@techreport{cheng-idr-redirection-risks-ps-03,
    number =    {draft-cheng-idr-redirection-risks-ps-03},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cheng-idr-redirection-risks-ps/03/},
    author =    {Weiqiang Cheng and Dan Li and Ce Zheng and Mingqing(Michael) Huang and Fang Gao and Mingxing Liu},
    title =     {{Problem statement of Inter-domain Traffic Redirection Risks}},
    pagetotal = 8,
    year =      2023,
    month =     jul,
    day =       9,
    abstract =  {BGP Update includes the destination prefix and AS\_PATH that records the AS number through which it passes. The traffic routing to the destination prefix should be forwarded along the AS sequence in AS\_PATH. However, due to traffic redirection, route aggregation and etc., the AS path of forwarding and the AS\_PATH of BGP Update often do not match. The inconsistency leads to security risks such as black holes, loops in inter-domain forwarding, and the possibility of forwarding through malicious AS that source/upstream AS does not want to pass through.},
}