Verified Mark Certificates Proposal: A Security Perspective
draft-chuang-ietf-bimi-security-perspectives-00

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Last updated 2019-03-11
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Application Area Working Group                            W. Chuang, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                              Google, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                             T. Loder, Ed.
Expires: September 12, 2019                              Skye Logicworks
                                                          March 11, 2019

      Verified Mark Certificates Proposal: A Security Perspective
            draft-chuang-ietf-bimi-security-perspectives-00

Abstract

   This document motivates the need for embedding logotypes in X.509
   certificates along with the certificate validation process from a
   security perspective.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.

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Chuang & Loder         Expires September 12, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft          VMC Security Perspective              March 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Objectives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Critique of the BIMI Proposals  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       1.1.1.  BIMI Draft  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       1.1.2.  BIMI Guidance (So far) About Certificates . . . . . .   5
   2.  Verified Mark Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.1.  Certificate Association With Logo . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Verified Identity of Sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.3.  Root Program  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.4.  Certificate Transparency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.5.  Registered Trademark  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.5.1.  Coexistence with non-Registered Trademark . . . . . .  11
     2.6.  Logo Image Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.7.  Non-Display of Logo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.8.  BIMI Message Fetch  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.8.1.  Mail Clients Support  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   3.  Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.1.  Discussion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.2.  X.509 Message Authentication Proposal . . . . . . . . . .  14
   4.  Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.3.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Objectives

   Many Mail User Agents and mail systems provide logo imagery as
   avatars as part of the user interface chrome.  For branded email, the
   agents and systems use different, proprietary methods for
   provisioning the avatar which causes consistency problems.  Instead
   there should a common, internet scale, secure method to fetch the
   sender's brand logo indicators during message delivery which this
   document along with others documents by the AuthIndicators Working
   Group (aka BIMI Working Group) propose.

   Given the potential for impersonation abuse if not safeguarded, the
   proposal incorporates defense in depth as it assumes an adversarial
   security model and that parties will attempt to exploit sender/
   subscribers for their own criminal benefit.  Due to this risk of
   identity spoofing, a sender's identity is verified by a Certificate
   Authority (CA) that acts as a Mark Verification Authority (MVA) that
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