Babel Routing Protocol over Datagram Transport Layer Security
draft-decimo-babel-dtls-00

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Last updated 2018-06-29
Replaced by draft-ietf-babel-dtls
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Network Working Group                                          A. Decimo
Internet-Draft                         IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
Intended status: Standards Track                             D. Schinazi
Expires: December 30, 2018                                    Apple Inc.
                                                           J. Chroboczek
                                       IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
                                                           June 28, 2018

     Babel Routing Protocol over Datagram Transport Layer Security
                       draft-decimo-babel-dtls-00

Abstract

   This documents describes how to use Datagram Transport Layer Security
   (DTLS) to secure the Babel Routing Protocol.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Handling protected and unprotected data . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Cleartext and DTLS on the same port . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Cleartext and DTLS on separate ports  . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Establishing and handling Babel over DTLS sessions  . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Session Initiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Transmission  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  Neighbour flush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Interface MTU Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   The Babel routing protocol [RFC6126bis] does not provide security
   mechanisms.  This document describes how to protect Babel with the
   Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347] protocol.  The
   main change to the Babel protocol is that Babel over DTLS requires
   most packets to be sent over unicast.

   The motivations for proposing Babel over DTLS are that:

   o  DTLS provides a sub-layer of security that is well-defined, whose
      security has been shown, and that has multiple interoperable
      implementations;

   o  DTLS provides authentication of peers;

   o  DTLS provides integrity of data;

   o  DTLS provides confidentiality of data;

   o  DTLS allows the use of asymmetric keys.

   A malicious entity in range of a non-secured deployment of Babel can
   learn properties of the network, but also reroute legitimate traffic
   by advertising routes with a low metric.

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1.1.  Specification of Requirements

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
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