Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols
draft-cremers-cfrg-randomness-improvements-00
| Document | Type | Replaced Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2018-09-02 (latest revision 2018-03-01) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
pdf
htmlized
bibtex
|
||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements | |
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-cremers-cfrg-randomness-improvements-00.txt
Abstract
Randomness is a crucial ingredient for TLS and related security protocols. Weak or predictable "cryptographically-strong" pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs) can be abused or exploited for malicious purposes. The Dual EC random number backdoor and Debian bugs are relevant examples of this problem. This document describes a way for security protocol participants to mix their long- term private key into the entropy pool(s) from which random values are derived. This augments and improves randomness from broken or otherwise subverted CSPRNGs.
Authors
Cas Cremers
(cas.cremers@cs.ox.ac.uk)
Luke Garratt
(luke.garratt@cs.ox.ac.uk)
Stanislav Smyshlyaev
(svs@cryptopro.ru)
Nick Sullivan
(nick@cloudflare.com)
Christopher Wood
(cawood@apple.com)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)