Requirements for Trust and Privacy in WebRTC Peer-to-peer Authentication
draft-copeland-rtcweb-p2p-idp-auth-00

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Network Working Group                                   R. Copeland, Ed.
Internet-Draft                  Institut Mines Telecom-Telecom Sud Paris
Intended status: Informational                                  K. Corre
Expires: March 30, 2017                                      Orange Labs
                                                               I. Friese
                                                     Deutsche Telekom AG
                                                          S. El Jaouhari
                                 Institut Mines Telecom-Telecom Bretagne
                                                      September 26, 2016

Requirements for Trust and Privacy in WebRTC Peer-to-peer Authentication
                 draft-copeland-rtcweb-p2p-idp-auth-00

Abstract

   This document studies the relationships of WebRTC communication users
   with their web Calling Services (CS) and their Identity Providers
   (IdPs), in order to identify requirements for IdP based peer-to-peer
   authentication.  This study focuses in particular on issues of
   privacy, security and trust that are raised by the introduction of
   the IdP into the WebRTC call model, and by a different browser-based
   calling paradigm, compared with Mobile networks or traditional VoIP
   systems.  The document lists privacy and trust scenarios for WebRTC
   authentication for individuals as well as organizations.  This
   contribution is proposed to the RTCWEB working group.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 30, 2017.

Copeland, et al.         Expires March 30, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    Requirements in WebRTC Authentication   September 2016

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Call Context Aspects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Existing Protocols and Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  WebRTC Architecture Components  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  WebRTC Call Models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.3.1.  Single-CS Call Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.3.2.  Dual-CS Call Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.4.  Service Types and their Trust Models  . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.5.  Destination Categories  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Architecture  Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Untrusted Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Network Messages Across Multiple Parties  . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  Confidentiality of Call Logs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.4.  Dependency of Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.5.  IdP Selection Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Identity Privacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  Desirable and Undesirable Identity Privacy  . . . . . . .  13
     5.2.  Undetectable Calling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.3.  Pseudonymous Calling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.4.  Unlinkable Calling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.5.  Potential Methods of Identity Protection  . . . . . . . .  14
       5.5.1.  Sensitive User Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       5.5.2.  Proposed Surrogated identities with Pseudonyms  . . .  14
   6.  Trust Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
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