Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisement Problem Statement
draft-chown-v6ops-rogue-ra-03
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Tim Chown , Stig Venaas | ||
| Last updated | 2009-06-01 (Latest revision 2009-03-09) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-v6ops-rogue-ra | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-v6ops-rogue-ra | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
When deploying IPv6, whether IPv6-only or dual-stack, routers are configured to send IPv6 Router Advertisements to convey information to nodes that enable them to autoconfigure on the network. This information includes the implied default router address taken from the observed source address of the Router Advertisement (RA) message, as well as on-link prefix information. However, unintended misconfigurations by users or administrators, or possibly malicious attacks on the network, may lead to bogus RAs being present, which in turn can cause operational problems for hosts on the network. In this draft we summarise the scenarios in which rogue RAs may be observed and present a list of possible solutions to the problem. We focus on the unintended causes of rogue RAs in the text. The goal of this text is to be Informational, and as such to present a framework around which solutions can be proposed and discussed.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)