TLS clients should reject static Diffie-Hellman
draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Daniel Kahn Gillmor | ||
| Last updated | 2019-06-07 (Latest revision 2018-12-04) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This draft addresses problematic proposals that contradict the expected security properties of TLS. In particular, the ETSI "Middlebox Security Protocol" standard deliberately weakens the cryptographic guarantees of TLS unilaterally by the server, using static Diffie-Hellman keys where ephemeral keys are expected. Responsible TLS clients should avoid connecting to servers that appear to implement such a specification.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)