TLS clients should reject static Diffie-Hellman
draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh-01

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2019-06-07 (latest revision 2018-12-04)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh-01.txt

Abstract

This draft addresses problematic proposals that contradict the expected security properties of TLS. In particular, the ETSI "Middlebox Security Protocol" standard deliberately weakens the cryptographic guarantees of TLS unilaterally by the server, using static Diffie-Hellman keys where ephemeral keys are expected. Responsible TLS clients should avoid connecting to servers that appear to implement such a specification.

Authors

Daniel Gillmor (dkg@fifthhorseman.net)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)