KARP IS-IS security gap analysis
draft-chunduri-karp-is-is-gap-analysis-00

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Working Group                                                U. Chunduri
Internet-Draft                                                   A. Tian
Intended status: Informational                                     W. Lu
Expires: April 26, 2012                                   Ericsson Inc.,
                                                        October 24, 2011

                    KARP IS-IS security gap analysis
               draft-chunduri-karp-is-is-gap-analysis-00

Abstract

   This document analyzes the threats applicable for Intermediate system
   to Intermediate system (IS-IS) routing protocol and security gaps
   according to the KARP Design Guide.  This document also provides
   specific requirements to address the gaps with both manual and auto
   key management protocols.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 26, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Current State  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.1.  Sub network Independent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.2.  Sub network dependent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Key Agility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.3.  Security Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.3.1.  Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.3.2.  Spoofing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.3.3.  DoS Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  Gap Analysis and Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.1.  Manual Key Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  Key Management Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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1.  Introduction

   This document analyzes the current state of Intermediate system to
   Intermediate system (IS-IS) protocol according to the requirements
   set forth in [I-D.ietf-karp-design-guide] for both manual and key
   management protocols.

   With currently published work, IS-IS meets some of the requirements
   expected from a manually keyed routing protocol.  Integrity
   protection is expanded with more cryptographic algorithms and also
   limited algorithm agility (HMAC-SHA family) is provided with
   [RFC5310].  Basic form of Intra-connection re-keying capability is
   provided by the specification [RFC5310] with some gaps as explained
   in Section 3.

   This draft summarizes the current state of cryptographic key usage in
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