SRH and IP header protection
draft-chen-spring-srv6-srh-security-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Dongjie Lu  , chenmeiling  , Li Su 
Last updated 2021-02-22
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Spring                                                             D. Lu
Internet-Draft                                                   M. Chen
Intended status: Standards Track                                  Li. Su
Expires: August 27, 2021                                    China Mobile
                                                       February 23, 2021

                      SRH and IP header protection
                 draft-chen-spring-srv6-srh-security-00

Abstract

   This document proposes a method to protect SRH and IP header using
   signature which stored in the TLV, this scheme can apply to SRv6 and
   G-SRv6.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 27, 2021.

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   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  New TLV Type for Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  signing and verifying process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  verifying optimization process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   SRv6 is a protocol for forwarding IPv6 packets over a network based
   on the concept of source routing.  By inserting a Segment Routing
   Header (SRH) into the IPv6 packet, an explicit IPv6 address stack is
   pressed into the SRH, and the destination address and offset address
   stack are constantly updated by the intermediate node to complete
   hop-by-hop forwarding, SRH is defined in RFC8754 [RFC8754]

   G-SRv6 is generalized Segment Routing over IPv6 which can reduce the
   overhead of SRv6 by encoding the Generalized SIDs in SID list, the
   compression solution is designed in the draft [I-D.cl-spring-
   generalized-srv6-for-cmpr].

   As an emerging source routing protocol, SRv6 is confronted with
   various threat of source routing attacks.  By defining SRH, attackers
   can construct various source routing attacks, such as bypassing key
   detection nodes of network and constructing malicious loops.

   SRv6 networks generally define SRv6 trust domains for basic security
   protection, which is also mentioned in the draft [I.D.li-spring-srv6-
   security-consideration] and RFC 8754 [RFC8754].  Firstly, the address
   space in the SRv6 trust domain is defined to avoid SRv6 trust domain
   address leakage.  Then ACL filtering is enabled at the boundary of
   the trust domain, and packets whose destination address is SRv6 trust
   domain are discarded to avoid source routing attack on SRV6 trust
   domain by attacking packets.

   SRv6 trust domains use Segment Bingding technology for basic
   security.  RFC8754 defines SRv6 HMAC TLV for IPv6 source address and
   SRH integrity protection which based on SRv6 trust domain, identity
   authentication based on the shared key, to prevent illegal access and
   tamper header, so as to prevent various source routing attacks.
   However, there is a problem with this scheme, HMAC verification is
   based on symmetric key verification, that means all network nodes

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