%% You should probably cite draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-06 instead of this revision.
@techreport{dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-01,
    number =    {draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-01},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore/01/},
    author =    {Daniel Kahn Gillmor},
    title =     {{Abuse-Resistant OpenPGP Keystores}},
    pagetotal = 27,
    year =      ,
    month =     ,
    day =       ,
    abstract =  {OpenPGP transferable public keys are composite certificates, made up of primary keys, direct key signatures, user IDs, identity certifications ("signature packets"), subkeys, and so on. They are often assembled by merging multiple certificates that all share the same primary key, and are distributed in public keystores. Unfortunately, since any third-party can add certifications with any content to any OpenPGP certificate, the assembled/merged form of a certificate can become unwieldy or undistributable. This draft documents techniques that an archive of OpenPGP certificates can use to mitigate the impact of these various forms of flooding attacks.},
}