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STRINT Workshop Position Paper: Levels of Opportunistic Privacy Protection for Messaging-Oriented Architectures

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Expired & archived
Authors Dave Crocker , Pete Resnick
Last updated 2014-07-21 (Latest revision 2014-01-15)
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:


Given a concern for pervasive monitoring, messaging information needing protection includes primary payload, descriptive meta-data, and traffic-related analysis. Complete protection against pervasive monitoring (PM), for traffic through complex handling sequences, has not yet been achieved reliably in real-world operation. Consequently, it is reasonable to consider a range of mechanisms, for protecting differing amounts of information and against monitoring of different kinds. Although channel-based encryption can be helpful, it is not sufficient. This paper considers pursuing different levels of end-to-end protection, referencing examples of component mechanisms that already have encouraging field experience.


Dave Crocker
Pete Resnick

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)