Stateless OpenPGP Command Line Interface
draft-dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli-13
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| Last updated | 2025-01-03 (Latest revision 2024-12-04) | ||
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draft-dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli-13
openpgp D. K. Gillmor
Internet-Draft ACLU
Intended status: Informational 3 January 2025
Expires: 7 July 2025
Stateless OpenPGP Command Line Interface
draft-dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli-13
Abstract
This document defines a generic stateless command-line interface for
dealing with OpenPGP messages, certificates, and secret key material,
known as sop. It aims for a minimal, well-structured API covering
OpenPGP object security and maintenance of credentials and secrets.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://dkg.gitlab.io/openpgp-stateless-cli/. Status information for
this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-
dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the OpenPGP Working Group
mailing list (mailto:openpgp@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/openpgp/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/openpgp/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://gitlab.com/dkg/openpgp-stateless-cli/.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 July 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Using sop in a Test Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4. Semantics vs. Wire Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. sopv Subset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. sopv Versioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Universal Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. --debug: emit more verbose output . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Subcommands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Meta Subcommands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.1. version: Version Information . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.2. list-profiles: Describe Available Profiles . . . . . 10
5.2. Key and Certificate Management Subcommands . . . . . . . 11
5.2.1. generate-key: Generate a Secret Key . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2.2. change-key-password: Update a Key's Password . . . . 12
5.2.3. revoke-key: Create a Revocation Certificate . . . . . 13
5.2.4. extract-cert: Extract a Certificate from a Secret
Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.5. update-key: Keep a Secret Key Up-To-Date . . . . . . 14
5.2.6. merge-certs: Merge OpenPGP Certificates . . . . . . . 16
5.3. User Identity Subcommands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.3.1. certify-userid: Certify OpenPGP Certificate User
IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.3.2. validate-userid: Validate a User ID in an OpenPGP
Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.4. Messaging Subcommands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.4.1. sign: Create Detached Signatures . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.4.2. verify: Verify Detached Signatures . . . . . . . . . 21
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5.4.3. encrypt: Encrypt a Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.4.4. decrypt: Decrypt a Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4.5. inline-detach: Split Signatures from an Inline-Signed
Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.4.6. inline-verify: Verify an Inline-Signed Message . . . 28
5.4.7. inline-sign: Create an Inline-Signed Message . . . . 29
5.5. Transport Subcommands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.5.1. armor: Convert Binary to ASCII . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.5.2. dearmor: Convert ASCII to Binary . . . . . . . . . . 32
6. Input String Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.1. DATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2. USERID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.3. SUBCOMMAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.4. PROFILE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7. Input/Output Indirect Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1. Special Designators for Indirect Types . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1.1. @ENV: Special Designator for Environment Variable . . 36
7.1.2. @FD: Special Designator for File Descriptor . . . . . 36
7.2. CERTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.3. KEYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.4. CIPHERTEXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.5. INLINESIGNED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.6. SIGNATURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.7. SESSIONKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.8. MICALG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.9. PASSWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.10. VERIFICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.10.1. VERIFICATIONS extension JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.11. DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.12. PROFILELIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8. Failure Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9. Known Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10. Alternate Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
11. Guidance for Implementers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
11.1. One OpenPGP Message at a Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
11.2. Simplified Subset of OpenPGP Message . . . . . . . . . . 46
11.3. Validate Signatures Only from Known Signers . . . . . . 46
11.4. OpenPGP Inputs can be either Binary or ASCII-armored . . 47
11.5. Complexities of the Cleartext Signature Framework . . . 48
11.6. Reliance on Supplied Certs and Keys . . . . . . . . . . 49
11.7. Text is always UTF-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
11.8. Passwords are Human-Readable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
11.8.1. Generating Material with Human-Readable Passwords . 50
11.8.2. Consuming Password-protected Material . . . . . . . 51
11.9. Be Careful with Special Designators . . . . . . . . . . 51
11.10. Nuances for Hardware-backed Secret Key Material . . . . 52
11.11. Statelessness exemptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
12. Guidance for Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
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12.1. Choosing Between --as=text and --as=binary . . . . . . . 54
12.2. Special Designators and Unusual Filenames . . . . . . . 54
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
13.1. Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
13.1.1. Explaining Non-Verification on Standard Error . . . 56
13.2. Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
14. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
14.1. Object Security vs. Transport Security . . . . . . . . . 58
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Appendix A. sopv Version Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.1. sopv Version 1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.2. sopv Version 1.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Appendix B. C Library API (Tentative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
B.1. Design Choices for Library API . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
B.2. Library Use Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
B.3. libsopv C API Subset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
B.3.1. libsopv 1.1 C API Subset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Appendix C. Simple CLI Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Appendix D. Testing the sopv Subset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
D.1. setup-sopv-test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
D.2. sopv-test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Appendix E. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Appendix F. Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Appendix G. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
G.1. Substantive Changes between -12 and -13: . . . . . . . . 95
G.2. Substantive Changes between -11 and -12: . . . . . . . . 95
G.3. Substantive Changes between -10 and -11: . . . . . . . . 95
G.4. Substantive Changes between -09 and -10: . . . . . . . . 96
G.5. Substantive Changes between -08 and -09: . . . . . . . . 96
G.6. Substantive Changes between -07 and -08: . . . . . . . . 97
G.7. Substantive Changes between -06 and -07: . . . . . . . . 97
G.8. Substantive Changes between -05 and -06: . . . . . . . . 97
G.9. Substantive Changes between -04 and -05: . . . . . . . . 97
G.10. Substantive Changes between -03 and -04: . . . . . . . . 98
G.11. Substantive Changes between -02 and -03: . . . . . . . . 98
G.12. Substantive Changes between -01 and -02: . . . . . . . . 98
G.13. Substantive Changes between -00 and -01: . . . . . . . . 99
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
1. Introduction
Different OpenPGP implementations have many different requirements,
which typically break down in two main categories: key/certificate
management and object security.
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The purpose of this document is to provide a "stateless" interface
that can handle both object security side and key and certificate
management in a way that would be usable by applications across the
full OpenPGP lifecycle.
A priority for this interface is to facilitate interoperability
testing for OpenPGP implementations, for example as described in
Section 1.3.
This document defines a generic stateless command-line interface for
dealing with OpenPGP messages, secret keys, and certificates, known
here by the placeholder sop. It aims for a minimal, well-structured
API.
An OpenPGP implementation should not name its executable sop to
implement this specification. It just needs to provide a program
that conforms to this interface.
A sop implementation should leave no trace on the system, and its
behavior should not be affected by anything other than command-line
arguments and input.
Inputs to sop are immutable inputs. Any named files that it receives
as input should only need read access, and it must not write to or
modify any of its inputs. The only places a sop implementation
should write to are standard output and (in some special cases) a
location specified by an --*-out= argument.
Obviously, the user (or consuming application) will need to manage
persistent secret keys and certificates somehow, but the goal of this
interface is to separate out that task from the task of processing
and handling OpenPGP objects.
While this document identifies a command-line interface, the rough
outlines of this interface should also be amenable to relatively
straightforward library implementations in different languages.
Appendix B offers a preliminary sketch of a C library interface that
also has no implicit state.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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1.2. Terminology
This document uses the term "key" to refer exclusively to OpenPGP
Transferable Secret Keys (see Section 10.2 of [RFC9580]).
It uses the term "certificate" to refer to OpenPGP Transferable
Public Key (see Section 10.1 of [RFC9580]).
"Stateless" in "Stateless OpenPGP" means avoiding any sort of
persistent and implicit state. The user is responsible for managing
all OpenPGP certificates and secret keys themselves, and passing them
to sop as needed. The user should also not be concerned that any
state could affect the underlying operations.
OpenPGP revocations can have "Reason for Revocation"
(Section 5.2.3.31 of [RFC9580]), which can be either "soft" or
"hard". The set of "soft" reasons is: "Key is superseded" and "Key
is retired and no longer used". All other reasons (and revocations
that do not state a reason) are "hard" revocations.
This document refers to a special verification-only subset of the sop
command-line interface as sopv (see Section 3 for more details).
1.3. Using sop in a Test Suite
If an OpenPGP implementation provides a sop interface, it can be used
to test interoperability (e.g.,
[OpenPGP-Interoperability-Test-Suite]).
Such an interop test suite can, for example, use custom code (_not_
sop) to generate a new OpenPGP object that incorporates new
primitives, and feed that object to a stable of sop implementations,
to determine whether those implementations can consume the new form.
Or, the test suite can drive each sop implementation with a simple
input, and observe which cryptographic primitives each implementation
chooses to use as it produces output.
A simple self-test can be found in Appendix C.
1.4. Semantics vs. Wire Format
The semantics of sop are deliberately simple and very high-level
compared to the vast complexity and nuance available within the
OpenPGP specification. This reflects the perspective of nearly every
piece of tooling that relies on OpenPGP to accomplish its task: most
toolchains don't care about the specifics, they just want the high-
level object security properties.
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Given this framing, this document generally tries to avoid
overconstraining the details of the wire format objects emitted, or
what kinds of wire format structures should be acceptable or
unacceptable. This allows a test suite to evaluate and contrast the
wire format choices made by different implementations in as close to
their native configuration as possible. It also makes it easier to
promote interoperability by ensuring that the native wire formats
emitted by one implementation can be consumed by another, without
relying on their choices of wire format being constrained by this
draft.
Where this draft does identify specific wire format requirements,
that might be due to an ambiguity in the existing specifications
(which maybe needs fixing elsewhere), or to a bug in this
specification that could be improved.
2. Examples
These examples show no error checking, but give a flavor of how sop
might be used in practice from a shell.
The key and certificate files described in them (e.g., alice.sec)
could be for example those found in
[I-D.draft-bre-openpgp-samples-01].
sop generate-key "Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>" > alice.sec
sop extract-cert < alice.sec > alice.pgp
sop generate-key "Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>" > bob.sec
sop extract-cert < bob.sec > bob.pgp
sop sign --as=text alice.sec < statement.txt > statement.txt.asc
sop verify statement.txt.asc alice.pgp < statement.txt
sop encrypt --sign-with=alice.sec bob.pgp < msg.eml > ciphertext.asc
sop decrypt bob.sec < ciphertext.asc > cleartext.eml
See Section 8 for more information about errors and error handling.
3. sopv Subset
While the primary goal of this document is to provide a full sop
interface, as a special case, an implementer may choose to produce a
version of the command-line interface that only supports OpenPGP
signature verification. As a shorthand, this document refers to such
an interface as sopv, or "the sopv subset". This can be useful for
constrained environments where the only thing needed is signature
verification, for example, system installation or update media.
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A full implementation of sop by definition provides sopv, of course.
Only the following subcommands and their associated options MUST be
implemented for sopv:
* version (Section 5.1.1)
* verify (Section 5.4.2)
* inline-verify (Section 5.4.6)
3.1. sopv Versioning
The abstract sopv interface is itself versioned using [SEMVER]. The
definition of the relevant subcommands and options specified in this
document is known as sopv version 1.0.
If backward-incompatible changes are made to the sopv subset, the
major version number will be increased. If the sopv subset is
extended without backward-incompatible changes, the minor version
number will be increased.
Elements of the CLI relevant to sopv are annotated in this document
with the sopv version in which they were introduced.
See also Appendix A for enumerated version history.
4. Universal Options
Every invocation of sop or sopv MAY use the options described in this
section, even though they are not specified in the synopsis for any
specific subcommand.
4.1. --debug: emit more verbose output
When the --debug option is present, sop MAY emit implementation-
specific debugging information to standard error.
A locale-aware, internationalized sop implementation will localize
this debugging information.
5. Subcommands
sop uses a subcommand interface, similar to those popularized by
systems like git and svn.
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If the user supplies a subcommand that sop does not implement, it
fails with UNSUPPORTED_SUBCOMMAND. If a sop implementation does not
handle a supplied option for a given subcommand, it fails with
UNSUPPORTED_OPTION.
All subcommands that produce OpenPGP material on standard output
produce ASCII-armored (Section 6 of [RFC9580]) objects by default
(except for sop dearmor). These subcommands have a --no-armor
option, which causes them to produce binary OpenPGP material instead.
All subcommands that accept OpenPGP material on input should be able
to accept either ASCII-armored or binary inputs (see Section 11.4)
and behave accordingly.
See Section 7 for details about how various forms of OpenPGP material
are expected to be structured.
5.1. Meta Subcommands
The subcommands grouped in this section are related to the sop
implementation itself.
5.1.1. version: Version Information
sop version [--backend|--extended|--sop-spec|--sopv]
* Standard Input: ignored
* Standard Output: version information
This subcommand emits version information as UTF-8-encoded text.
With no arguments, the version string emitted should contain the name
of the sop implementation, followed by a single space, followed by
the version number. A sop implementation should use a version number
that respects an established standard that is easily comparable and
parsable, like [SEMVER].
If --backend is supplied, the implementation should produce a
comparable line of implementation and version information about the
primary underlying OpenPGP toolkit.
If --extended is supplied, the implementation may emit multiple lines
of version information. The first line MUST match the information
produced by a simple invocation, but the rest of the text has no
defined structure.
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If --sop-spec is supplied, the implementation should emit a single
line of text indicating the latest version of this draft that it
targets, for example, draft-dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli-06. If the
implementation targets a specific draft but the implementer knows the
implementation is incomplete, it should prefix the draft title with a
"~" (TILDE, U+007E), for example: ~draft-dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli-
06. The implementation MAY emit additional text about its
relationship to the targeted draft on the lines following the
versioned title.
If --sopv is supplied, the implementation should produce a single
line with the implemented [SEMVER] version of the sopv interface
subset (see Section 3) that this implementation provides complete
coverage for. If the implementation does not provide complete
coverage for any sopv interface, it should emit nothing on standard
out and return UNSUPPORTED_OPTION.
--backend, --extended, --sop-spec, and --sopv are mutually-exclusive
options.
Example:
$ sop version
ExampleSop 0.2.1
$ sop version --backend
LibExamplePGP 3.4.2
$ sop version --extended
ExampleSop 0.2.1
Running on MonkeyScript 4.5
LibExamplePGP 3.4.2
LibExampleCrypto 3.1.1
LibXCompression 4.0.2
See https://pgp.example/sop/ for more information
$ sop version --sop-spec
~draft-dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli-06
This implementation does not handle @FD: special designators for output.
$ sop version --sopv
1.0
$
The version subcommand and all of its options are part of the sopv
subset (see Section 3) starting at sopv version 1.0.
5.1.2. list-profiles: Describe Available Profiles
sop list-profiles SUBCOMMAND
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* Standard Input: ignored
* Standard Output: PROFILELIST (Section 7.12)
This subcommand emits a list of profiles supported by the identified
subcommand. The first profile listed is the default profile, as
described in Section 7.12.
If the indicated SUBCOMMAND does not accept a --profile option, it
returns UNSUPPORTED_PROFILE.
Example:
$ sop list-profiles generate-key
default: use the implementer's recommendations
security: higher-security, maybe reduced performance
performance: higher-performance, maybe reduced security
rfc4880: use algorithms from RFC 4880 (alias: compatibility)
$
5.2. Key and Certificate Management Subcommands
The subcommands grouped in this section are primarily intended to
manipulate keys and certificates.
5.2.1. generate-key: Generate a Secret Key
sop generate-key [--no-armor]
[--with-key-password=PASSWORD]
[--profile=PROFILE]
[--signing-only]
[--] [USERID...]
* Standard Input: ignored
* Standard Output: KEYS (Section 7.3)
Generate a single default OpenPGP key with zero or more User IDs.
The generated secret key SHOULD be usable for as much of the sop
functionality as possible. In particular:
* It should be possible to extract an OpenPGP certificate from the
key in KEYS with sop extract-cert.
* The key in KEYS should be able to create signatures (with sop
sign) that are verifiable by using sop verify with the extracted
certificate.
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* Unless the --signing-only parameter is supplied, the key in KEYS
should be able to decrypt messages (with sop decrypt) that are
encrypted by using sop encrypt with the extracted certificate.
The detailed internal structure of the certificate is left to the
discretion of the sop implementation.
If the --with-key-password option is supplied, the generated key will
be password-protected (locked) with the supplied password. Note that
PASSWORD is an indirect data type from which the actual password is
acquired (Section 7). See also the guidance on ensuring that the
password is human-readable in Section 11.8.1.
If no --with-key-password option is supplied, the generated key will
be unencrypted.
If the --profile argument is supplied and the indicated PROFILE is
not supported by the implementation, sop will fail with
UNSUPPORTED_PROFILE.
The presence of the --signing-only option is intended to create a key
that is only capable of signing, not decrypting. This is useful for
deployments where only signing and verification are necessary.
If any of the USERID options are not valid UTF-8, sop generate-key
fails with EXPECTED_TEXT.
If the implementation rejects any USERID option that is valid UTF-8
(e.g., due to internal policy, see Section 6.2), sop generate-key
fails with BAD_DATA.
Example:
$ sop generate-key 'Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>' > alice.sec
$ head -n1 < alice.sec
-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
$
5.2.2. change-key-password: Update a Key's Password
sop change-key-password [--no-armor]
[--new-key-password=PASSWORD]
[--old-key-password=PASSWORD...]
* Standard Input: KEYS (Section 7.3)
* Standard Output: KEYS (Section 7.3)
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The output will be the same set of OpenPGP Transferable Secret Keys
as the input, but with all secret key material locked according to
the password indicated by the --new-key-password option (or, with no
password at all, if --new-key-password is absent). Note that --old-
key-password can be supplied multiple times, and each supplied
password will be tried as a means to unlock any locked key material
encountered. It will normalize a Transferable Secret Key to use a
single password even if it originally had distinct passwords locking
each of the subkeys.
If any secret key packet is locked but cannot be unlocked with any of
the supplied --old-key-password arguments, this subcommand should
fail with KEY_IS_PROTECTED.
Example:
# adding a password to an unlocked key:
$ sop change-key-password --new-key-password=@ENV:keypass \
< unlocked.key > locked.key
# removing a password:
$ sop change-key-password --old-key-password=@ENV:keypass \
< locked.key > unlocked.key
# changing a password:
$ sop change-key-password --old-key-password=@ENV:keypass \
--new-key-password=@ENV:newpass < locked.key > refreshed.key
$
5.2.3. revoke-key: Create a Revocation Certificate
sop revoke-key [--no-armor]
[--with-key-password=PASSWORD...]
* Standard Input: KEYS (Section 7.3)
* Standard Output: CERTS (Section 7.2)
Generate a revocation certificate for each Transferable Secret Key
found. See Section 10.1.2 of [RFC9580] for a discussion of common
forms of revocation certificate.
Example:
$ sop revoke-key < alice.key > alice-revoked.pgp
$
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5.2.4. extract-cert: Extract a Certificate from a Secret Key
sop extract-cert [--no-armor]
* Standard Input: KEYS (Section 7.3)
* Standard Output: CERTS (Section 7.2)
The output should contain one OpenPGP certificate in CERTS per
OpenPGP Transferable Secret Key found in KEYS. There is no guarantee
what order the CERTS will be in.
sop extract-cert SHOULD work even if any of the keys in KEYS is
password-protected.
Example:
$ sop extract-cert < alice.sec > alice.pgp
$ head -n1 < alice.pgp
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
$
5.2.5. update-key: Keep a Secret Key Up-To-Date
sop update-key [--no-armor]
[--signing-only]
[--no-added-capabilities]
[--with-key-password=PASSWORD...]
[--merge-certs=CERTS...]
* Standard Input: KEYS (Section 7.3)
* Standard Output: KEYS (Section 7.3)
The input OpenPGP Transferable Secret Keys that arrive on standard
input will be updated by the implementation, and their updated forms
will be produced on standard output. This update will "fix"
everything that the implementation knows how to fix to bring each
Transferable Secret Key up to reasonable modern practice. Each
Transferable Secret Key output must be capable of signing, and
(unless --signing-only is provided) capable of decryption. The
primary key of each Transferable Secret Key will not be changed in
any way that affects its fingerprint.
One important aspect of sop update-key is how it handles
advertisement of support for various OpenPGP capabilities
(algorithms, mechanisms, etc). All capabilities that the
implementation knows it does not support, or knows to be weak and/or
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deprecated MUST be removed from the output Transferable Secret Keys.
This includes unknown/deprecated flags in the Features subpacket, and
any unknown/deprecated algorithm IDs in algorithm preferences
subpackets. For example, an implementation compliant with [RFC9580]
will never emit a Transferable Secret Key with a Preferred Hash
Preferences subpacket that explicitly indicates support for MD5,
RIPEMD160, or SHA1.
If --no-added-capabilities is not present, then any capability that
the implementation supports and encourages that was not advertised in
the input Transferable Secret Key MAY be added to the advertisements
in the output Transferable Secret Key. If --no-added-capabilities is
present, then new capabilities MUST NOT be added to the advertised
sets during the update.
Beyond cleanup of the advertised capabilities, --signing-only, and --
no-added-capabilities, the choice of exactly what updates to do are
up to the implementation. It is expected that an implementer will
document and describe the specific considerations and updates they
make for this operation. It is acceptable to propagate any non-
critical unknown subpackets from old self-signatures to the new,
replacement self-signatures.
Possible updates might include:
* Refresh or replace any subkey approaching expiry.
* Refresh any self-signature (including cross-sigs) that is
approaching expiry.
* Refresh any self-signature (including cross-sigs) that is made
using weak or risky algorithms.
* Correct any mistaken 2-octet hash prefix found in a signature (see
Section 5.2.3 of [RFC9580]).
* Ensure proof of "aliveness": if no self-signatures are more recent
than some cutoff in the recent past, re-issue the same self-
signatures.
If there is nothing to be updated because all the incoming
Transferable Secret Keys are already in good shape, then the same set
of Transferable Secret Keys will be emitted to standard output and
sop update-key succeeds.
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If any Transferable Secret Key cannot be fixed (for example, because
its primary key uses a weak algorithm, or because the whole
certificate is hard-revoked), sop update-key fails with
PRIMARY_KEY_BAD, emits an explanation on stderr, and nothing on
stdout.
If any secret key that needs to make a signature to update the key
cannot be unlocked with any of the supplied PASSWORD objects, sop
update-key fails with KEY_IS_PROTECTED, emits an explanation on
stderr, and nothing on stdout.
If --merge-certs is supplied, and any of the CERTS objects correspond
to the Transferable Secret Keys being updated, then any additional
elements found in the corresponding CERTS are merged into the
Transferable Secret Key before it is emitted. This can be used, for
example, to absorb a third-party certification into the Transferable
Secret Key.
Example (keeping certificates fresh):
$ sop update-key < alice.key > alice-updated.key
$ mv alice-updated.key alice.key
$ sop extract-cert < alice.key > alice.pgp
$
Example (advertising the intersection of features supported by two
Stateless OpenPGP implementations, rendered here as sop1 and sop2):
$ sop1 update-key < alice.key | sop2 update-key | \
sop1 --no-added-capabilities update-key > alice-updated.key
$ mv alice-updated.key alice.key
$ sop1 extract-cert < alice.key > alice.pgp
$
5.2.6. merge-certs: Merge OpenPGP Certificates
sop merge-certs [--no-armor]
[--] CERTS [CERTS...]
* Standard Input: CERTS (Section 7.2)
* Standard Output: CERTS (Section 7.2)
The OpenPGP certificates on standard input will be produced on
standard output, merged with the corresponding elements of any of the
CERTS objects named on the command line.
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This can be used, for example, to absorb a third-party certification
into a certificate, or to update a certificate's feature
advertisements without losing local annotations.
The certificates produced on standard output are only the
certificates received on standard input. If any certificate found
via named command line parameters does not share a primary key with
any standard input certificate, the certificate from the command line
is ignored.
If any of the OpenPGP certificates on standard input share the same
primary key, they are also merged and de-deduplicated on standard
output. If multiple OpenPGP certificates named on the command line
share a primary key with one of the certificates on standard input,
their certificate updates are cumulatively merged for output.
Example:
$ sop merge-certs alice-certified-by-bob.pgp \
< alice.pgp > alice-updated.pgp
$ mv alice-updated.pgp alice.pgp
$
5.3. User Identity Subcommands
The subcommands in this section handle OpenPGP user identities.
OpenPGP certificates contain cryptographic certifications which bind
text-based "User IDs" to primary key material, which is in turn
cryptographically bound to additional key material.
These subcommands are related to the network of cryptographic
identity assertions that has traditionally been called the "Web of
Trust". Note also the similarity in structure between these
subcommands and sop sign (Section 5.4.1) and sop verify
(Section 5.4.2)
5.3.1. certify-userid: Certify OpenPGP Certificate User IDs
sop certify-userid [--no-armor]
--userid=USERID
[--userid=USERID...]
[--with-key-password=PASSWORD...]
[--no-require-self-sig]
[--] KEYS [KEYS...]
* Standard Input: CERTS (Section 7.2)
* Standard Output: CERTS (Section 7.2)
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With each Transferable Secret Key in all KEYS objects, add a third-
party certification to CERTS found on standard input, and emit the
updated OpenPGP certificates (including the new certification(s)) on
standard output.
If the caller does not specify at least one --userid=USERID option,
sop certify-userid fails with MISSING_ARG.
If the certification-capable key of any Transferable Secret Key in
KEYS is locked and cannot be unlocked by any of the supplied
PASSWORDs, fail with KEY_IS_PROTECTED.
If any incoming CERTS object does not already have all of the
specified User IDs as valid, self-signed User IDs, then sop certify-
userid fails with CERT_USERID_NO_MATCH, unless --no-require-self-sig
is supplied.
If --no-require-self-sig is supplied, then each incoming OpenPGP
certificate will have each specified User ID added to it (if it did
not have it already), and certified directly, regardless of self-
signatures. This may be useful for associating a certificate with a
specific identity even in cases where the certificate does not itself
advertise the identity.
If any key in the KEYS objects is not capable of producing a
certification, sop sign will fail with KEY_CANNOT_CERTIFY.
Example:
$ sop certify-userid \
--userid="Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>" \
bob.key < alice.pgp > alice-signed-by-bob.pgp
$
Example (adding a User ID to your own certificate):
$ sop certify-userid \
--userid="Alice Lovelace <lovelace@business.example>" \
alice.key < alice.pgp > alice-updated.pgp
$ sop update-key --merge-certs alice-updated.pgp \
< alice.key > alice-updated.key
$ mv alice-updated.key alice.key
$ rm alice-updated.pgp
$ sop extract-cert < alice.key > alice.pgp
$
5.3.2. validate-userid: Validate a User ID in an OpenPGP Certificate
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sop validate-userid
[--addr-spec-only]
[--validate-at=DATE]
[--] USERID CERTS [CERTS...]
* Standard Input: CERTS (Section 7.2)
* Standard Output: none
Given a set of authority OpenPGP certificates on the command line,
succeed if and only if all OpenPGP certificates on standard input are
correctly bound by at least one valid signature from one authority to
the USERID in question.
If --addr-spec-only is present, then the USERID is treated as an
e-mail address, and matched only against the e-mail address part of
each correctly bound User ID. The rest of each correctly bound User
ID is ignored. If any correctly bound User ID is not a conventional
OpenPGP User ID, it will not match with --addr-spec-only at all.
Note that [RFC9580] (and [RFC4880] and [RFC2440] before them)
mislabeled an OpenPGP User ID as a name-addr, but that is likely to
be wrong.
If --validate-at is present, then evaluate the validity of the User
ID at the specified time. If --validate-at is not present (or if it
is present with the literal value now), the User ID validity is
evaluated at the current time.
If any OpenPGP certificate in the CERTS on standard input does not
have a correctly bound User ID that matches USERID, sop validate-
userid fails with CERT_USERID_NO_MATCH.
Example:
$ if sop validate-userid "Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>" \
bob.pgp < alice.pgp; then echo Good; fi
Good
$ if sop validate-userid --addr-spec-only "alice@openpgp.example" \
bob.pgp < alice.pgp; then echo Good; fi
Good
$
5.4. Messaging Subcommands
The subcommands in this section handle OpenPGP messages: encrypting,
decrypting, signing, and verifying.
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5.4.1. sign: Create Detached Signatures
sop sign [--no-armor] [--micalg-out=MICALG]
[--with-key-password=PASSWORD...]
[--as={binary|text}] [--] KEYS [KEYS...]
* Standard Input: DATA (Section 7.11)
* Standard Output: SIGNATURES (Section 7.6)
Exactly one signature will be made by each key in the supplied KEYS
arguments.
--as defaults to binary. If --as=text and the input DATA is not
valid UTF-8 (Section 11.7), sop sign fails with EXPECTED_TEXT.
--as=binary SHOULD result in OpenPGP signatures of type 0x00
("Signature of a binary document"). --as=text SHOULD result in
OpenPGP signatures of type 0x01 ("Signature of a canonical text
document"). See Section 5.2.1 of [RFC4880] for more details.
When generating PGP/MIME messages ([RFC3156]), it is useful to know
what digest algorithm was used for the generated signature. When --
micalg-out is supplied, sop sign emits the digest algorithm used to
the specified MICALG file in a way that can be used to populate the
micalg parameter for the Content-Type (see Section 7.8). If the
specified MICALG file already exists in the filesystem, sop sign will
fail with OUTPUT_EXISTS. When --micalg-out is supplied, the DATA on
standard input should already be in canonical text form (7-bit clean,
CRLF line endings, no trailing whitespace), as specified in Section 3
of [RFC3156]. If the incoming DATA does not already meet these
requirements, sop sign will fail with EXPECTED_TEXT, regardless of
any argument supplied for --as. When --micalg-out is supplied, and
multiple signatures are made but they do not all use the same digest
algorithm, sop sign MUST emit the empty string to the designated
MICALG.
If the signing key material in any key in the KEYS objects is
password-protected, sop sign SHOULD try all supplied --with-key-
password options to unlock the key material until it finds one that
enables the use of the key for signing. If none of the PASSWORD
options unlock the key (or if no such option is supplied), sop sign
will fail with KEY_IS_PROTECTED. Note that PASSWORD is an indirect
data type from which the actual password is acquired (Section 7).
Note also the guidance for retrying variants of a non-human-readable
password in Section 11.8.2.
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If any key in the KEYS objects is not capable of producing a
signature, sop sign will fail with KEY_CANNOT_SIGN.
sop sign MUST NOT produce any extra signatures beyond those from KEYS
objects supplied on the command line.
Example:
$ sop sign --as=text alice.sec < message.txt > message.txt.asc
$ head -n1 < message.txt.asc
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
$
5.4.2. verify: Verify Detached Signatures
sop verify [--not-before=DATE] [--not-after=DATE]
[--] SIGNATURES CERTS [CERTS...]
* Standard Input: DATA (Section 7.11)
* Standard Output: VERIFICATIONS (Section 7.10)
--not-before and --not-after indicate that signatures with dates
outside certain range MUST NOT be considered valid.
--not-before defaults to the beginning of time. Accepts the special
value - to indicate the beginning of time (i.e., no lower boundary).
--not-after defaults to the current system time (now). Accepts the
special value - to indicate the end of time (i.e., no upper
boundary).
sop verify only returns OK if at least one certificate included in
any CERTS object made a valid signature in the time window specified
over the DATA supplied.
For details about the valid signatures, the user MUST inspect the
VERIFICATIONS output.
If no CERTS are supplied, sop verify fails with MISSING_ARG.
If no valid signatures are found, sop verify fails with NO_SIGNATURE.
In this case, sop verify MAY emit some human-readable explanation to
standard error about why no valid signatures were found, see
Section 13.1.1.
See Section 13.1 for more details about signature verification.
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Example:
(In this example, we see signature verification succeed first, and
then fail on a modified version of the message.)
$ sop verify message.txt.asc alice.pgp < message.txt
2019-10-29T18:36:45Z EB85BB5FA33A75E15E944E63F231550C4F47E38E EB85BB5FA33A75E15E944E63F231550C4F47E38E mode:text {"signers": ["alice.pgp"]}
$ echo $?
0
$ tr a-z A-Z < message.txt | sop verify message.txt.asc alice.pgp
$ echo $?
3
$
The verify subcommand and all of its options are part of the sopv
subset (see Section 3) starting at sopv version 1.0.
5.4.3. encrypt: Encrypt a Message
sop encrypt [--as={binary|text}]
[--no-armor]
[--with-password=PASSWORD...]
[--sign-with=KEYS...]
[--with-key-password=PASSWORD...]
[--profile=PROFILE]
[--session-key-out=SESSIONKEY]
[--] [CERTS...]
* Standard Input: DATA (Section 7.11)
* Standard Output: CIPHERTEXT (Section 7.4)
--as defaults to binary. The setting of --as corresponds to the one
octet format field found in the Literal Data packet at the core of
the output CIPHERTEXT. If --as is set to binary, the octet is b
(0x62). If it is text, the format octet is u (0x75).
--with-password enables symmetric encryption (and can be used
multiple times if multiple passwords are desired).
--sign-with creates exactly one signature by for each secret key
found in the supplied KEYS object (this can also be used multiple
times if signatures from keys found in separate files are desired).
If any key in any supplied KEYS object is not capable of producing a
signature, sop sign will fail with KEY_CANNOT_SIGN. If any signing
key material in any supplied KEYS object is password-protected, sop
encrypt SHOULD try all supplied --with-key-password options to unlock
the key material until it finds one that enables the use of the key
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for signing. If none of the --with-key-password=PASSWORD options can
unlock any locked signing key material (or if no such option is
supplied), sop encrypt will fail with KEY_IS_PROTECTED. All
signatures made must be placed inside the encryption produced by sop
encrypt.
Note that both --with-password and --with-key-password supply
PASSWORD arguments, but they do so in different contexts which are
not interchangeable. A PASSWORD supplied for symmetric encryption
(--with-password) MUST NOT be used to try to unlock a signing key (--
with-key-password) and a PASSWORD supplied to unlock a signing key
MUST NOT be used to symmetrically encrypt the message. Regardless of
context, each PASSWORD argument is presented as an indirect data type
from which the actual password is acquired (Section 7). If sop
encrypt encounters a password which is not a valid UTF-8 string
(Section 11.7), or is otherwise not robust in its representation to
humans, it fails with PASSWORD_NOT_HUMAN_READABLE. If sop encrypt
sees trailing whitespace at the end of a password, it will trim the
trailing whitespace before using the password. See Section 11.8 for
more discussion about passwords.
If --as is set to binary, then --sign-with will sign as a binary
document (OpenPGP signature type 0x00).
If --as is set to text, then --sign-with will sign as a canonical
text document (OpenPGP signature type 0x01). In this case, if the
input DATA is not valid UTF-8 (Section 11.7), sop encrypt fails with
EXPECTED_TEXT.
If --sign-with is supplied for input DATA that is not valid UTF-8,
sop encrypt MAY sign as a binary document (OpenPGP signature type
0x00).
sop encrypt MUST NOT produce any extra signatures beyond those from
KEYS objects identified by --sign-with.
The resulting CIPHERTEXT should be decryptable by the secret keys
corresponding to every certificate included in all CERTS, as well as
each password given with --with-password.
If no CERTS or --with-password options are present, sop encrypt fails
with MISSING_ARG.
If at least one of the identified certificates requires encryption to
an unsupported asymmetric algorithm, sop encrypt fails with
UNSUPPORTED_ASYMMETRIC_ALGO.
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If at least one of the identified certificates is not encryption-
capable (e.g., revoked, expired, no encryption-capable flags on
primary key and valid subkeys), sop encrypt fails with
CERT_CANNOT_ENCRYPT.
If the --profile argument is supplied and the indicated PROFILE is
not supported by the implementation, sop will fail with
UNSUPPORTED_PROFILE. The use of a profile for this subcommand allows
an implementation faced with parametric or algorithmic choices to
make a decision coarsely guided by the operator. For example, when
encrypting with a password, there is no knowledge about the
capabilities of the recipient, and an implementation may prefer
cryptographically modern algorithms, or it may prefer more broad
compatibility. In the event that a known recipient (i.e., one of the
CERTS) explicitly indicates a lack of support for one of the features
preferred by the indicated profile, the implementation SHOULD conform
to the recipient's advertised capabilities where possible.
If --session-key-out argument is supplied, the session key generated
for this encrypted will be written to the indicated location. This
can be useful, for example, when Alice encrypts a message to Bob, but
also wants to retain the ability to read it without having any of her
own secret key material available (see Section 9.1 of
[I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance-11]).
If sop encrypt fails for any reason, it emits no CIPHERTEXT.
Example:
(In this example, bob.bin is a file containing Bob's binary-formatted
OpenPGP certificate. Alice is encrypting a message to both herself
and Bob.)
$ sop encrypt --as=text --sign-with=alice.key \
alice.asc bob.bin < message.eml > encrypted.asc
$ head -n1 encrypted.asc
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
$
5.4.4. decrypt: Decrypt a Message
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sop decrypt [--session-key-out=SESSIONKEY]
[--with-session-key=SESSIONKEY...]
[--with-password=PASSWORD...]
[--with-key-password=PASSWORD...]
[--verifications-out=VERIFICATIONS
[--verify-with=CERTS...]
[--verify-not-before=DATE]
[--verify-not-after=DATE] ]
[--] [KEYS...]
* Standard Input: CIPHERTEXT (Section 7.4)
* Standard Output: DATA (Section 7.11)
The caller can ask sop for the session key discovered during
decryption by supplying the --session-key-out option. If the
specified file already exists in the filesystem, sop decrypt will
fail with OUTPUT_EXISTS. When decryption is successful, sop decrypt
writes the discovered session key to the specified file.
--with-session-key enables decryption of the CIPHERTEXT using the
session key directly against the SEIPD packet. This option can be
used multiple times if several possible session keys should be tried.
SESSIONKEY is an indirect data type from which the actual sessionkey
value is acquired (Section 7).
--with-password enables decryption based on any SKESK (Section 5.3 of
[RFC9580]) packets in the CIPHERTEXT. This option can be used
multiple times if the user wants to try more than one password.
--with-key-password lets the user use password-protected (locked)
secret key material. If the decryption-capable secret key material
in any key in the KEYS objects is password-protected, sop decrypt
SHOULD try all supplied --with-key-password options to unlock the key
material until it finds one that enables the use of the key for
decryption. If none of the --with-key-password options unlock the
key (or if no such option is supplied), and the message cannot be
decrypted with any other KEYS, --with-session-key, or --with-password
options, sop decrypt will fail with KEY_IS_PROTECTED.
Note that the two kinds of PASSWORD options are for different
domains: --with-password is for unlocking an SKESK, and --with-key-
password is for unlocking secret key material in KEYS. sop decrypt
SHOULD NOT apply the --with-key-password argument to any SKESK, or
the --with-password argument to any KEYS.
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Each PASSWORD argument is an indirect data type from which the actual
password is acquired (Section 7). If sop decrypt tries and fails to
use a password supplied by a PASSWORD, and it observes that there is
trailing UTF-8 whitespace at the end of the password, it will retry
with the trailing whitespace stripped. See Section 11.8.2 for more
discussion about consuming password-protected key material.
--verifications-out produces signature verification status to the
designated file. If the designated file already exists in the
filesystem, sop decrypt will fail with OUTPUT_EXISTS.
The return code of sop decrypt is not affected by the results of
signature verification. The caller MUST check the returned
VERIFICATIONS to confirm signature status. An empty VERIFICATIONS
output indicates that no valid signatures were found.
If no valid signatures were found, but --verifications-out was
supplied, sop decrypt MAY emit some human-readable explanation to
standard error about why no valid signatures were found, see
Section 13.1.1.
--verify-with identifies a set of certificates whose signatures would
be acceptable for signatures over this message.
If the caller is interested in signature verification, both --
verifications-out and at least one --verify-with must be supplied.
If only one of these options is supplied, sop decrypt fails with
INCOMPLETE_VERIFICATION.
--verify-not-before and --verify-not-after provide a date range for
acceptable signatures, by analogy with the options for sop verify
(see Section 5.4.2). They should only be supplied when doing
signature verification.
See Section 13.1 for more details about signature verification.
If no KEYS or --with-password or --with-session-key options are
present, sop decrypt fails with MISSING_ARG.
If unable to decrypt, sop decrypt fails with CANNOT_DECRYPT.
sop decrypt only emits cleartext to Standard Output that was
successfully decrypted.
Example:
(In this example, Alice stashes and re-uses the session key of an
encrypted message.)
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$ sop decrypt --session-key-out=session.key \
alice.sec < ciphertext.asc > cleartext.out
$ ls -l ciphertext.asc cleartext.out
-rw-r--r-- 1 user user 321 Oct 28 01:34 ciphertext.asc
-rw-r--r-- 1 user user 285 Oct 28 01:34 cleartext.out
$ sop decrypt --with-session-key=session.key \
< ciphertext.asc > cleartext2.out
$ diff cleartext.out cleartext2.out
$
5.4.4.1. Historic Options for sop decrypt
The sop decrypt option --verifications-out used to be named --verify-
out. An implementation SHOULD accept either form of this option, and
SHOULD produce a deprecation warning to standard error if the old
form is used.
5.4.5. inline-detach: Split Signatures from an Inline-Signed Message
sop inline-detach [--no-armor] --signatures-out=SIGNATURES
* Standard Input: INLINESIGNED
* Standard Output: DATA (the message without any signatures)
In some contexts, the user may expect an inline-signed message of
some form or another (INLINESIGNED, see Section 7.5) rather than a
message and its detached signature. sop inline-detach takes such an
inline-signed message on standard input, and splits it into:
* the potentially signed material on standard output, and
* a detached signature block to the destination identified by --
signatures-out
Note that no cryptographic verification of the signatures is done by
this subcommand. Once the inline-signed message is separated,
verification of the detached signature can be done with sop verify.
If no --signatures-out is supplied, sop inline-detach fails with
MISSING_ARG.
Note that there may be more than one Signature packet in an inline-
signed message. All signatures found in the inline-signed message
will be emitted to the --signatures-out destination.
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If the inline-signed message uses the Cleartext Signature Framework,
it may be dash-escaped (see Section 7.2 of [RFC9580]). The output of
sop detach-inband-signature-and-message will have any dash-escaping
removed.
If the input is not an INLINESIGNED message, sop inline-detach fails
with BAD_DATA. If the input contains more than one object that could
be interpreted as an INLINESIGNED message, sop inline-detach also
fails with BAD_DATA. A sop implementation MAY accept (and discard)
leading and trailing data when the incoming INLINESIGNED message uses
the Cleartext Signature Framework.
If the file designated by --signatures-out already exists in the
filesystem, sop detach-inband-signature-and-message will fail with
OUTPUT_EXISTS.
Note that --no-armor here governs the data written to the --
signatures-out destination. Standard output is always the raw
message, not an OpenPGP packet.
Example:
$ sop inline-detach --signatures-out=Release.pgp < InRelease >Release
$ sop verify Release.pgp archive-keyring.pgp < Release
$
5.4.6. inline-verify: Verify an Inline-Signed Message
sop inline-verify [--not-before=DATE] [--not-after=DATE]
[--verifications-out=VERIFICATIONS]
[--] CERTS [CERTS...]
* Standard Input: INLINESIGNED (Section 7.5)
* Standard Output: DATA (Section 7.11)
This command is similar to sop verify (Section 5.4.2) except that it
takes an INLINESIGNED message (see Section 7.5) and produces the
message body (without signatures) on standard output. It is also
similar to sop inline-detach (Section 5.4.5) except that it actually
performs signature verification.
--not-before and --not-after indicate that signatures with dates
outside certain range MUST NOT be considered valid. See
Section 5.4.2 for their syntax and defaults.
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sop inline-verify only returns OK if INLINESIGNED contains at least
one valid signature made during the time window specified by a
certificate included in any CERTS object.
For details about the valid signatures, the user MUST inspect the
VERIFICATIONS output.
If no CERTS are supplied, sop inline-verify fails with MISSING_ARG.
If no valid signatures are found, sop inline-verify fails with
NO_SIGNATURE and emits nothing on standard output. In this case, sop
inline-verify MAY emit some human-readable explanation to standard
error about why no valid signatures were found, see Section 13.1.1.
See Section 13.1 for more details about signature verification.
Example:
(In this example, we see signature verification succeed first, and
then fail on a modified version of the message.)
$ sop inline-verify -- alice.pgp < message.txt
Hello, world!
$ echo $?
0
$ sed s/Hello/Goodbye/ < message.txt | sop inline-verify -- alice.pgp
$ echo $?
3
$
The inline-verify subcommand and all of its options are part of the
sopv subset (see Section 3) starting at sopv version 1.0.
5.4.7. inline-sign: Create an Inline-Signed Message
sop inline-sign [--no-armor]
[--with-key-password=PASSWORD...]
[--as={binary|text|clearsigned}]
[--] KEYS [KEYS...]
* Standard Input: DATA (Section 7.11)
* Standard Output: INLINESIGNED (Section 7.5)
Exactly one signature will be made by each key in the supplied KEYS
arguments.
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The generated output stream will be an inline-signed message, by
default producing an OpenPGP "Signed Message" packet stream.
--as defaults to binary. If --as= is set to either text or
clearsigned, and the input DATA is not valid UTF-8 (Section 11.7),
sop inline-sign fails with EXPECTED_TEXT.
--as=binary SHOULD result in OpenPGP signatures of type 0x00
("Signature of a binary document", see Section 5.2.1.1 of [RFC9580]).
--as=text SHOULD result in an OpenPGP signature of type 0x01
("Signature of a canonical text document" see Section 5.2.1.2 of
[RFC9580]). --as=clearsigned SHOULD behave the same way as --as=text
except that it produces an output stream using the Cleartext
Signature Framework (see Section 7 of [RFC9580] and Section 11.5).
If both --no-armor and --as=clearsigned are supplied, sop inline-sign
fails with INCOMPATIBLE_OPTIONS.
If the signing key material in any key in the KEYS objects is
password-protected, sop inline-sign SHOULD try all supplied --with-
key-password options to unlock the key material until it finds one
that enables the use of the key for signing. If none of the PASSWORD
options unlock the key (or if no such option is supplied), sop
inline-sign will fail with KEY_IS_PROTECTED. Note that PASSWORD is
an indirect data type from which the actual password is acquired
(Section 7). Note also the guidance for retrying variants of a non-
human-readable password in Section 11.8.2.
If any key in the KEYS objects is not capable of producing a
signature, sop inline-sign will fail with KEY_CANNOT_SIGN.
sop inline-sign MUST NOT produce any extra signatures beyond those
from KEYS objects supplied on the command line.
Example:
$ sop inline-sign --as=clearsigned alice.sec \
< message.txt > message-signed.txt
$ head -n5 < message-signed.txt
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
This is the message.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
$
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5.5. Transport Subcommands
The commands in this section handle manipulating OpenPGP objects for
transport: armoring and dearmoring for 7-bit cleanness and
compactness, respectively.
5.5.1. armor: Convert Binary to ASCII
sop armor
* Standard Input: OpenPGP material (SIGNATURES, KEYS, CERTS,
CIPHERTEXT, or INLINESIGNED)
* Standard Output: the same material with ASCII-armoring added, if
not already present
sop armor inspects the input and chooses the label appropriately,
based on the OpenPGP packets encountered.
sop armor ought to be able to correctly re-armor any of the packet
streams that are produced by sop with the --no-armor option.
For example, if the type of the first OpenPGP packet is:
* 0x05 (Secret-Key), the packet stream should be parsed as a KEYS
input (with Armor Header BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK).
* 0x06 (Public-Key), the packet stream should be parsed as a CERTS
input (with Armor Header BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK).
* 0x01 (Public-key Encrypted Session Key) or 0x03 (Symmetric-key
Encrypted Session Key), the packet stream should be parsed as a
CIPHERTEXT input (with Armor Header BEGIN PGP MESSAGE).
* 0x04 (One-Pass Signature), the packet stream should be parsed as
an INLINESIGNED input (with Armor Header BEGIN PGP MESSAGE).
* 0x02 (Signature), the packet stream may be either a SIGNATURES
input or an INLINESIGNED input. If the packet stream contains
only Signature packets, it should be parsed as aSIGNATURES input
(with Armor Header BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE). If it contains any
packet other than a Signature packet, it should be parsed as an
INLINESIGNED input (with Armor Header BEGIN PGP MESSAGE).
If the input packet stream does not match any expected sequence of
packet types, sop armor fails with BAD_DATA.
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Since sop armor accepts ASCII-armored input as well as binary input,
this operation is idempotent on well-structured data. A caller can
use this subcommand blindly to ensure that any well-formed OpenPGP
packet stream is 7-bit clean.
FIXME: what to do if the input is a CSF INLINESIGNED message? Three
choices:
* Leave it untouched -- this violates the claim about blindly
ensuring 7-bit clean, since UTF-8-encoded message text is not
necessarily 7-bit clean.
* Convert to ASCII-armored INLINESIGNED -- this requires synthesis
of OPS packet (from signatures block) and Literal Data packet
(from the message body).
* Raise a specific error.
Example:
$ sop armor < bob.bin > bob.pgp
$ head -n1 bob.pgp
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
$
5.5.1.1. Historic Options for sop armor
sop armor used to be specified as having a --label option, with an
argument that took one of the following values: auto, sig, key, cert,
or message, which allowed the user to specify the label used in the
header and tail of the armoring.
The default value for --label was auto, which matches the currently
specified behavior. This option is now deprecated, as it offers no
useful functionality.
5.5.2. dearmor: Convert ASCII to Binary
sop dearmor
* Standard Input: OpenPGP material (SIGNATURES, KEYS, CERTS,
CIPHERTEXT, or INLINESIGNED)
* Standard Output: the same material with any ASCII-armoring removed
If the input packet stream does not match any of the expected
sequence of packet types, sop dearmor fails with BAD_DATA. See also
Section 11.4.
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Since sop dearmor accepts binary-formatted input as well as ASCII-
armored input, this operation is idempotent on well-structured data.
A caller can use this subcommand blindly ensure that any well-formed
OpenPGP packet stream is in its standard binary representation.
FIXME: what to do if the input is a CSF INLINESIGNED? Three choices:
* Leave it untouched -- output data is not really in binary format.
* Convert to binary-format INLINESIGNED -- this requires synthesis
of OPS packet (from CSF Hash header) and Literal Data packet (from
the message body).
* Raise a specific error.
Example:
$ sop dearmor < message.txt.asc > message.txt.sig
$
6. Input String Types
Some material is passed to sop directly as a string on the command
line.
6.1. DATE
An ISO-8601 formatted timestamp with time zone, or the special value
now to indicate the current system time.
Examples:
* now
* 2019-10-29T12:11:04+00:00
* 2019-10-24T23:48:29Z
* 20191029T121104Z
In some cases where used to specify lower and upper boundaries, a
DATE value can be set to - to indicate "no time limit".
A flexible implementation of sop MAY accept date inputs in other
unambiguous forms.
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Note that whenever sop emits a timestamp (e.g., in Section 7.10) it
MUST produce only a UTC-based ISO-8601 compliant representation with
a resolution of one second, using the literal Z suffix to indicate
timezone.
6.2. USERID
This is an arbitrary UTF-8 string (Section 11.7). By convention,
most User IDs are of the form Display Name
<email.address@example.com>, but they do not need to be.
By internal policy, an implementation MAY reject a USERID if there
are certain UTF-8 strings it declines to work with as a User ID. For
example, an implementation may reject the empty string, or a string
with characters in it that it considers problematic. Of course,
refusing to create a particular User ID does not prevent an
implementation from encountering such a User ID in its input.
6.3. SUBCOMMAND
This is an ASCII string that matches the name of one of the
subcommands listed in Section 5.
6.4. PROFILE
Some sop subcommands can accept a --profile option, which takes as an
argument the name of a profile.
A profile name is a UTF-8 string that has no whitespace in it.
Which profiles are available depends on the sop implementation.
Similar to OpenPGP Notation names, profile names are divided into two
namespaces: the IETF namespace and the user namespace. A profile
name in the user namespace ends with the @ character (0x40) followed
by a DNS domain name. A profile name in the IETF namespace does not
have an @ character.
A profile name in the user space is owned and controlled by the owner
of the domain in the suffix. A sop implementation that implements a
user profile but does not own the domain in question SHOULD hew as
closely as possible to the semantics described by the owner of the
domain.
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A profile name in the IETF namespace that begins with the string rfc
should have semantics that hew as closely as possible to the
referenced RFC. Similarly, a profile name in the IETF namespace that
begins with the string draft- should have semantics that hew as
closely as possible to the referenced Internet Draft.
The reserved profile name default in the IETF namespace simply refers
to the implementation's default choices. It is not mandatory to name
the default profile default. The first profile listed in the list-
profiles output is considered the default configuration, as specified
in Section 7.12.
The reserved profile names security, performance, and compatibility
refer to the implementation's choices when increased emphasis on
security, performance or compatibility is required, respectively. It
is not mandatory to name any profile security, performance, or
compatibility; in that case, those profile names MUST act as aliases
of another profile name. They are also allowed to be aliases of the
default profile.
Note that this profile mechanism is intended to provide a limited way
for an implementation to select among a small set of options that the
implementer has vetted and is satisfied with. It is not intended to
provide an arbitrary channel for complex configuration, and a sop
implementation MUST NOT use it in that way.
7. Input/Output Indirect Types
Some material is passed to sop indirectly, typically by referring to
a filename containing the data in question. This type of data may
also be passed to sop on Standard Input, or delivered by sop to
Standard Output.
If any input data is specified explicitly to be read from a file that
does not exist, sop will fail with MISSING_INPUT.
If any input data does not meet the requirements described below, sop
will fail with BAD_DATA.
7.1. Special Designators for Indirect Types
An indirect argument or parameter that starts with "@" (COMMERCIAL
AT, U+0040) is not treated as a filename, but is reserved for special
handling, based on the prefix that follows the @. We describe two of
those prefixes (@ENV: and @FD:) here. A sop implementation that
receives such a special designator but does not know how to handle a
given prefix in that context MUST fail with
UNSUPPORTED_SPECIAL_PREFIX.
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See Section 11.9 for more details about safe handling of these
special designators.
7.1.1. @ENV: Special Designator for Environment Variable
If the filename for any indirect material used as input has the
special form @ENV:xxx, then contents of environment variable $xxx is
used instead of looking in the filesystem. @ENV is for input only: if
the prefix @ENV: is used for any output argument, sop fails with
UNSUPPORTED_SPECIAL_PREFIX.
The sopv subset (see Section 3) MUST be capable of supporting the
@ENV special designator for all relevant inputs starting at sopv
version 1.0.
7.1.2. @FD: Special Designator for File Descriptor
If the filename for any indirect material used as either input or
output has the special form @FD:nnn where nnn is a decimal integer,
then the associated data is read from file descriptor nnn.
On platforms which support file descriptors, the sopv subset (see
Section 3) MUST be capable of supporting the @FD special designator
for all relevant inputs and outputs starting at sopv version 1.0.
7.2. CERTS
One or more OpenPGP certificates (Section 10.1 of [RFC9580]), aka
"Transferable Public Key". May be armored (see Section 11.4).
Although some existing workflows may prefer to use one CERTS object
with multiple certificates in it (a "keyring"), supplying exactly one
certificate per CERTS input will make error reporting clearer and
easier.
If any CERTS input contains secret key material, sop MUST fail with
BAD_DATA. This strictness is intended to keep the consumer of the
sop interface clear about what material they are dealing with in what
locations. This should reduce the consumer's risk of accidentally
exposing secret key material where they meant to expose a CERTS
object.
7.3. KEYS
One or more OpenPGP Transferable Secret Keys (Section 10.2 of
[RFC9580]). May be armored (see Section 11.4).
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Secret key material is often locked with a password to ensure that it
cannot be simply copied and reused. If any secret key material is
locked with a password and no --with-key-password option is supplied,
sop may fail with error KEY_IS_PROTECTED. However, when a cleartext
secret key (that is, one not locked with a password) is available,
sop should always be able to use it, whether a --with-key-password
option is supplied or not.
Although some existing workflows may prefer to use one KEYS object
with multiple keys in it (a "secret keyring"), supplying exactly one
key per KEYS input will make error reporting clearer and easier.
7.4. CIPHERTEXT
sop accepts only a restricted subset of the arbitrarily-nested
grammar allowed by the OpenPGP Messages definition (Section 10.3 of
[RFC9580]).
In particular, it accepts and generates only:
An OpenPGP message, consisting of a sequence of PKESKs (Section 5.1
of [RFC9580]) and SKESKs (Section 5.3 of [RFC9580]), followed by one
SEIPD (Section 5.13 of [RFC9580]).
The SEIPD can decrypt into one of two things:
* "Maybe Signed Data" (see below), or
* Compressed data packet that contains "Maybe Signed Data"
"Maybe Signed Data" is a sequence of:
* N (zero or more) one-pass signature packets, followed by
* zero or more signature packets, followed by
* one Literal data packet, followed by
* N signature packets (corresponding to the outer one-pass
signatures packets)
FIXME: does any tool do compression inside signing? Do we need to
handle that?
May be armored (see Section 11.4).
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7.5. INLINESIGNED
An inline-signed message may take any one of three different forms:
* A binary sequence of OpenPGP packets that matches a subset of the
"Signed Message" element in the grammar in Section 10.3 of
[RFC9580]
* The same sequence of packets, but ASCII-armored (see Section 11.4)
* A message using the Cleartext Signature Framework described in
Section 7 of [RFC9580]
The subset of the packet grammar expected in the first two forms
consists of either:
* a series of Signature packets followed by a Literal Data packet
* a series of One-Pass Signature (OPS) packets, followed by one
Literal Data packet, followed by an equal number of Signature
packets corresponding to the OPS packets
When the message is in the third form (Cleartext Signature
Framework), it has the following properties:
* The stream SHOULD consist solely of UTF-8 text
* Every Signature packet found in the stream SHOULD have Signature
Type 0x01 (canonical text document).
* It SHOULD NOT contain leading text (before the -----BEGIN PGP
SIGNED MESSAGE----- cleartext header) or trailing text (after the
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- armor tail).
While some OpenPGP implementations MAY produce more complicated
inline signed messages, a sop implementation SHOULD limit itself to
producing these straightforward forms.
7.6. SIGNATURES
One or more OpenPGP Signature packets. May be armored (see
Section 11.4).
7.7. SESSIONKEY
This documentation uses the GnuPG defacto ASCII representation:
ALGONUM:HEXKEY
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where ALGONUM is the decimal value associated with the OpenPGP
Symmetric Key Algorithms (Section 9.3 of [RFC9580]) and HEXKEY is the
hexadecimal representation of the binary key.
Example AES-256 session key:
9:FCA4BEAF687F48059CACC14FB019125CD57392BAB7037C707835925CBF9F7BCD
A sop implementation SHOULD produce session key data in this format.
When consuming such a session key, sop SHOULD be willing to accept
either upper or lower case hexadecimal digits, and to gracefully
ignore any trailing whitespace.
7.8. MICALG
This output-only type indicates the cryptographic digest used when
making a signature. It is useful specifically when generating signed
PGP/MIME objects, which want a micalg= parameter for the multipart/
signed content type as described in Section 5 of [RFC3156].
It will typically be a string like pgp-sha512, but in some situations
(multiple signatures using different digests) it will be the empty
string. If the user of sop is assembling a PGP/MIME signed object,
and the MICALG output is the empty string, the user should omit the
micalg= parameter entirely.
7.9. PASSWORD
This input-only is expected to be a UTF-8 string (Section 11.7), but
for sop decrypt, any bytestring that the user supplies will be
accepted. Note the details in sop encrypt and sop decrypt about
trailing whitespace!
See also Section 11.8 for more discussion.
7.10. VERIFICATIONS
This output-only type consists of one line per successful signature
verification. Each line has four structured fields delimited by a
single space, followed by a single-line JSON object or arbitrary text
to the end of the line.
* ISO-8601 UTC datestamp of the signature, to one second precision,
using the Z suffix
* Fingerprint of the signing key (may be a subkey)
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* Fingerprint of primary key of signing certificate (if signed by
primary key, same as the previous field)
* A string describing the mode of the signature, either mode:text or
mode:binary
* A JSON object or free-form message describing the verification
(see Section 7.10.1)
Note that while Section 6.1 permits a sop implementation to accept
other unambiguous date representations, its date output here MUST be
a strict ISO-8601 UTC date timestamp. In particular:
* the date and time fields MUST be separated by T, not by
whitespace, since whitespace is used as a delimiter
* the time MUST be emitted in UTC, with the explicit suffix Z
* the time MUST be emitted with one-second precision
Example:
2019-10-24T23:48:29Z C90E6D36200A1B922A1509E77618196529AE5FF8 C4BC2DDB38CCE96485EBE9C2F20691179038E5C6 mode:binary {"signers": ["dkg.asc"]}
7.10.1. VERIFICATIONS extension JSON
The final field of each VERIFICATIONS line is either JSON data or
arbitrary text.
If the final field begins and ends with curly brackets ("{" (LEFT
CURLY BRACKET, U+007B) and "}" (RIGHT CURLY BRACKET, U+007D), it is
JSON data. Otherwise, the final field is arbitrary text (whose
content and structure are up to the discretion of the
implementation).
JSON data allows for sophisticated future extensions, and is the
preferred form of this field. Arbitrary text is deprecated. The
rest of this subsection describes the JSON data.
The JSON data is a single JSON object, coerced into a one-line
representation (there are no literal LINE FEED (U+000A) characters in
it, though there may be appropriately escaped LINE FEED characters
within the JSON text).
The JSON object MAY contain the following keys:
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* signers: a list the supplied CERTS objects that could have issued
the signature, identified by the name given on the command line.
If this key is present, as long as any OpenPGP certificate in a
given CERTS object could have issued the signature, that CERTS
object MUST be listed here. If multiple CERTS objects contain
certificates that could have issued the signature, each CERTS MUST
be listed here.
* comment: Free-form UTF-8-encoded text describing the verification.
An internationalized, locale-aware sop implementation should
localize this field.
* ext: A "extensions" JSON object containing arbitrary,
implementation-specific data.
To avoid collisions with future definitions, the top-level JSON
object MUST NOT contain any other keys. For forward compatibility,
when consuming a JSON object produced by a SOP implementation,
unknown keys MUST be ignored.
7.11. DATA
Cleartext, arbitrary data. This is either a bytestream or UTF-8
text.
It MUST only be UTF-8 text in the case of input supplied to sop sign
--as=text or sop encrypt --as=text. If sop receives DATA containing
non-UTF-8 octets in this case, it will fail (see Section 11.7) with
EXPECTED_TEXT.
7.12. PROFILELIST
This output-only type consists of simple UTF-8 textual output, with
one line per profile. Each line consists of the profile name
optionally followed by a colon (0x31), a space (0x20), and a brief
human-readable description of the intended semantics of the profile.
Each line may be at most 1000 bytes, and no more than 4 profiles may
be listed.
These limits are intended to force sop implementers to make hard
decisions and to keep things simple.
The first profile MAY be explicitly named default. If it is not
named default, then default is an alias for the first profile listed.
No profile after the first listed may be named default.
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Any of the profiles MAY be explicitly named security, performance, or
compatibility. If none of the listed profiles have (some of) these
names, the profiles of which they are an alias should indicate as
much in the human-readable description.
See Section 6.4 for more discussion about the namespace and intended
semantics of each profile.
8. Failure Modes
sop return codes have both mnemonics and numeric values.
When sop succeeds, it will return 0 (OK) and emit nothing to Standard
Error. When sop fails, it fails with a non-zero return code, and
emits one or more warning messages on Standard Error. Known return
codes include:
+=======+=============================+============================+
| Value | Mnemonic | Meaning |
+=======+=============================+============================+
| 0 | OK | Success |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 1 | UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE | An otherwise unspecified |
| | | failure occurred |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 3 | NO_SIGNATURE | No acceptable signatures |
| | | found (sop verify) |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 13 | UNSUPPORTED_ASYMMETRIC_ALGO | Asymmetric algorithm |
| | | unsupported (sop encrypt) |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 17 | CERT_CANNOT_ENCRYPT | Certificate not |
| | | encryption-capable (e.g., |
| | | expired, revoked, |
| | | unacceptable usage flags) |
| | | (sop encrypt) |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 19 | MISSING_ARG | Missing required argument |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 23 | INCOMPLETE_VERIFICATION | Incomplete verification |
| | | instructions (sop decrypt) |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 29 | CANNOT_DECRYPT | Unable to decrypt (sop |
| | | decrypt) |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 31 | PASSWORD_NOT_HUMAN_READABLE | Non-UTF-8 or otherwise |
| | | unreliable password (sop |
| | | encrypt, sop generate-key) |
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+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 37 | UNSUPPORTED_OPTION | Unsupported option |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 41 | BAD_DATA | Invalid data type (no |
| | | secret key where KEYS |
| | | expected, secret key where |
| | | CERTS expected, etc) |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 53 | EXPECTED_TEXT | Non-text input where text |
| | | expected |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 59 | OUTPUT_EXISTS | Output file already exists |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 61 | MISSING_INPUT | Input file does not exist |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 67 | KEY_IS_PROTECTED | A KEYS input is password- |
| | | protected (locked), and |
| | | sop cannot unlock it with |
| | | any of the --with-key- |
| | | password (or --old-key- |
| | | password) options |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 69 | UNSUPPORTED_SUBCOMMAND | Unsupported subcommand |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 71 | UNSUPPORTED_SPECIAL_PREFIX | An indirect parameter is a |
| | | special designator (it |
| | | starts with @) but sop |
| | | does not know how to |
| | | handle the prefix |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 73 | AMBIGUOUS_INPUT | A indirect input parameter |
| | | is a special designator |
| | | (it starts with @), and a |
| | | filename matching the |
| | | designator is actually |
| | | present |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 79 | KEY_CANNOT_SIGN | Key not signature-capable |
| | | (e.g., expired, revoked, |
| | | unacceptable usage flags) |
| | | (sop sign and sop encrypt |
| | | with --sign-with) |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 83 | INCOMPATIBLE_OPTIONS | Options were supplied that |
| | | are incompatible with each |
| | | other |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 89 | UNSUPPORTED_PROFILE | The requested profile is |
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| | | unsupported (sop generate- |
| | | key, sop encrypt), or the |
| | | indicated subcommand does |
| | | not accept profiles (sop |
| | | list-profiles) |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 97 | NO_HARDWARE_KEY_FOUND | The sop implementation |
| | | supports some form of |
| | | hardware-backed secret |
| | | keys, but could not |
| | | identify the hardware |
| | | device (see Section 11.10) |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 101 | HARDWARE_KEY_FAILURE | The sop implementation |
| | | tried to use a hardware- |
| | | backed secret key, but the |
| | | cryptographic hardware |
| | | refused the operation for |
| | | some reason other than a |
| | | bad PIN or password (see |
| | | Section 11.10) |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 103 | PRIMARY_KEY_BAD | The primary key of a KEYS |
| | | object is too weak or |
| | | revoked |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 107 | CERT_USERID_NO_MATCH | The CERTS object has no |
| | | matching User ID |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
| 109 | KEY_CANNOT_CERTIFY | Key not certification- |
| | | capable (e.g., expired, |
| | | revoked, unacceptable |
| | | usage flags) (sop certify- |
| | | userid) |
+-------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+
Table 1: Error return codes
If a sop implementation fails in some way not contemplated by this
document, it MAY return UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE or any non-zero error
code, not only those listed above.
9. Known Implementations
The following implementations are known at the time of this draft:
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+================+================+=================================+
| Project name | cli name | notes |
+================+================+=================================+
| dkg-sop | dkg-sop | Implemented in C++ using the |
| | | LibTMCG library ([DKG-SOP]) |
+----------------+----------------+---------------------------------+
| gosop | gosop | Implemented in golang (Go) |
| | | using GOpenPGP ([GOSOP]) |
+----------------+----------------+---------------------------------+
| gpgme-sop | gpgme-sop | A Rust wrapper around the |
| | | gpgme C library ([GPGME-SOP]) |
+----------------+----------------+---------------------------------+
| PGPainless SOP | pgpainless-cli | Implemented in Java using |
| | | PGPainless ([PGPAINLESS-CLI]) |
+----------------+----------------+---------------------------------+
| RNP-sop | rnp-sop | A Rust wrapper around the |
| | | librnp C library ([RNP-SOP]) |
+----------------+----------------+---------------------------------+
| rsop | rsop | Implemented in Rust using the |
| | | rpgpie crate ([RSOP]) |
+----------------+----------------+---------------------------------+
| Sequoia SOP | sqop | Implemented in Rust using the |
| | | sequoia-openpgp crate ([SQOP]) |
+----------------+----------------+---------------------------------+
| sop-openpgp.js | sop-openpgp.js | Implemented in JavaScript |
| | | using OpenPGP.js |
| | | ([SOP-OPENPGPJS]) |
+----------------+----------------+---------------------------------+
| sopgpy | sopgpy | Implemented in Python using |
| | | PGPy ([SOPGPY]) |
+----------------+----------------+---------------------------------+
Table 2: Known implementations
10. Alternate Interfaces
This draft primarily defines a command line interface, but future
versions may try to outline a comparable idiomatic interface for C or
some other widely-used programming language.
Comparable idiomatic interfaces are already active in the wild for
different programming languages, in particular:
* Rust: [RUST-SOP]
* Java: [SOP-JAVA]
* Python: [PYTHON-SOP]
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These programmatic interfaces are typically coupled with a wrapper
that can automatically generate a command-line tool compatible with
this draft.
An implementation that uses one of these languages should target the
corresponding idiomatic interface for ease of development and
interoperability.
11. Guidance for Implementers
sop uses a few assumptions that implementers might want to consider.
11.1. One OpenPGP Message at a Time
sop is intended to be a simple tool that operates on one OpenPGP
object at a time. It should be composable, if you want to use it to
deal with multiple OpenPGP objects.
FIXME: discuss what this means for streaming. The stdio interface
doesn't necessarily imply streamed output.
11.2. Simplified Subset of OpenPGP Message
While the formal grammar for OpenPGP Message is arbitrarily nestable,
sop constrains itself to what it sees as a single "layer" (see
Section 7.4).
This is a deliberate choice, because it is what most consumers
expect. Also, if an arbitrarily-nested structure is parsed with a
recursive algorithm, this risks a denial of service vulnerability.
sop intends to be implementable with a parser that defensively
declines to do recursive descent into an OpenPGP Message.
Note that an implementation of sop decrypt MAY choose to handle more
complex structures, but if it does, it should document the other
structures it handles and why it chooses to do so. We can use such
documentation to improve future versions of this spec.
11.3. Validate Signatures Only from Known Signers
There are generally only a few signers who are relevant for a given
OpenPGP message. When verifying signatures, sop expects that the
caller can identify those relevant signers ahead of time.
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11.4. OpenPGP Inputs can be either Binary or ASCII-armored
OpenPGP material on input can be in either ASCII-armored or binary
form. This is a deliberate choice because there are typical
scenarios where the program can't predict which form will appear.
Expecting the caller of sop to detect the form and adjust accordingly
seems both redundant and error-prone.
The simple way to detect possible ASCII-armoring is to see whether
the high bit of the first octet is set: Section 4.2 of [RFC9580]
indicates that bit 7 is always one in the first octet of an OpenPGP
packet. In standard ASCII-armor, the first character is "-" (HYPHEN-
MINUS, U+002D), so the high bit should be cleared.
When considering an input as ASCII-armored OpenPGP material, sop MAY
reject an input based on any of the following variations (see
Section 6.2 of [RFC9580] for precise definitions):
* An unknown Armor Header Line
* Any text before the Armor Header Line
* Malformed lines in the Armor Headers section
* Any non-whitespace data after the Armor Tail
* Any Radix-64 encoded line with more than 76 characters
* Invalid characters in the Radix-64-encoded data
* An invalid Armor Checksum
* A mismatch between the Armor Header Line and the Armor Tail
* More than one ASCII-armored object in the input
For robustness, sop SHOULD be willing to ignore whitespace after the
Armor Tail.
For any plural data type (i.e.,SIGNATURES, CERTS, or KEYS), the
unarmored form is trivially concatenatable with another object of the
same type (e.g., with Unix's cat utility). But the armored forms are
not concatenatable without first dearmoring. To avoid inconsistent
behavior, a sop implementation SHOULD reject anything that appears to
be a concatenated series of ASCII-armored objects.
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When considering OpenPGP material as input, regardless of whether it
is ASCII-armored or binary, sop SHOULD reject any material that
doesn't produce a valid stream of OpenPGP packets. For example, sop
SHOULD raise an error if an OpenPGP packet header is malformed, or if
there is trailing garbage after the end of a packet.
For a given type of OpenPGP input material (i.e., SIGNATURES, CERTS,
KEYS, INLINESIGNED, or CIPHERTEXT), sop SHOULD also reject any input
that does not conform to the expected packet stream. See Section 7
for the expected packet stream for different types.
11.5. Complexities of the Cleartext Signature Framework
sop prefers a detached signature as the baseline form of OpenPGP
signature, but provides affordances for dealing with inline-signed
messages (see INLINESIGNED, Section 7.5) as well.
The most complex form of inline-signed messages is the Cleartext
Signature Framework (CSF). Handling the CSF structure requires
parsing to delimit the multiple parts of the document, including at
least:
* any preamble before the message
* the inline message header (delimiter line, OpenPGP headers)
* the message itself
* the divider between the message and the signature (including any
OpenPGP headers there)
* the signature
* the divider that terminates the signature
* any suffix after the signature
Note also that the preamble or the suffix might be arbitrary text,
and might themselves contain OpenPGP messages (whether signatures or
otherwise).
If the parser that does this split differs in any way from the parser
that does the verification, or parts of the message are confused, it
would be possible to produce a verification status and an actual
signed message that don't correspond to one another.
Blurred boundary problems like this can produce ugly attacks similar
to those found in [EFAIL].
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A user of sop that receives an inline-signed message (whether the
message uses the CSF or not) can detach the signature from the
message with sop inline-detach (see Section 5.4.5).
Alternately, the user can send the message through sop inline-verify
to confirm required signatures, and then (if signatures are valid)
supply its output to the consumer of the signed message.
11.6. Reliance on Supplied Certs and Keys
A truly stateless implementation may find that it spends more time
validating the internal consistency of certificates and keys than it
does on the actual object security operations.
For performance reasons, an implementation may choose to ignore
validation on certificate and key material supplied to it. The
security implications of doing so depend on how the certs and keys
are managed outside of sop.
11.7. Text is always UTF-8
Various places in this specification require UTF-8 [RFC3629] when
encoding text. sop implementations SHOULD NOT consider textual data
in any other character encoding.
OpenPGP Implementations MUST already handle UTF-8, because various
parts of [RFC9580] require it, including:
* User ID
* Notation name
* Reason for revocation
* ASCII-armor Comment: header
Dealing with messages in other charsets leads to weird security
failures like [Charset-Switching], especially when the charset
indication is not covered by any sort of cryptographic integrity
check. Restricting textual data to UTF-8 universally across the
OpenPGP ecosystem eliminates any such risk without losing
functionality, since UTF-8 can encode all known characters.
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11.8. Passwords are Human-Readable
Passwords are generally expected to be human-readable, as they are
typically recorded and transmitted as human-visible, human-
transferable strings. However, they are used in the OpenPGP protocol
as bytestrings, so it is important to ensure that there is a reliable
bidirectional mapping between strings and bytes. The maximally
robust behavior here is for sop encrypt and sop generate-key (that
is, commands that use a password to encrypt) to constrain the choice
of passwords to strings that have such a mapping, and for sop decrypt
and sop sign (and sop inline-sign, as well assop encrypt when
decrypting a signing key; that is, commands that use a password to
decrypt) to try multiple plausible versions of any password supplied
by PASSWORD.
11.8.1. Generating Material with Human-Readable Passwords
When generating material based on a password, sop encrypt and sop
generate-key enforce that the password is actually meaningfully
human-transferable. In particular, an implementation generating
material based on a new password SHOULD apply the following
considerations to the supplied password:
* require UTF-8
* trim trailing whitespace
Some sop encrypt and sop generate-key implementations may make even
more strict requirements on input to ensure that they are
transferable between humans in a robust way.
For example, a more strict sop encrypt or sop generate-key MAY also:
* forbid leading whitespace
* forbid non-printing characters other than SPACE (U+0020), such as
ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER (U+200C) or TAB (U+0009)
* require the password to be in Unicode Normal Form C
([UNICODE-NORMALIZATION])
Violations of these more-strict policies SHOULD result in an error of
PASSWORD_NOT_HUMAN_READABLE.
A sop encrypt or sop generate-key implementation typically SHOULD NOT
attempt enforce a minimum "password strength", but in the event that
some implementation does, it MUST NOT represent a weak password with
PASSWORD_NOT_HUMAN_READABLE.
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11.8.2. Consuming Password-protected Material
When sop decrypt receives a PASSWORD input, either from a --with-key-
password or --with-password option, it sees its content as a
bytestring. sop sign also sees the content of any PASSWORD input
supplied to its --with-key-password option as a bytestring. If the
bytestring fails to work as a password, but ends in UTF-8 whitespace,
it will try again with the trailing whitespace removed. This handles
a common pattern of using a file with a final newline, for example.
The pattern here is one of robustness in the face of typical errors
in human-transferred textual data.
A more robust sop decrypt or sop sign implementation that finds
neither of the above two attempts work for a given PASSWORD MAY try
additional variations if they produce a different bytestring, such
as:
* trimming any leading whitespace, if discovered
* trimming any internal non-printable characters other than SPACE
(U+0020)
* converting the supplied PASSWORD into Unicode Normal Form C
([UNICODE-NORMALIZATION])
A sop decrypt or sop sign implementation that stages multiple
decryption attempts like this SHOULD consider the computational
resources consumed by each attempt, to avoid presenting an attack
surface for resource exhaustion in the face of a non-standard
PASSWORD input.
11.9. Be Careful with Special Designators
As documented in Section 7.1, special designators for indirect inputs
like @ENV: and @FD: (and indirect outputs using @FD:) warrant some
special/cautious handling.
For one thing, it's conceivable that the filesystem could contain a
file with these literal names. If sop receives an indirect output
parameter that starts with an "@" (COMMERCIAL AT, U+0040) it MUST NOT
write to the filesystem for that parameter. A sop implementation
that receives such a parameter as input MAY test for the presence of
such a file in the filesystem and fail with AMBIGUOUS_INPUT to warn
the user of the ambiguity and possible confusion.
These special designators are likely to be used to pass sensitive
data (like secret key material or passwords) so that it doesn't need
to touch the filesystem. Given this sensitivity, sop should be
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careful with such an input, and minimize its leakage to other
processes. In particular, sop SHOULD NOT leak any environment
variable identified by @ENV: or file descriptor identified by @FD: to
any subprocess unless the subprocess specifically needs access to
that data.
11.10. Nuances for Hardware-backed Secret Key Material
There are a number of limitations and nuances to be aware of for
hardware-backed secret key support in this interface. Some sop
implementations will simply not support hardware-backed secret key
material. Other implementations might support only a single kind of
hardware-backing (e.g., an OpenPGP Smartcard [OPENPGP-SMARTCARD] but
not a TPM, or vice versa).
There is no formally adopted OpenPGP standard for identifying that a
given secret key is backed by hardware based on the OpenPGP wire
format. [I-D.dkg-openpgp-hardware-secrets] proposes one simple and
straightforward approach for how the wire format could cover this use
case. This simple mechanism is deliberately agnostic about the
specific kind of cryptographic hardware, but it does imply a sort of
rough shape of what the interface to the hardware would permit. In
particular, it will work best with hardware that has the following
properties:
* The hardware does specific asymmetric secret key operations, using
secret keys that it does not release.
* The user can ask the hardware to provide a list of corresponding
public key material (or OpenPGP key fingerprints) for any of the
secret keys held by the device.
* The hardware MAY require the provision of a PIN or password to
enable secret key operation, but does not require a PIN or
password for the list of public key material.
The sop interface does not currently provide for provisioning
cryptographic hardware with secret key material, or for changing the
PIN or password for the cryptographic hardware. Users of
cryptographic hardware need to do provisioning and PIN or password
setting outside of sop.
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If a user has two attached hardware tokens that both hold the same
secret key, and they are both password-locked, and they use different
passwords, sop offers no way for the user to clearly indicate which
password belongs to which device. Some cryptographic hardware is
designed to lock the device if the wrong password is entered too many
times, so users in this configuration are at risk of accidental
lockout. The easiest resolution for this is for the user to detach
any duplicate devices before invoking sop.
Note that some OpenPGP implementations use the private codepoint
ranges in the OpenPGP specification within an OpenPGP Transferable
Secret Key (e.g., [GNUPG-SECRET-STUB]) to indicate that the secret
key can be found on a smartcard.
While hardware-backed secret key operations can be significantly
slower than modern computers, and physical affordances like button-
presses or NFC tapping can themselves incur delay, it's bad form for
an invocation of sop to hang forever. This specification doesn't
define a specific maximum allowable delay, but if an implementation
calls into a hardware device either for public key listing or for
secret key operations, it should not allow the cryptographic hardware
to take an arbitrary amount of time to respond.
11.11. Statelessness exemptions
While this specification strives to define all operations as
stateless implementers MAY, for practical reasons, rely on the global
state of the system.
For example, the following items constitute a system state but are
not considered to violate the stateless rule:
* current time
Implementers are advised to document which global state items they
rely on to help in troubleshooting issues for consumers.
12. Guidance for Consumers
While sop is originally conceived of as an interface for
interoperability testing, it's conceivable that an application that
uses OpenPGP for object security would want to use it.
FIXME: more guidance for how to use such a tool safely and
efficiently goes here.
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FIXME: if an encrypted OpenPGP message arrives without metadata, it
is difficult to know which signers to consider when decrypting. How
do we do this efficiently without invoking sop decrypt twice, once
without --verify-* and again with the expected identity material?
12.1. Choosing Between --as=text and --as=binary
A program that invokes sop to generate an OpenPGP signature typically
needs to decide whether it is making a text or binary signature.
By default, sop will make a binary signature. The caller of sop sign
should choose --as=text only when it knows that:
* the data being signed is in fact textual, and encoded in UTF-8,
and
* the signed data might be transmitted to the recipient (the
verifier of the signature) over a channel that has the propensity
to transform line-endings.
Examples of such channels include FTP ([RFC0959]) and SMTP
([RFC5321]).
12.2. Special Designators and Unusual Filenames
In some cases, a user of sop might want to pass all the files in a
given directory as positional parameters (e.g., a list of CERTS files
to test a signature against).
If one of the files has a name that starts with --, it might be
confused by sop for an option. If one of the files has a name that
starts with @, it might be confused by sop as a special designator
(Section 7.1).
If the user wants to deliberately refer to such an ambiguously-named
file in the filesystem, they should prefix the filename with ./ or
use an absolute path.
Any specific @FD: special designator SHOULD NOT be supplied more than
once to an invocation of sop. If a sop invocation sees multiple
copies of a specific @FD:n input (e.g., sop sign @FD:3 @FD:3), it MAY
fail with MISSING_INPUT even if file descriptor 3 contains a valid
KEYS, because the bytestream for the KEYS was consumed by the first
argument. Doubling up on the same @FD: for output (e.g., sop decrypt
--session-key-out=@FD:3 --verifications-out=@FD:3) also results in an
ambiguous data stream.
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13. Security Considerations
The OpenPGP object security model is typically used for
confidentiality and authenticity purposes.
13.1. Signature Verification
In many contexts, an OpenPGP signature is verified to prove the
origin and integrity of an underlying object.
When sop checks a signature over data (e.g., via sop verify or sop
decrypt --verify-with), it MUST NOT consider it to be verified unless
all of these conditions are met:
* The signature must be made by a signing-capable public key that is
present in one of the supplied certificates
* The certificate and signing subkey must have been created before
or at the signature time
* The certificate and signing subkey must not have been expired at
the signature time
* The certificate and signing subkey must not be revoked with a
"hard" revocation
* If the certificate or signing subkey is revoked with a "soft"
revocation, then the signature time must predate the revocation
* The signing subkey must be properly bound to the primary key, and
cross-signed
* The signature (and any dependent signature, such as the cross-sig
or subkey binding signatures) must be made with strong
cryptographic algorithms (e.g., not MD5 or a 1024-bit RSA key)
* The signature must be of type 0x00 ("Signature of a binary
document") or 0x01 ("Signature of a canonical text document");
other signature types are inappropriate for data signatures
Implementers MAY also consider other factors in addition to the
origin and authenticity, including application-specific information.
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For example, consider the application domain of checking software
updates. If software package Foo version 13.3.2 was signed on
2019-10-04, and the user receives a copy of Foo version 12.4.8 that
was signed on 2019-10-16, it may be authentic and have a more recent
signature date. But it is not an upgrade (12.4.8 < 13.3.2), and
therefore it should not be applied automatically.
In such cases, it is critical that the application confirms that the
other information verified is _also_ protected by the relevant
OpenPGP signature.
Signature validity is a complex topic (see for example the discussion
at [DISPLAYING-SIGNATURES]), and this documentation cannot list all
possible details.
13.1.1. Explaining Non-Verification on Standard Error
When verifying OpenPGP signatures, sometimes no valid signatures are
found. This will cause the verifying subcommand to produce an empty
VERIFICATIONS output, and for some subcommands (sop verify and sop
inline-verify in particular) will also cause the subcommand to fail
with NO_SIGNATURE.
When this happens, some consumers will want to know more details
about the verification failure, since some verification failures may
be indications that something is wrong with the verifier's setup,
such as outdated OpenPGP implementations (which can be upgraded),
expired signing certificates (which can be refreshed), and so on.
To address this, when no valid signatures are found at all, sop MAY
emit a human-readable explanation to standard error.
Some example explanations for complete signature validation failure
include:
* Version 7 signature found, but FooPGP 2.0.3 only supports versions
4 and 6.
* Version 3 signature found, but BarPGP 0.9.7 rejects all version 3
signatures.
* Signature from pubkey algorithm 94 found, but BazPGP 1.1 does not
support this pubkey algorithm.
* Signature using hash algorithm 22 found, but QuxPGP 19.0.5 does
not support this hash algorithm.
* Two signatures found, both made by unknown OpenPGP certificates.
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* Signature does not match hash prefix.
* No OpenPGP signatures found.
In some cases (such as when two OpenPGP signatures are discovered,
and they both fail to validate for different reasons), a sop
implementation may choose to emit a more complex warning.
Unless --debug is present, sop SHOULD NOT emit any such warning (even
if true for one of the OpenPGP signatures found) if another signature
was found in the same SIGNATURES object or INLINESIGNED message that
does verify correctly. This keeps the upgrade path smooth for the
whole ecosystem. As the ecosystem evolves, signatures using new
versions and algorithms, or signatures simply using new signing keys,
are typically introduced as a second signature distributed alongside
the first. A warning about a signature with a new or unknown
algorithm (or key) when an accompanying signature still verifies from
a known key with a known algorithm will discourage signers from
adopting new algorithms or keys. And introducing a warning about a
signature using a deprecated algorithm (or key), when an accompanying
signature still verifies using a more modern algorithm or key will
discourage a verifier from upgrading their OpenPGP implementation or
dropping old, deprecated keys.
Implementers should avoid emitting dangerous explanations. For
example, an explanation like "Signature from 0xDEADBEEF found, but
not in list of acceptable signers" might encourage a user to go
hunting for any certificate with short key ID 0xDEADBEEF and start
using it to verify signatures. This would be a very dangerous
explanation, in particular because short key IDs are trivially
forgeable. But it would also be nearly as dangerous to use a full
fingerprint (instead of a short Key ID) in such a message because
then all an attacker has to do is to get their signature to appear in
the place where the verifier is looking for a signature, and then the
warning will encourage the verifier go look up the attacker's
certificate by fingerprint.
An internationalized, locale-aware sop implementation should localize
these warning messages.
13.2. Compression
The interface as currently specified does not allow for control of
compression. Compressing and encrypting data that may contain both
attacker-supplied material and sensitive material could leak
information about the sensitive material (see the CRIME attack).
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Unless an application knows for sure that no attacker-supplied
material is present in the input, it should not compress during
encryption.
14. Privacy Considerations
Material produced by sop encrypt may be placed on an untrusted
machine (e.g., sent through the public SMTP network). That material
may contain metadata that leaks associational information (e.g.,
recipient identifiers in PKESK packets (Section 5.1 of [RFC9580])).
FIXME: document things like PURBs and --hidden-recipient)
14.1. Object Security vs. Transport Security
OpenPGP offers an object security model, but says little to nothing
about how the secured objects get to the relevant parties.
When sending or receiving OpenPGP material, the implementer should
consider what privacy leakage is implicit with the transport.
15. References
15.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3156] Elkins, M., Del Torto, D., Levien, R., and T. Roessler,
"MIME Security with OpenPGP", RFC 3156,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3156, August 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3156>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3629>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9580] Wouters, P., Ed., Huigens, D., Winter, J., and Y. Niibe,
"OpenPGP", RFC 9580, DOI 10.17487/RFC9580, July 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9580>.
15.2. Informative References
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[Charset-Switching]
Gillmor, D. K., "Inline PGP Considered Harmful", 24
February 2014,
<https://dkg.fifthhorseman.net/notes/inline-pgp-harmful/>.
[DISPLAYING-SIGNATURES]
Brunschwig, P., "On Displaying Signatures", n.d.,
<https://admin.hostpoint.ch/pipermail/enigmail-
users_enigmail.net/2017-November/004683.html>.
[DKG-SOP] Stamer, H., "dkg-sop", n.d.,
<https://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/dkgpg.git/tree/
tools/dkg-sop.cc>.
[EFAIL] Poddebniak, D. and C. Dresen, "Efail: Breaking S/MIME and
OpenPGP Email Encryption using Exfiltration Channels",
n.d., <https://efail.de>.
[GNUPG-SECRET-STUB]
Koch, W., "GNU Extensions to the S2K algorithm", 4 July
2023,
<https://dev.gnupg.org/source/gnupg/browse/master/doc/
DETAILS;gnupg-2.4.3$1511>.
[GOSOP] Proton, "gosop", n.d.,
<https://github.com/ProtonMail/gosop>.
[GPGME-SOP]
Winter, J., "gpgme-sop", n.d.,
<https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/gpgme-sop>.
[I-D.dkg-openpgp-hardware-secrets]
Gillmor, D. K., "OpenPGP Hardware-Backed Secret Keys",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-dkg-openpgp-
hardware-secrets-02, 19 April 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-dkg-openpgp-
hardware-secrets-02>.
[I-D.draft-bre-openpgp-samples-01]
Einarsson, B. R., "juga", and D. K. Gillmor, "OpenPGP
Example Keys and Certificates", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-bre-openpgp-samples-01, 20 December
2019, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bre-
openpgp-samples-01>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance-11]
Gillmor, D. K., Hoeneisen, B., and A. Melnikov, "Guidance
on End-to-End E-mail Security", Work in Progress,
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Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance-11, 8
August 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance-11>.
[OpenPGP-Interoperability-Test-Suite]
"OpenPGP Interoperability Test Suite", 25 October 2021,
<https://tests.sequoia-pgp.org/>.
[OPENPGP-SMARTCARD]
Pietig, A., "Functional Specification of the OpenPGP
application on ISO Smart Card Operating Systems, Version
3.4", 18 March 2020, <https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/specs/
OpenPGP-smart-card-application-3.4.pdf>.
[PGPAINLESS-CLI]
Schaub, P., "pgpainless-cli", n.d.,
<https://codeberg.org/PGPainless/pgpainless/src/branch/
master/pgpainless-sop>.
[PYTHON-SOP]
Gillmor, D., "SOP for python", n.d.,
<https://pypi.org/project/sop/>.
[RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol",
STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc959>.
[RFC2440] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., and R. Thayer,
"OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440, DOI 10.17487/RFC2440,
November 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2440>.
[RFC4880] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4880, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4880>.
[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321>.
[RNP-SOP] Winter, J., "rnp-sop", n.d.,
<https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/rnp-sop>.
[RSOP] Schaefer, H., "rsop", n.d.,
<https://codeberg.org/heiko/rsop>.
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[RUST-SOP] Winter, J., "A Rust implementation of the Stateless
OpenPGP Protocol", n.d.,
<https://sequoia-pgp.gitlab.io/sop-rs/>.
[SEMVER] Preston-Werner, T., "Semantic Versioning 2.0.0", 18 June
2013, <https://semver.org/>.
[SOP-JAVA] Schaub, P., "Stateless OpenPGP Protocol for Java.", n.d.,
<https://github.com/pgpainless/sop-java>.
[SOP-OPENPGPJS]
Proton, "sop-openpgp.js", n.d.,
<https://github.com/openpgpjs/sop-openpgpjs>.
[SOPGPY] Gillmor, D. K., "sopgpy", n.d.,
<https://github.com/SecurityInnovation/PGPy/pull/440>.
[SQOP] Sequoia PGP, "sqop", n.d.,
<https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/sequoia-sop>.
[UNICODE-NORMALIZATION]
Whistler, K., "Unicode Normalization Forms", 4 February
2019, <https://unicode.org/reports/tr15/>.
Appendix A. sopv Version Changelog
This is a reverse-chronological order changelog for the sopv subset.
A.1. sopv Version 1.1
* VERIFICATIONS output always includes the fourth mode: field
* VERIFICATIONS output always uses JSON format for the trailer of
each line, and always populates the signers member (see
Section 7.10.1)
A.2. sopv Version 1.0
The following subcommands:
* sop version
* sop verify
* sop inline-verify
And the following features:
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* Special designators @FD: and @ENV: as input for CERTS objects
* Special designator @FD: as possible output for --verifications-out
argument to sopv inline-verify
* Multiple certificates in each CERTS object
* --not-before and --not-after constraints
Appendix B. C Library API (Tentative)
As specified in this draft, SOP is a command-line tool.
However, it can also be useful to have a comparable API exposed as a
C library. This library can be implemented as a shared object (e.g.,
.so, .dll, or .dylib depending on the platform) or as a statically
linked object. This interface can be reused in many different
places, as most modern programming languages offer "bindings" to C
libraries.
A proposed interface to a C library follows here as a C header file.
The primary goal of this shared object interface is to make it easy
to implement the command-line interface described in this document.
That said, it is also intended to be relatively ergonomic to use in
plausible OpenPGP workflows where the caller has access to all of the
explicit state.
If there is a plausible OpenPGP workflow that is not supported by
this library API, please propose improvements and explain the
specific workflow.
#ifndef __SOP_H__
#define __SOP_H__
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
/* C API for Stateless OpenPGP */
/* Depends on C99 */
/* statically-defined, non-opaque definitions */
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typedef enum {
SOP_OK = 0,
SOP_INTERNAL_ERROR = 1, /* Not part of sop CLI */
SOP_INVALID_ARG = 2, /* Not part of sop CLI */
SOP_NO_SIGNATURE = 3,
SOP_OPERATION_ALREADY_EXECUTED = 4, /* Not part of sop CLI */
SOP_UNSUPPORTED_ASYMMETRIC_ALGO = 13,
SOP_CERT_CANNOT_ENCRYPT = 17,
SOP_MISSING_ARG = 19,
SOP_INCOMPLETE_VERIFICATION = 23,
SOP_CANNOT_DECRYPT = 29,
SOP_PASSWORD_NOT_HUMAN_READABLE = 31,
SOP_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION = 37,
SOP_BAD_DATA = 41,
SOP_EXPECTED_TEXT = 53,
SOP_OUTPUT_EXISTS = 59,
SOP_MISSING_INPUT = 61,
SOP_KEY_IS_PROTECTED = 67,
SOP_UNSUPPORTED_SUBCOMMAND = 69,
SOP_UNSUPPORTED_SPECIAL_PREFIX = 71,
SOP_AMBIGUOUS_INPUT = 73,
SOP_KEY_CANNOT_SIGN = 79,
SOP_INCOMPATIBLE_OPTIONS = 83,
SOP_UNSUPPORTED_PROFILE = 89,
SOP_NO_HARDWARE_KEY_FOUND = 97,
SOP_HARDWARE_KEY_FAILURE = 101,
SOP_PRIMARY_KEY_BAD = 103,
SOP_CERT_USERID_NO_MATCH = 107,
SOP_KEY_CANNOT_CERTIFY = 109,
/* ensures a stable size for the enum -- do not use! */
SOP_MAX_ERR = INT_MAX,
} sop_err;
typedef enum {
SOP_SIGN_AS_BINARY = 0,
SOP_SIGN_AS_TEXT = 1,
/* ensures a stable size for the enum -- do not use! */
SOP_SIGN_AS_MAX = INT_MAX,
} sop_sign_as;
typedef enum {
SOP_INLINE_SIGN_AS_BINARY = 0,
SOP_INLINE_SIGN_AS_TEXT = 1,
SOP_INLINE_SIGN_AS_CLEARSIGNED = 2,
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/* ensures a stable size for the enum -- do not use! */
SOP_INLINE_SIGN_AS_MAX = INT_MAX,
} sop_inline_sign_as;
typedef enum {
SOP_ENCRYPT_AS_BINARY = 0,
SOP_ENCRYPT_AS_TEXT = 1,
/* ensures a stable size for the enum -- do not use! */
SOP_ENCRYPT_AS_MAX = INT_MAX,
} sop_encrypt_as;
/* FIXME: timestamps */
/* time_t is 32-bit on some architectures; we also want this to be
able to represent a "none" value as well as a "now" value without
removing some value from the range of time_t */
typedef time_t sop_time;
#define sop_time_none ((sop_time)0)
#define sop_time_now ((sop_time)-1)
/* Context object
*
* Each SOP object is bound back to a context object, and, when used
* in combination with other SOP objects, all SOP objects should come
* from the same context.
*
* A SOP context object need not be thread-safe; it should probably
* not be used across multiple threads. See "Zero global state" in
* the README file in
* https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kay/libabc.git
*/
struct sop_ctx_st;
typedef struct sop_ctx_st sop_ctx;
sop_ctx*
sop_ctx_new ();
void
sop_ctx_free (sop_ctx *sop);
/* Logging: */
typedef enum {
SOP_LOG_NEVER = 0,
SOP_LOG_ERROR = 1,
SOP_LOG_WARNING = 2,
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SOP_LOG_INFO = 3,
SOP_LOG_DEBUG = 4,
/* ensures a stable size for the enum -- do not use! */
SOP_LOG_MAX = INT_MAX,
} sop_log_level;
static inline const char *
sop_log_level_name (sop_log_level log_level) {
#define rep(x) if (log_level == SOP_LOG_ ## x) return #x
rep(ERROR);
rep(WARNING);
rep(INFO);
rep(DEBUG);
#undef rep
return "Unknown";
}
/* Handle warnings and other feedback.
*
* A SOP implementation that is capable of producing log messages
* will invoke the requested function with the log level of the
* message, and a NULL-terminated UTF-8 human-readable string with
* no trailing whitespace.
*
* the "passthrough" pointer is supplied by the library user via
* sop_set_log_level.
*/
typedef void (*sop_log_func) (sop_log_level log_level,
void *passthrough, const char *);
sop_err
sop_set_log_function (sop_ctx *sop, sop_log_func func,
void *passthrough);
/* Set the logging verbosity.
*
* Only log warnings up to max_level. (by default, max_level is
* SOP_LOG_WARNING, meaning SOP_LOG_INFO and SOP_LOG_DEBUG will be
* suppressed).
*/
sop_err
sop_set_log_level (sop_ctx *sop, sop_log_level max_level);
/* Information about the library: */
/* The name and version of the implementation of the C API (simple
* NUL-terminated string, no newlines), or NULL if there is an error
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* producing the version. */
const char *
sop_version (sop_ctx *sop);
/* The name and version of the primary underlying OpenPGP toolkit
* (or NULL if there is no backend, or if there was an error
* producing the backend version) */
const char *
sop_version_backend (sop_ctx *sop);
/* Any arbitrary extended version information other than
sop_ctx_version. Version info should be UTF-8 text, separated by
newlines (a NUL-terminated string, no trailing newline). Can
return NULL if there is nothing more to report beyond
sop_version. */
const char *
sop_version_extended (sop_ctx *sop);
/* note: there is nothing comparable to sop version --sop-spec
* because that should be visible based on the exported symbols in
* the shared object */
/* PROFILE objects: */
/* These describe a profile (e.g. for generate-key or encrypt).
* This use used when the implementation might legitimately want to
* offer the user some minimal amount of control over what is done.
* The profile-listing functions return blocks of four profiles. A
* sop_profile value of NULL represents no profile at all. In a
* list of sop_profile objects, once a NULL profile appears, no
* non-NULL profiles may follow.
*/
struct sop_profile_st;
typedef struct sop_profile_st sop_profile;
/* the NUL-terminated string returned by sop_profile_name MUST be a
UTF-8 encoded string, and MUST NOT include any whitespace or
colon (`:`) characters. It MUST NOT vary depending on locale. */
const char *
sop_profile_name (const sop_profile *profile);
/* The NUL-terminated string returned by sop_profile_description
cannot contain any newlines, and it MAY vary depending on
locale(7) if the implementation is internationalized. */
const char *
sop_profile_description (const sop_profile *profile);
#define SOP_MAX_PROFILE_COUNT 4
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typedef struct {
sop_profile *profile[SOP_MAX_PROFILE_COUNT];
} sop_profiles;
static inline int
sop_profiles_count(const sop_profiles profiles) {
for (int i = 0; i < SOP_MAX_PROFILE_COUNT; i++)
if (profiles.profile[i] == NULL)
return i;
return SOP_MAX_PROFILE_COUNT;
}
/* Return a list of profiles supported by the library for generating
* keys.
*/
sop_err
sop_list_profiles_generate_key (sop_ctx *sop, sop_profiles *out);
/* CLEARTEXT (and other raw data): */
/* This is a standard buffer for bytestrings produced by sop. Users
never create this kind of object, but it is sometimes returned
from the library. */
struct sop_buf_st;
typedef struct sop_buf_st sop_buf;
void
sop_buf_free (sop_buf *buf);
size_t
sop_buf_size (const sop_buf *buf);
const uint8_t *
sop_buf_data (const sop_buf *buf);
/* KEYS objects: */
struct sop_keys_st;
typedef struct sop_keys_st sop_keys;
sop_err
sop_keys_from_bytes (sop_ctx *sop,
const uint8_t* data, size_t len,
sop_keys **out);
sop_err
sop_keys_to_bytes (const sop_keys *keys,
bool armor, sop_buf **out);
void
sop_keys_free (sop_keys *keys);
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/* Generate a new, minimal OpenPGP Transferable secret key.
`profile` can be NULL to mean the default profile. */
sop_err
sop_generate_key_with_profile (sop_ctx *sop,
sop_profile *profile,
bool sign_only,
sop_keys **out);
static inline sop_err
sop_generate_key (sop_ctx *sop, sop_keys **out) {
return sop_generate_key_with_profile (sop, NULL, false, out);
}
/* For each key in the sop_keys object, add the given user ID, and
return a new sop_keys object containing the updated keys. If the
supplied user ID is not valid UTF-8 text, this call will fail and
return SOP_EXPECTED_TEXT.
If the implementation rejects the user ID string by policy for
any other reason, this call will fail and return SOP_BAD_DATA.
*/
sop_err
sop_keys_add_uid (const sop_keys *keys, const char *uid,
sop_keys **out);
/* returns true if any of the secret key material is currently
locked with a password */
sop_err
sop_keys_locked (const sop_keys *keys, bool *out);
/* return a new sop_keys object with any secret key material
encrypted with `password` unlocked, Returns SOP_OK if all keys
have now been unlocked.
If any locked key material could not be unlocked, return
SOP_KEY_IS_PROTECTED, while also unlocking what key material can
be unlocked.
This allows the user to try an arbitrary bytestream as a
password. Most users will just invoke the inlined
sop_keys_unlock, below.
An implementation MUST NOT reject proposed passwords by policy
during unlock, but rather should try them as requested.
*/
sop_err
sop_keys_unlock_raw (const sop_keys *keys,
const uint8_t *raw_password, size_t len,
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sop_keys **out);
static inline sop_err
sop_keys_unlock (const sop_keys *keys, const char *password,
sop_keys **out) {
return sop_keys_unlock_raw (keys,
(const uint8_t *)password,
strlen (password),
out);
}
/* return a new sop_keys object where all secret key material is
locked with `password` where possible.
During locking, a safety-oriented implementation MAY reject the
supplied password by policy for any number of reasons. This
helps libsop ensure that the proposed password can be
successfully re-supplied during some future unlock attempt.
If the implementation requires passwords to be UTF-8 text and the
supplied password is not valid UTF-8, the implementation will
fail, returning SOP_EXPECTED_TEXT. If an implementation rejects
a supplied password for some other reason (for example, if it
contains an NUL, unprintable, or otherwise forbidden character),
this call will fail and return SOP_BAD_DATA.
If any key material is already locked, it does nothing and
returns SOP_KEY_IS_PROTECTED.
Upon a successful locking, the user probably wants to use
sop_keys_free to free the original keys object.
*/
sop_err
sop_keys_lock_raw (const sop_keys *keys,
const uint8_t *password, size_t len,
sop_keys **out);
static inline sop_err
sop_keys_lock (const sop_keys *keys, const char *password,
sop_keys **out) {
return sop_keys_lock_raw (keys,
(const uint8_t *)password,
strlen (password),
out);
}
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/* CERTS objects: */
struct sop_certs_st;
typedef struct sop_certs_st sop_certs;
sop_err
sop_certs_from_bytes (sop_ctx *sop,
const uint8_t* data, size_t len,
sop_certs **out);
sop_err
sop_certs_to_bytes (const sop_certs *certs,
bool armor, sop_buf **out);
void
sop_certs_free (sop_certs *certs);
/* Return the OpenPGP certificates ("Transferable Public Keys") that
correspond to the OpenPGP Transferable Secret Keys. */
sop_err
sop_keys_extract_certs (const sop_keys *keys, sop_certs **out);
/* Return an OpenPGP revocation certificate for each Transferable
Secret Key found in the input. */
sop_err
sop_keys_revoke_keys (const sop_keys *keys, sop_certs **out);
/* SIGNATURES objects: */
struct sop_sigs_st;
typedef struct sop_sigs_st sop_sigs;
sop_err
sop_sigs_from_bytes (sop_ctx *sop,
const uint8_t* data, size_t len,
sop_sigs **out);
sop_err
sop_sigs_to_bytes (const sop_sigs *sigs,
bool armor, sop_buf **out);
void
sop_sigs_free (sop_sigs *sigs);
/* VERIFICATIONS (output only, describes valid, verified
signatures): */
struct sop_verifications_st;
typedef struct sop_verifications_st sop_verifications;
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void
sop_verifications_free (sop_verifications *verifs);
sop_err
sop_verifications_count (const sop_verifications *verifs, int *out);
/* textual representations of verifications, in the form described
by VERIFICATIONS in the CLI */
sop_err
sop_verifications_to_text (const sop_verifications *verifs,
sop_buf **out);
/* returns SOP_INTERNAL_ERROR if index is out of bounds. */
sop_err
sop_verifications_get_time (const sop_verifications *verifs,
int index, sop_time *out);
/* returns SOP_INTERNAL_ERROR if index is out of bounds. If the
signature is neither type 0x00 nor 0x01, this should probably not
be considered a valid, verified signature. */
sop_err
sop_verifications_get_mode (const sop_verifications *verifs,
int index, sop_sign_as *out);
/* returns SOP_INTERNAL_ERROR if index is out of bounds. */
sop_err
sop_verifications_get_signer_count (const sop_verifications *verifs,
int index, int *out);
/* returns SOP_INTERNAL_ERROR if either verif_index or signer_index
is out of bounds. Yields a pointer to the sop_certs object that
could have made the signature.
*/
sop_err
sop_verifications_get_signer (const sop_verifications *verifs,
int verif_index, int signer_index,
const sop_certs **out);
/* FIXME: (do we want to get more detailed info programmatically?
each verification should also have an issuing key fingerprint, a
primary key fingerprint, and a trailing text string) */
/* create detached signatures: */
struct sop_op_sign_st;
typedef struct sop_op_sign_st sop_op_sign;
sop_err
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sop_op_sign_new (sop_ctx *sop, sop_op_sign** out);
void
sop_op_sign_free (sop_op_sign *sign);
sop_err
sop_op_sign_use_keys (sop_op_sign *sign, const sop_keys *keys);
sop_err
sop_op_sign_detached_execute (sop_op_sign *sign,
sop_sign_as sign_as,
const uint8_t *msg,
size_t sz,
sop_buf **micalg_out,
sop_sigs **out);
/* verify detached signatures: */
struct sop_op_verify_st;
typedef struct sop_op_verify_st sop_op_verify;
sop_err
sop_op_verify_new (sop_ctx *sop, sop_op_verify** out);
void
sop_op_verify_free (sop_op_verify *verify);
sop_err
sop_op_verify_not_before (sop_op_verify *verify, sop_time when);
sop_err
sop_op_verify_not_after (sop_op_verify *verify, sop_time when);
sop_err
sop_op_verify_add_signers (sop_op_verify *verify,
const sop_certs *signers);
/* if no verifications are possible with the set of signers, this
returns SOP_NO_SIGNATURE, and *out is set to NULL */
sop_err
sop_op_verify_detached_execute (sop_op_verify *verify,
const sop_sigs *sigs,
const uint8_t *msg,
size_t sz,
sop_verifications **out);
/* INLINESIGNED object: */
struct sop_inlinesigned_st;
typedef struct sop_inlinesigned_st sop_inlinesigned;
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sop_err
sop_inlinesigned_from_bytes (sop_ctx *sop,
const uint8_t* data, size_t len,
sop_inlinesigned **out);
/* if the inlinesigned object uses the Cleartext Signing framework,
* the armor parameter is ignored.
*/
sop_err
sop_inlinesigned_to_bytes (const sop_inlinesigned *inlinesigned,
bool armor, sop_buf **out);
void
sop_inlinesigned_free (sop_inlinesigned *inlinesigned);
/* sop inline-sign */
sop_err
sop_op_sign_inline_execute (sop_op_sign *sign,
sop_inline_sign_as sign_as,
const uint8_t *msg,
size_t sz,
sop_inlinesigned **out);
/* sop inline-verify */
sop_err
sop_op_verify_inline_execute (sop_op_verify *verify,
const sop_inlinesigned *msg,
sop_verifications **verifications_out,
sop_buf **msg_out);
/* sop inline-detach */
sop_err
sop_inlinesigned_detach (const sop_inlinesigned *msg,
sop_sigs **sigs_out,
sop_buf **msg_out);
#endif // __SOP_H__
This proposed interface currently deals only with signing.
Encryption and decryption will be added in a future revision.
B.1. Design Choices for Library API
The library is deliberately minimal, with data types and
functionality corresponding to the SOP CLI. The interface itself
should expose no dependencies beyond libc.
All datatypes are opaque structs. Library implementations MUST NOT
expose library users to the memory layout of the underlying objects.
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The library deals with data that is all in RAM, and produces data in
RAM. For simplicity, it does not currently expose a streaming
interface.
It should be fairly straightforward to implement the SOP CLI on top
of such a library.
B.2. Library Use Patterns
There are two main kinds of data structures: operations (e.g.,
sop_op_sign and sop_op_verify) and datatypes (e.g., sop_keys and
sop_certs).
Operation objects are one-shot objects. They are used in the
following pattern:
* create an operations object (sop_op_*_new)
* adjust it to behave in certain ways (e.g., sop_op_sign_use_keys,
sop_op_verify_not_before)
* execute it (with some specific sop_op_*_execute function)
* dispose of it (sop_op_*_free)
The library user MUST NOT execute the same operation object more than
once. When a single operation object is executed more than once, it
should fail with SOP_OPERATION_ALREADY_EXECUTED. FIXME: if a use
case arises with a reasonable need to re-execute an already adjusted
object, we could extend the API to allow the user to clone an object.
Datatype objects are reusable objects. For example, it is fine for a
library user to pass the same sop_certs to multiple sop_op_*
operation objects, as long as the sop_certs object is not freed
before the execution of all the operation objects it has been passed
to.
Datatype objects are also immutable. Any function which modifies a
datatype object always creates a new copy of the object, with the
specific change applied. This immutability avoids any ambiguity
about what should happen when a datatype object is adjusted after it
was passed to an operation object but before it was executed.
B.3. libsopv C API Subset
A minimalist library subset that only does OpenPGP signature
verification might be called libsopv. This library is useful
wherever the use case is just OpenPGP signature verification.
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Such a library MUST implement the following functions from the C API:
* sop_ctx_new
* sop_ctx_free
* sop_set_log_function
* sop_set_log_level
* sop_version
* sop_version_backend
* sop_version_extended
* sop_buf_size
* sop_buf_data
* sop_buf_free
* sop_certs_from_bytes
* sop_certs_free
* sop_sigs_from_bytes
* sop_sigs_free
* sop_verifications_count
* sop_verifications_get_time
* sop_verifications_to_text
* sop_verifications_free
* sop_inlinesigned_from_bytes
* sop_op_verify_new
* sop_op_verify_not_before
* sop_op_verify_not_after
* sop_op_verify_add_signers
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* sop_op_verify_detached_execute
* sop_op_verify_inline_execute
* sop_op_verify_free
This minimal library interface should be sufficient to implement the
sopv subset version 1.0 (see Section 3).
B.3.1. libsopv 1.1 C API Subset
In addition to the above, to implement sopv version 1.1, the
additional functions are necessary:
* sop_verifications_get_mode
* sop_verifications_get_signer_count
* sop_verifications_get_signer
Appendix C. Simple CLI Test
The following POSIX-compliant shell script can be pointed to a SOP
implementation. It will report which subcommands have basic
coverage.
It does not consider all possible combinations of all options.
#!/bin/sh
# Simple, positive self-test for Stateless OpenPGP implementations
# https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli/
# This does not test all possible combinations of options or
# argument structures, it merely confirms that the standard
# subcommands and options are all implemented.
# This code makes many simplifying assumptions (e.g., there is no
# whitespace or metacharacters in filenames; filenames follow a
# strict convention) in order to be simple POSIX-compliant shell.
# The invocations are not necessarily safe shell programming if
# those assumptions are not met. Please use caution when borrowing
# from this test script.
# Author: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
# License: CC-0
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SOP=$1
if [ -z "$SOP" ]; then
cat >&2 <<EOF
Usage: $0 SOP
SOP should refer (either by \$PATH or by absolute path) to an
implementation of the Stateless OpenPGP command-line interface.
See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli/
EOF
exit 1
fi
if ! COMMAND_OUTPUT=$(command -v "$SOP"); then
printf >&2 "No such command: %s\n" "$SOP"
exit 1
fi
shift
# We skip commands whose inputs are not available.
# Return 0 if the test should be skipped, 1 otherwise.
# missing inputs are printed to stdout.
skip_test() {
# do not skip commands that consume no input.
if [ "$1" = generate-key \
-o "$1" = list-profiles \
-o "$1" = version ]; then
return 1
fi
shift
local arg=""
local ret=1
for arg in $SIN "$@"; do
local noninput='^--\(\(.*out\|as\|profile\|userid\|'
noninput="${noninput}"'validate-at\|\(verify-\|\)'
noninput="${noninput}"'not-\(before\|after\)\)=\|[^=]*$\)'
if printf %s "$arg" | grep -q "$noninput" ; then
continue
fi
arg=$(printf %s "$arg" | sed 's/^--.*=\(.*\)$/\1/')
if ! [ -r "$arg" ]; then
ret=0
printf ' %s' "$arg"
fi
done
return "$ret"
}
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sop() {
local suffix=""
if [ -n "$SIN" ]; then
suffix=" < $SIN"
fi
if [ -n "$SOUT" ]; then
suffix="$suffix > $SOUT"
fi
local missing=""
if missing=$(skip_test "$@"); then
printf "⛅ skipped [%s %s%s] due to missing inputs%s\n" \
"$SOP" "$*" "$suffix" "$missing"
SKIPCOUNT=$(( $SKIPCOUNT + 1 ))
return
fi
printf "🔒 [%s %s%s]\n" "$SOP" "$*" "$suffix"
if ! ( if [ -n "$SIN" ]; then exec < "$SIN"; fi;
if [ -n "$SOUT" ]; then exec > "$SOUT"; fi;
$SOP "$@") ; then
printf "💣 Failed: %s%s\n" "$*" "$suffix"
rm -f "$SOUT"
ERRORS="$ERRORS
$*$suffix"
else
PASSCOUNT=$(( $PASSCOUNT + 1 ))
fi
}
sop_fail() {
local suffix=""
if [ -n "$SIN" ]; then
suffix=" < $SIN"
fi
if [ -n "$SOUT" ]; then
printf 'ERROR: do not call sop_fail with expected stdout\n'
exit 1
fi
local missing=""
if missing=$(skip_test "$@"); then
printf "⛅ skipped failing test [%s %s%s] due to %s%s\n" \
"$SOP" "$*" "$suffix" "missing input" "$missing"
SKIPCOUNT=$(( $SKIPCOUNT + 1 ))
return
fi
printf "🔒⚠ [%s %s%s]\n" "$SOP" "$*" "$suffix"
if ( if [ -n "$SIN" ]; then exec < "$SIN"; fi; $SOP "$@"); then
printf >&2 "💣 succeeded when it should have failed: %s%s\n" \
"$*" "$suffix"
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ERRORS="$ERRORS
! $*$suffix"
else
PASSCOUNT=$(( $PASSCOUNT + 1 ))
fi
}
compare() {
local args=""
if [ "$1" = text -o "$1" = clearsigned ]; then
args=--ignore-trailing-space
fi
comptype="$1"
shift
if ! [ -r "$1" -a -r "$2" ]; then
printf "⛅ skipped %s comparison (%s) of %s and %s\n" \
"missing inputs" "$comptype" "$1" "$2"
SKIPCOUNT=$(( $SKIPCOUNT + 1 ))
return
fi
if diff --unified $args "$1" "$2"; then
printf "👍 %s and %s match!\n" "$1" "$2"
PASSCOUNT=$(( $PASSCOUNT + 1 ))
else
printf " 💣 %s and %s do not match!\n" "$1" "$2"
ERRORS="$ERRORS
Mismatch ($*)"
fi
}
show_errs() {
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
if [ 0 -ne $SKIPCOUNT ]; then
printf "No errors, but %d tests skipped somehow\n" \
$SKIPCOUNT
else
printf "No errors!\n"
fi
else
local SKIPMSG=''
if [ 0 -ne $SKIPCOUNT ]; then
SKIPMSG=$(printf "%d tests skipped due to prior errors" \
$SKIPCOUNT)
fi
cat <<EOF
$PASSCOUNT tests passed.
$SKIPMSG
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=== ERRORS ===
$1
=== Error summary ===
EOF
E=$(echo "$1" | grep -v '^$')
printf "%d Errors:\n" $(echo "$E" | wc -l)
echo "$E" | sed 's/^! //' | cut -f1 -d\ | sort | uniq -c
fi
}
DEARMORED=""
dearmor() {
SIN="$1" SOUT="$1.bin" sop dearmor
DEARMORED="$DEARMORED $1.bin"
}
ERRORS=""
SKIPCOUNT=0
PASSCOUNT=0
WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)
printf "Working in: %s\n" "$WORKDIR"
cd "$WORKDIR"
sop version
sop version --extended
sop version --backend
sop version --sop-spec
sop version --sopv
sop list-profiles generate-key
sop list-profiles encrypt
SOUT=test.key sop generate-key "Example User <user@example.net>"
dearmor test.key
SIN=test.key SOUT=test.cert sop extract-cert
dearmor test.cert
SOUT=zeina.key sop generate-key "Zeina <zeina@example.net>"
dearmor zeina.key
SIN=zeina.key SOUT=zeina.cert sop extract-cert
dearmor zeina.cert
for f in cert key; do
cat zeina.$f.bin test.$f.bin > both.$f.bin
SIN=both.$f.bin SOUT=both.$f sop armor
done
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SIN=test.key SOUT=test-revoked.cert sop revoke-key
dearmor test-revoked.cert
echo b4n4n4s > pw-orig.txt
SIN=test.key SOUT=test-locked.key sop change-key-password \
--new-key-password=pw-orig.txt
dearmor test-locked.key
# ensure that the key password is based on content, not filename
mv pw-orig.txt pw.txt
echo no-bananas > wrong-pw.txt
SIN=test-locked.key sop_fail change-key-password \
--old-key-password=wrong-pw.txt
SIN=test-locked.key SOUT=test-unlocked.key sop change-key-password \
--old-key-password=pw.txt
dearmor test-unlocked.key
compare binary test.key.bin test-unlocked.key.bin
cat > test.txt <<EOF
This is a test message.
We all ♥ OpenPGP!
EOF
for as in '' binary text; do
asarg=''
if [ -n "$as" ]; then
asarg=--as=$as
fi
SIN=test.txt SOUT=test.$as.sig sop sign $asarg test.key
dearmor test.$as.sig
# should fail because no password is supplied.
SIN=test.txt sop_fail sign $asarg test-locked.key
# should fail because wrong password is supplied.
SIN=test.txt sop_fail sign $asarg \
--with-key-password=wrong-pw.txt test-locked.key
SIN=test.txt SOUT=test.$as.siglocked sop sign $asarg \
--with-key-password=pw.txt test-locked.key
dearmor test.$as.siglocked
for sig in test.$as.sig test.$as.sig.bin test.$as.siglocked \
test.$as.siglocked.bin; do
for cert in test.cert test.cert.bin \
both.cert both.cert.bin; do
SIN=test.txt sop verify $sig $cert
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done
for cert in test-revoked.cert test-revoked.cert.bin; do
SIN=test.txt sop_fail verify $sig $cert
done
done
done
for as in '' binary text clearsigned; do
asarg=''
cmparg=binary
if [ -n "$as" ]; then
asarg=--as=$as
cmparg=$as
fi
SIN=test.txt SOUT=test.$as.signed sop inline-sign $asarg test.key
msgs=test.$as.signed
if [ "$as" != clearsigned ]; then
dearmor test.$as.signed
msgs="$msgs test.$as.signed.bin"
fi
for msg in $msgs; do
SIN=$msg SOUT=$msg.body sop inline-detach \
--signatures-out=$msg.detached-sigs
compare $cmparg test.txt $msg.body
for cert in test.cert test.cert.bin both.cert \
both.cert.bin; do
SIN=$msg SOUT=$msg.$cert.verified.txt sop \
inline-verify $cert
compare $cmparg test.txt $msg.$cert.verified.txt
SIN=$msg.body sop verify $msg.detached-sigs $cert
done
for cert in test-revoked.cert test-revoked.cert.bin; do
SIN=$msg sop_fail inline-verify $cert
done
done
done
SIN=test.txt SOUT=test.msg sop encrypt test.cert
dearmor test.msg
SIN=test.txt SOUT=test.both.msg sop encrypt both.cert.bin
dearmor test.both.msg
for msg in test.msg test.msg.bin test.both.msg test.both.msg.bin; do
SIN=$msg SOUT=$msg.decrypted.txt sop decrypt test.key
compare binary test.txt $msg.decrypted.txt
SIN=$msg sop_fail decrypt test-locked.key
SIN=$msg sop_fail decrypt --with-key-password=wrong-pw.txt \
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test-locked.key
SIN=$msg SOUT=$msg.locked-decrypted.txt sop decrypt \
--with-key-password=pw.txt test-locked.key
compare binary test.txt $msg.decrypted.txt
done
for x in $DEARMORED ; do
SIN=$x SOUT=$x.asc sop armor
SIN=$x.asc SOUT=$x.asc.bin sop dearmor
compare binary $x $x.asc.bin
done
# TODO (subcommands still untested):
# merge-certs
# update-key
# certify-userid
# validate-userid
# TODO (sop features still untested):
# symmetric encryption/decryption (with password)
# using --no-armor explicitly
# sop generate-key --signing-only
# sop generate-key --with-key-password
# sop revoke-key --with-key-password
# using the -- delimiter between options and positional args
# sop sign --micalg-out
# signing and encrypting at the same time
# decrypting and verifying at the same time
# using profiles
# using session keys
# using date ranges
# using special designators (@FD: and @ENV:)
# using piped input instead of material in the filesystem
# confirming error codes for expected failures
# put multiple TSKs in a KEYS object
# sop_fail when KEYS is offered where CERTS should be
# sop_fail when CERTS are offered where KEYS should be
# This script does not test different algorithms or protocol-layer
# subtleties For more complete testing, see the OpenPGP
# Interoperability Test Suite, at https://tests.sequoia-pgp.org/
show_errs "$ERRORS"
if [ -d "$WORKDIR" ]; then
rm -rf "$WORKDIR"
fi
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Appendix D. Testing the sopv Subset
The following two POSIX-compliant shell scripts can be used (with a
signing-capable sop implementation) to exhaustively test a sopv
implementation.
First, use setup-sopv-test with a signing-capable sop implementation
to generate a set of test vectors in the current working directory.
Then, run sopv-test against the sopv implementation:
./setup-sopv-test some-sop
./sopv-test my-sopv
D.1. setup-sopv-test
#!/bin/sh
# Create a-test environment for sopv: Stateless OpenPGP
# implementation Verification-only subset. This needs a
# signing-capable SOP implementation to work.
# https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli/
# Author: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
# License: CC-0
set -e
SOP=$1
if [ -z "$SOP" ]; then
cat >&2 <<EOF
Usage: $0 [--clean|SOP]
SOP should refer (either by \$PATH or by absolute path) to an
implementation of the Stateless OpenPGP command-line interface.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli/
This will build a list of files in the current directory which can be
used with ./test-sopv to confirm support for the sopv subset.
If --clean is provided, destroy the list of files for testing sopv.
EOF
exit 1
fi
objs() {
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for s in .bin ''; do
printf "%s\n" alice.cert$s bob.cert$s both.cert$s
for m in text binary; do
for u in alice bob both; do
for o in sig inlinesigned; do
printf "%s\n" msg.$m.$u.$o$s
done
done
done
done
for u in alice bob both; do
printf "%s\n" msg.text.$u.csf
done
printf "%s\n" msg.text msg.binary alice.key bob.key
}
if [ "$SOP" = --clean ]; then
rm -f $(objs)
exit 0
fi
sop() {
"$SOP" "$@"
}
# use the first two profiles for the keys, reusing the default
# if zero or one exists
profiles=$(sop list-profiles generate-key | cut -f1 -d: && \
echo default && echo default)
profile_line=1
for uid in alice bob; do
profile=$(printf "%s\n" "$profiles" | sed -n ${profile_line}p)
profile_line=$(( $profile_line + 1 ))
if [ "$profile" = default ]; then
profile=
else
profile=--profile=$profile
fi
sop generate-key --signing-only $profile "$uid" \
> "$uid.key"
sop extract-cert < "$uid.key" > "$uid.cert"
sop dearmor < "$uid.cert" > "$uid.cert.bin"
done
cat alice.cert.bin bob.cert.bin > both.cert.bin
sop armor < both.cert.bin > both.cert
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cat > msg.text <<EOF
This is the signed message for the sopv test suite.
It should test the following things:
- Messages using the cleartext signing framework (CSF)
- Text-based signatures (armored and non-armored)
- Binary data signatures (armored and non-armored)
- Multiple certificates per CERTS or INLINESIGNED
- Unknown signatures in a CERTS
- @ENV as CERTS or SIGNATURES input
- @FD as CERTS or SIGNATURES input
- @FD as --verifications-out
- UTF-8 data (💣)
- Armored and non-armored OpenPGP certificates
Please confirm!
EOF
base64 -d > msg.binary <<EOF
AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8gISIjJCUmJygpKissLS4v
MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTo7PD0+P0BBQkNERUZHSElKS0xNTk9QUVJTVFVWV1hZWltcXV5f
YFNPUFYgaXMgdGhlIFN0YXRlbGVzcyBPcGVuUEdQIFZlcmlmaWNhdGlvbiBTdWJz
ZXTimaVhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3h5ent8fX5/gIGCg4SFhoeIiYqL
jI2Oj5CRkpOUlZaXmJmam5ydnp+goaKjpKWmp6ipqqusra6vsLGys7S1tre4ubq7
vL2+v8DBwsPExcbHyMnKy8zNzs/Q0dLT1NXW19jZ2tvc3d7f4OHi4+Tl5ufo6err
7O3u7/Dx8vP09fb3+Pn6+/z9/v8=
EOF
for signer in alice bob; do
for form in text binary; do
sop sign --as=$form $signer.key < msg.$form \
> msg.$form.$signer.sig
sop dearmor < msg.$form.$signer.sig \
> msg.$form.$signer.sig.bin
sop inline-sign --as=$form $signer.key < msg.$form \
> msg.$form.$signer.inlinesigned
sop dearmor < msg.$form.$signer.inlinesigned \
> msg.$form.$signer.inlinesigned.bin
done
sop inline-sign --as=clearsigned $signer.key < msg.text \
> msg.text.$signer.csf
done
for form in text binary; do
sop sign --as=$form alice.key bob.key < msg.$form \
> msg.$form.both.sig
sop dearmor < msg.$form.both.sig > msg.$form.both.sig.bin
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sop inline-sign --as=$form alice.key bob.key < msg.$form \
> msg.$form.both.inlinesigned
sop dearmor < msg.$form.both.inlinesigned \
> msg.$form.both.inlinesigned.bin
done
sop inline-sign --as=clearsigned alice.key bob.key \
< msg.text > msg.text.both.csf
if ! ls $(objs) > /dev/null; then
exit 1
fi
D.2. sopv-test
#!/bin/sh
# Test the Stateless OpenPGP implementation Verification-only subset.
# This needs to be run from within a directory created by the
# setup-sopv-test script.
# https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli/
# Author: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
# License: CC-0
SOPV=$1
if [ -z "$SOPV" ]; then
cat >&2 <<EOF
Usage: $0 SOPV
SOPV should refer (either by \$PATH or by absolute path) to an
implementation of the Stateless OpenPGP Verification-only subset.
See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dkg-openpgp-stateless-cli/
EOF
exit 1
fi
sopv() {
local suffix=""
if [ -n "$SIN" ]; then
suffix=" < $SIN"
fi
if [ -n "$SOUT" ]; then
suffix="$suffix > $SOUT"
fi
if [ -n "$FD_3" ]; then
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suffix="$suffix 3< $FD_3"
fi
if [ -n "$FD_4" ]; then
suffix="$suffix 4< $FD_4"
fi
if [ -n "$FD_5" ]; then
suffix="$suffix 5< $FD_5"
fi
# FD 9 is used for output, not input
if [ -n "$FD_9" ]; then
suffix="$suffix 9> $FD_9"
fi
local missing=""
printf "🔒 [%s %s%s]\n" "$SOPV" "$*" "$suffix"
if ! ( if [ -n "$SIN" ]; then exec < "$SIN"; fi;
if [ -n "$SOUT" ]; then exec > "$SOUT"; fi;
if [ -n "$FD_3" ]; then exec 3< "$FD_3"; fi;
if [ -n "$FD_4" ]; then exec 4< "$FD_4"; fi;
if [ -n "$FD_5" ]; then exec 5< "$FD_5"; fi;
if [ -n "$FD_9" ]; then exec 9> "$FD_9"; fi;
$SOPV "$@") ; then
printf "💣 Failed: %s%s\n" "$*" "$suffix"
rm -f "$SOUT"
ERRORS="$ERRORS
$*$suffix"
return 1
else
PASSCOUNT=$(( $PASSCOUNT + 1 ))
return 0
fi
}
sopv_fail() {
local suffix=""
if [ -n "$SIN" ]; then
suffix=" < $SIN"
fi
if [ -n "$SOUT" ]; then
printf 'ERROR: do not call sopv_fail and expect stdout\n'
exit 1
fi
if [ -n "$FD_3" ]; then
suffix="$suffix 3< $FD_3"
fi
if [ -n "$FD_4" ]; then
suffix="$suffix 4< $FD_4"
fi
if [ -n "$FD_5" ]; then
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suffix="$suffix 5< $FD_5"
fi
# FD 9 is used for output, not input
if [ -n "$FD_9" ]; then
suffix="$suffix 9> $FD_9"
fi
local missing=""
printf "🔒⚠ [%s %s%s]\n" "$SOPV" "$*" "$suffix"
if ( if [ -n "$SIN" ]; then exec < "$SIN"; fi;
if [ -n "$FD_3" ]; then exec 3< "$FD_3"; fi;
if [ -n "$FD_4" ]; then exec 4< "$FD_4"; fi;
if [ -n "$FD_5" ]; then exec 5< "$FD_5"; fi;
if [ -n "$FD_9" ]; then exec 9> "$FD_9"; fi;
$SOPV "$@" > fail.out); then
printf >&2 "💣 succeeded when it should have failed: %s%s\n" \
"$*" "$suffix"
ERRORS="$ERRORS
! $*$suffix"
else
if [ -s fail.out ]; then
printf >&2 "💣 produced material to stdout: %s%s\n" \
"$*" "$suffix"
sed 's/^/ 💣> /' < fail.out >&2
ERRORS="$ERRORS
! $*$suffix ⚠PRODUCED OUTPUT⚠"
else
PASSCOUNT=$(( $PASSCOUNT + 1 ))
fi
fi
rm -f fail.out
}
compare() {
local args=""
if [ "$1" = text -o "$1" = clearsigned ]; then
args=--ignore-trailing-space
fi
comptype="$1"
shift
if ! [ -r "$1" -a -r "$2" ]; then
printf "⛅ skipped %s cmp (missing inputs): %s and %s\n" \
"$comptype" "$1" "$2"
SKIPCOUNT=$(( $SKIPCOUNT + 1 ))
return
fi
if diff --unified $args "$1" "$2"; then
printf "👍 %s and %s match!\n" "$1" "$2"
PASSCOUNT=$(( $PASSCOUNT + 1 ))
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else
printf " 💣 %s and %s do not match!\n" "$1" "$2"
ERRORS="$ERRORS
Mismatch ($*)"
fi
}
reject_output() {
for f in "$@"; do
if [ -s "$f" ]; then
printf "💣 %s should not exist with content!\n" "$f"
ERRORS="$ERRORS
Should-not-exist $f"
else
PASSCOUNT=$(( $PASSCOUNT + 1 ))
fi
done
}
confirm_mode() {
local foundmode=''
for m in $(cut -f4 -d\ < "$2"); do
if [ "$m" != "mode:$1" ]; then
printf "💣 %s should have mentioned mode:%s, was %s!\n" \
"$2" "$1" "$m"
ERRORS="$ERRORS
VERIFICATIONS-bad-mode $2 (was: $m; wanted mode:$1)"
else
foundmode=yes
fi
done
if [ -z "$foundmode" ]; then
printf "💣 %s had no mode, wanted %s!\n" "$2" "$1"
ERRORS="$ERRORS
VERIFICATIONS-no-mode $2 (wanted mode:$1)"
else
PASSCOUNT=$(( $PASSCOUNT + 1 ))
fi
}
show_errs() {
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
if [ 0 -ne $SKIPCOUNT ]; then
printf "No errors, %d tests passed.\n"
printf "but %d tests skipped somehow\n" \
$PASSCOUNT $SKIPCOUNT
else
printf "No errors! %d tests passed\n" $PASSCOUNT
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fi
else
local SKIPMSG=''
if [ 0 -ne $SKIPCOUNT ]; then
SKIPMSG=$(printf "%d tests skipped due to prior errors" \
$SKIPCOUNT)
fi
cat <<EOF
$PASSCOUNT tests passed.
$SKIPMSG
=== ERRORS ===
$1
=== Error summary ===
EOF
E=$(echo "$1" | grep -v '^$')
printf "%d Errors:\n" $(echo "$E" | wc -l)
echo "$E" | sed 's/^! //' | cut -f1 -d\ | sort | uniq -c
fi
}
ERRORS=""
SKIPCOUNT=0
PASSCOUNT=0
combine() {
# runners take: sopv|sopv_fail signer cert [cert...]
local runner=$1
shift
$runner sopv alice alice.$cert
$runner sopv bob bob.$cert
$runner sopv_fail bob alice.$cert
$runner sopv_fail alice bob.$cert
$runner sopv both alice.$cert
$runner sopv both bob.$cert
$runner sopv both both.$cert
$runner sopv alice both.$cert
$runner sopv bob both.$cert
$runner sopv alice alice.$cert bob.$cert
$runner sopv alice bob.$cert alice.$cert
$runner sopv bob alice.$cert bob.$cert
$runner sopv bob bob.$cert alice.$cert
FD_3=alice.$cert $runner sopv alice @FD:3
FD_3=bob.$cert FD_4=alice.$cert $runner sopv alice @FD:3 @FD:4
# don't try to test @ENV on non-armored certs
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if [ "$cert" = "cert" ]; then
SIGNER_CERT=$(cat alice.$cert) $runner sopv \
alice @ENV:SIGNER_CERT
fi
}
detached() {
local sopv=$1
shift
local signer=$1
shift
SIN=msg.$form $sopv verify $delim msg.$form.$signer.$sig "$@"
FD_5=msg.$form.$signer.$sig SIN=msg.$form $sopv verify $delim \
@FD:5 "$@"
# don't try to test @ENV on non-armored signatures
if [ "$sig" = "sig" ]; then
SIGNATURE=$(cat msg.$form.$signer.$sig) SIN=msg.$form $sopv \
verify $delim @ENV:SIGNATURE "$@"
fi
}
inlinesigned() {
local sopv=$1
shift
local signer=$1
shift
local vout=msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg.verifs
rm -f "$vout"
if [ "$sopv" = sopv ]; then
if SIN=msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg \
SOUT=msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg.out $sopv \
inline-verify --verifications-out=$vout \
$delim "$@" ; then
confirm_mode "$form" "$vout"
fi
if FD_9=$vout.fd SIN=msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg \
SOUT=msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg.out.fd \
$sopv inline-verify \
--verifications-out=@FD:9 \
$delim "$@" ; then
confirm_mode "$form" "$vout.fd"
fi
compare $form msg.$form msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg.out
compare binary msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg.out \
msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg.out.fd
rm -f msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg.out $vout \
msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg.out.fd $vout.fd
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# inlinesigned msgs can't be used as detached signatures:
SIN=msg.$form sopv_fail verify $delim \
msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg "$@"
else
SIN=msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg $sopv inline-verify \
--verifications-out=$vout \
$delim "$@"
FD_9=$vout.fd SIN=msg.$form.$signer.$inlmsg $sopv \
inline-verify --verifications-out=@FD:9 \
$delim "$@"
reject_output $vout $vout.fd
fi
}
sopv version --extended
sopv version --sopv
for delim in '' --; do
for cert in cert cert.bin; do
for form in binary text; do
# test detached signature
for sig in sig sig.bin; do
combine detached
done
# test inline-signed messages
for inlmsg in inlinesigned inlinesigned.bin; do
combine inlinesigned
done
done
# test CSF
form=text inlmsg=csf combine inlinesigned
done
done
# FIXME:
#
# - --not-before and --not-after
# - JSON extension to VERIFICATIONS, including "signers" (sopv 1.1)
# - using --argument=foo vs. --argument foo ?
# - review equivalence of VERIFICATIONS
# - confirm failure when --verifications-out already exists
# - passing CERTS where SIGNATURES are expected MUST fail
# - passing KEYS where CERTS are expected MUST fail
show_errs "$ERRORS"
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Appendix E. Acknowledgements
This work was inspired by Justus Winter's
[OpenPGP-Interoperability-Test-Suite].
The following people contributed helpful feedback and considerations
to this draft, but are not responsible for its problems:
* Allan Nordhøy
* Antoine Beaupré
* Edwin Taylor
* Guillem Jover
* Heiko Schaefer
* Jameson Rollins
* Justus Winter
* Paul Schaub
* Vincent Breitmoser
Appendix F. Future Work
* certificate transformation into popular publication forms:
- WKD
- DANE OPENPGPKEY
- Autocrypt
* sop encrypt -- specify compression? (see Section 13.2)
* sop encrypt -- specify padding policy/mechanism?
* sop decrypt -- how can it more safely handle zip bombs?
* sop decrypt -- what should it do when encountering weakly-
encrypted (or unencrypted) input?
* sop encrypt -- minimize metadata (e.g., --throw-keyids)?
* specify an error if a DATE arrives as input without a time zone?
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* add considerations about what it means for armored CERTS to
contain multiple certificates -- multiple armorings? one big
blob?
* do we need an interface or option (for performance?) with the
semantics that sop doesn't validate certificates internally, it
just accepts whatever's given as legit data? (see Section 11.6)
* do we need to be able to convert a message with a text-based
signature to a CSF INLINESIGNED message? I'd rather not, given
the additional complications.
* add encryption and decryption to C Library API
Appendix G. Document History
G.1. Substantive Changes between -12 and -13:
* Define sopv 1.1 (structured json VERIFICATIONS output)
* Fix misspellings
G.2. Substantive Changes between -11 and -12:
* Improvements in POSIX shell tests (including robust sopv test)
* Define security, performance, and compatibility profile aliases
* Clarify that sop armor ought to be able to armor any output that
sop produces
* Intro: acknowledge increased attention to key/cert management
* Add KEY_CANNOT_CERTIFY error code
* Relax guidance on multi-signature operations and --micalg-out
* Define sopv 1.0 (with changelog)
* Document exceptions to statelessness for system-level state
G.3. Substantive Changes between -10 and -11:
* update-key: new key management subcommand
* merge-certs: new certificate management subcommand
* certify-userid: new User ID certification subcommand
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* validate-userid: new User ID verification subcommand
* Replace references to RFC 4880 with RFC 9580
* Set aside error 1 as UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE
* Encourage JSON output in tail of VERIFICATIONS lines
* Add universal (ignorable) --debug option
* Add simple (and incomplete) shell-script test in appendix
G.4. Substantive Changes between -09 and -10:
* drop @HARDWARE: special designator in favor of the simple
[I-D.dkg-openpgp-hardware-secrets] or other magic
* drop hardware-specific C API function
* define SemVer-versioned sopv subset of CLI
* sop version: add --sopv option
* define libsopv subset of C API
* explicitly require BAD_DATA failure when KEYS are passed as CERTS
G.5. Substantive Changes between -08 and -09:
* enable the use of hardware-backed secret key material via the
@HARDWARE: special designator
* C API: clarify design goals and usage patterns
* C API: major overhaul and normalization:
- allow passthrough "cookie" for logging
- allow NULL return from sop_version_*
- explicitly offer SOP_LOG_NEVER
- use *_from_bytes and *_to_bytes instead of *_import and
*_export
- datatype objects are now immutable
- operation objects are one-shot
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- always return sop_err, even at a slight cost to C caller
ergonomics
G.6. Substantive Changes between -07 and -08:
* revoke-key, change-key-password: add --no-armor option
* generate-key: should fail on non-UTF-8 USERID
* generate-key: acknowledge that implementations MAY reject USERIDs
that seem bad
* armor: drop --label option
* encrypt: add --session-key-out option
* ASCII-armored objects should not be concatenated
* signature verification should only work for sigtypes 0x00 (binary)
and 0x01 (canonical text)
* sign: Constrain input when --micalg-out is present for alignment
with [RFC3156]
* propose simple C API for signing and verification
G.7. Substantive Changes between -06 and -07:
* generate-key: add --signing-only option
* new key management subcommand: change-key-password
* new key management subcommand: revoke-key
G.8. Substantive Changes between -05 and -06:
* version: add --sop-spec argument
* encrypt: add --profile argument
G.9. Substantive Changes between -04 and -05:
* decrypt: change --verify-out to --verifications-out
* encrypt: add missing --with-key-password
* add the concept of "profiles", use with generate-key
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* include table of known implementations
* VERIFICATIONS can now indicate the type of the signature
(mode:text or mode:binary)
G.10. Substantive Changes between -03 and -04:
* Reinforce that PASSWORD and SESSIONKEY are indirect data types
* encrypt: remove --as=mime option
* Handle password-locked secret key material: add --with-key-
password options to generate-key, sign, and decrypt.
* Introduce INLINESIGNED message type (Section 7.5)
* Rename detach-inband-signature-and-message to inline-detach,
clarify its possible inputs
* Add inline-verify
* Add inline-sign
G.11. Substantive Changes between -02 and -03:
* Added --micalg-out parameter to sign
* Change from KEY to KEYS (permit multiple secret keys in each blob)
* New error code: KEY_CANNOT_SIGN
* version now has --backend and --extended options
G.12. Substantive Changes between -01 and -02:
* Added mnemonics for return codes
* decrypt should fail when asked to output to a pre-existing file
* Removed superfluous --armor option
* Much more specific about what armor --label=auto should do
* armor and dearmor are now fully idempotent, but work only well-
formed OpenPGP streams
* Dropped armor --allow-nested
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* Specified what encrypt --as= means
* New error code: KEY_IS_PROTECTED
* Documented expectations around human-readable, human-transferable
passwords
* New subcommand: detach-inband-signature-and-message
* More specific guidance about special designators like @FD: and
@ENV:, including new error codes UNSUPPORTED_SPECIAL_PREFIX and
AMBIGUOUS_INPUT
G.13. Substantive Changes between -00 and -01:
* Changed generate subcommand to generate-key
* Changed convert subcommand to extract-cert
* Added "Input String Types" section as distinct from indirect I/O
* Made implicit arguments potentially explicit (e.g., sop armor
--label=auto)
* Added --allow-nested to sop armor to make it idempotent by default
* Added fingerprint of signing (sub)key to VERIFICATIONS output
* Dropped --mode and --session-key arguments for sop encrypt (no
plausible use, not needed for interop)
* Added --with-session-key argument to sop decrypt to allow for
session-key-based decryption
* Added examples to each subcommand
* More detailed error codes for sop encrypt
* Move from CERT to CERTS (each CERTS argument might contain
multiple certificates)
Author's Address
Daniel Kahn Gillmor
American Civil Liberties Union
125 Broad St.
New York, NY, 10004
United States of America
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Email: dkg@fifthhorseman.net
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