inform a DOTS server that the network is under a potential attack and
   that appropriate mitigation actions are required.  In the
   architecture draft, it says in the draft the enterprise has a DOTS
   client, which obtains information about the DDoS attack, and signals
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