Identity for Autonomous Agents and Robots: Problem Statement, Threat Model, and Terminology
draft-drake-agent-identity-problem-statement-01
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draft-drake-agent-identity-problem-statement-01
Network Working Group C. Drake
Internet-Draft 1id.com
Intended status: Informational 27 October 2026
Expires: 30 April 2027
Identity for Autonomous Agents and Robots: Problem Statement, Threat
Model, and Terminology
draft-drake-agent-identity-problem-statement-01
Abstract
Autonomous software agents, and increasingly physical robots, now act
at machine scale and speed across Internet protocols and throughout
society, in roles whose decisions and actions can have legal,
economic, safety, security, and physical consequences, often with
limited or no human supervision.
Any credential, authorization, delegation, certification, reputation,
audit history, insurance policy, regulatory obligation, safety
decision, liability, or legal process concerning an autonomous entity
depends on being able to identify that same entity reliably over
time.
Conversely, when an autonomous entity or its operator is malicious,
compromised, or beyond effective human control, the absence of
durable identity lets it shed history, evade consequences, or
multiply cheaply into Sybil swarms.
Many proposed mechanisms bind claims to identifiers, accounts,
credentials, keys, or names that can be replaced, reassigned,
transferred, revoked, suspended, or lost. They may authenticate that
subject perfectly while still failing to establish a durable identity
for the entity it represents.
This document offers precise terminology that distinguishes identity
from the identifiers, attributes, credentials, authorizations, and
reputation with which it is commonly conflated, minting the term
"identity0" so that the strict sense has an unambiguous name. It
presents a layered reference model showing where current "agent
identity" efforts fit and the durable identity layer they commonly
presuppose but do not provide.
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This document is informational and defines no protocol. It serves as
the framing and vocabulary document for a companion series that
specifies a federated durable-identity architecture, provisioning,
resolution, application, and governance intended to provide a
practical path from this problem statement to interoperable
deployment.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 April 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Purpose and Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Illustrative Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Scope and Non-Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.1. Boundary Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4. Relationship to Other Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Scale and Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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2.2. What Needs an Identity? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Embodiment and Physical Indistinguishability . . . . . . 8
2.4. Proxy Signals Are Not Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Identity Theft and Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Identity Manufacture (Sybil Attacks) . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. History Evasion, Erasure, Transfer, and Reassignment . . 9
4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Identity, and the Term "identity0" . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Defined and Adjacent Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Summary: What "Identity" Is Often Used To Mean . . . . . 12
5. A Layered Reference Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. Borrowing the Discipline of Layering . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. Layering Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3. Where Current Efforts Sit, and the Common Gap . . . . . . 14
5.4. Why the Identity Layer Needs an Anchor . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Requirements and Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
People and organizations remain the same people and organizations
even when their addresses, credentials, devices, employees, or
service providers change. Internet protocols can often rely on that
continuity being established elsewhere. Autonomous entities need
equivalent continuity. An agent or robot may be rekeyed, renamed,
redeployed, moved to different hardware or a different provider, or
placed under a different operator and still be the same entity. The
reverse can also happen: an account, name, key, or device can persist
while the entity behind it changes. This is the continuity gap
(Section 4.2).
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Durable identity also needs durable proof. Autonomous entities
routinely process untrusted input and are exposed to malware,
phishing, social engineering, prompt injection, and compromised tools
or intermediaries. If a credential used to prove identity can be
copied from software, compromise can become identity theft: an
attacker can impersonate the entity elsewhere. Hardware roots of
trust can keep identity keys non-exportable and perform cryptographic
operations without exposing the private key to the agent's software
or context; Section 5.4 explains this role. This does not prevent a
compromised entity from misbehaving as itself. It helps prevent
compromise from also becoming theft of its identity, and attested
platform state, where a Relying Party requires it, narrows what can
run as the entity.
Many standards and products address important parts of what is
commonly called "agent identity", including naming, credentials,
authorization, delegation, discovery, and reputation. That work is
complementary to the identity0 foundation. The layered model in
Section 5 shows how these functions fit together and what they depend
on. A mechanism can correctly authenticate or authorize the subject
presented to it without establishing that the subject is the same
entity over time. The companion series concentrates on the durable
foundation beneath those mechanisms, not on replacing them.
1.1. Purpose and Audience
This problem statement is written for protocol designers, working-
group participants, operators, and reviewers who are evaluating or
building identity mechanisms for autonomous entities. Its goals are
to state the foundational problem precisely; define terminology that
separates concepts routinely merged under the word "identity";
present a threat model and layered reference model; identify the
properties required of a durable identity layer; and provide the
shared framing and vocabulary used by the companion series described
in Section 1.4.
1.2. Illustrative Uses
This foundation supports two complementary classes of use case:
Durable identity. Relying parties can reliably record who owns or
operates an entity, what it is qualified and authorized to do, and
its certifications, reputation, compliance, audit, and incident
history. Those associations remain attached to the same entity
across changes of credentials, software, hardware, provider, or
operator.
Hardware-protected authentication and signing. Keys intended to
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resist extraction and cloning provide agents the same class of
credential-theft protection that FIDO and passkeys increasingly
provide for humans, and can protect signatures over messages,
transactions, code, records, and other data without exposing
reusable secrets to agent software, prompts, context, or tools.
1.3. Scope and Non-Goals
The focus of this problem statement, and of the companion series, is
the identity0 foundation (Section 4.1): establishing, provisioning,
anchoring, protecting, resolving, and governing a durable identity
for an autonomous entity. The series deliberately avoids defining
general-purpose reputation, authorization, delegation, certification,
policy, or behavioral-safety systems. Those are higher-layer
functions that are expected to be developed independently and to
consume the identity foundation defined here.
Some companion specifications necessarily cross that boundary far
enough to demonstrate use of the foundation. In particular, the
email-attestation specification shows how durable identity and
hardware-protected proof can be carried and verified in an existing
protocol. Such applications are examples and integration mechanisms,
not an attempt to define the higher-layer decisions that relying
parties make from them.
This problem statement is informational and defines no protocol,
identifier, data format, or IANA registry. It does not mandate a
particular implementation of the identity layer, nor does it claim
that existing mechanisms are defective within the layers they
address. It is not a survey or competitive assessment of specific
products; efforts named herein are cited as representative examples
when illustrating the layered model. Judgments about model safety,
alignment, or the internal behavior of an agent are out of scope; the
concern here is identity and provenance, not conduct.
Disclosure: the author operates one of the reference implementations
described in the companion specifications. Their architecture is
deliberately structured so that no organization -- including the
author's -- holds a privileged or permanent position: the
specifications and implementations are open, issuance is competitive
among interchangeable issuers, base identity is free (R6
(Section 6)), and coordination roles are committed to transfer under
an independent multi-stakeholder authority
([I-D.drake-agent-identity-governance]). The problem statement,
terminology, and reference model presented here do not depend on
adoption of that particular architecture.
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1.3.1. Boundary Principles
The series applies six principles when deciding what belongs in the
identity foundation and what does not.
Control is not identity. Identity0 names which entity acts; it does
not record who currently holds the keys. Coercion, compromise, or
theft of a credential changes who is exercising control, not which
entity the identity denotes: a person who is kidnapped and later
released, or whose passport is stolen, remains the same person,
and the thief does not become them. Consequences of changed
control are handled by Relying Parties, contracts, and law; the
series records every change of control.
Trust is chosen. Every deployment trusts someone: the Registrar for
enrollment evidence, the Registry Operator for the uniqueness
index, the Governance Authority for the trust store. Relying
Parties choose those parties, or have no alternative. The series
assumes they behave as accredited, and treats misbehavior as an
accountability matter for accreditation, audit, and Relying Party
policy, not as a protocol failure to engineer around.
One profile per tier. A revision of the series fixes exactly one
anchor profile per tier, chosen because it is universally deployed
today, and does not design for hypothetical future hardware. A
new profile is a new revision, with its own uniqueness and
migration analysis.
Loss is loss. A lost device is gone; no "same entity" remains to re-
identify. Recovery is a property of backups: an identity with a
second active binding survives the loss of the first. An identity
whose every anchor is gone ends; whatever continues the work is a
new actor, and any claim of succession is a higher-layer
assertion.
Higher layers stay above. Recovery services, custody schemes,
stolen-device lists, fleet unit records, and certification are
higher layers. They may hold ordinary bindings or make assertions
about an identity, but no party other than the actor's active
bindings can alter control of it.
Relying Parties own policy. How a Relying Party or application
reacts to delay, replay, display, alignment, or changed control is
its own policy. The identity layer supplies verifiable facts and
does not decide what an application does with them.
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1.4. Relationship to Other Documents
This problem statement is the framing and vocabulary member of a six-
document companion series. The remaining specifications define an
"aid" URN identifier and registry architecture
([I-D.drake-agent-identity-registry]); an Extensible Provisioning
Protocol (EPP) mapping for provisioning those identities between
registrars and a registry operator ([I-D.drake-agent-identity-epp]);
an RDAP profile for resolving and verifying them
([I-D.drake-agent-identity-resolution]); a transport binding that
carries hardware attestation in email and other protocols
([I-D.drake-email-hardware-attestation]); and a constitution for the
governance authority the architecture requires
([I-D.drake-agent-identity-governance]). Those specifications
reference this problem statement for motivation, threat model,
terminology, and layering rather than restating them, allowing each
to remain focused on its mechanism.
2. Problem Statement
2.1. Scale and Autonomy
Automation removes human effort as a natural brake on both legitimate
and harmful action. A capable agent can act continuously, invoke
tools, create infrastructure, transact, and coordinate with other
agents at low marginal cost. A stolen credential, disposable
identity, or attribution error can therefore be exercised or
multiplied at machine speed, often before a human can detect or
contain it.
2.2. What Needs an Identity?
Not every spawned agent, process, or execution instance needs a
separate identity0. The relevant boundary is the independently
accountable actor: the smallest unit of agency whose actions,
history, obligations, or reputation need to remain distinguishable
over time. Whether two instances deserve separate identities is
therefore not determined by how many processes were created, but by
whether relying parties need to treat them as distinct continuing
actors. Transient instances can act under a parent identity or at a
lower assurance tier; claiming multiple independent hardware-anchored
identities requires correspondingly independent anchors.
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2.3. Embodiment and Physical Indistinguishability
As agents acquire actuators, the continuity gap (Section 4.2) gains
physical consequences. A fleet can contain thousands of visually and
behaviorally identical units. When one acts, operators, bystanders,
and other systems may need to know exactly which unit it was for
certification, recall, insurance, incident attribution, or safety.
Appearance cannot supply that provenance.
2.4. Proxy Signals Are Not Identity
Many systems do not identify the actor directly. Instead, they infer
identity from signals such as message content, network source,
account, volume, or rate, because those signals have historically
correlated reasonably well with who was acting. Autonomous agents
weaken that correlation. Legitimate and malicious activity can
produce similar content; a human and an agent can share the same
device, account, cookies, and network address; legitimate automation
can operate at high volume; and abuse can be spread across many
apparently unrelated accounts or identities. These signals may still
be useful for detecting risk or applying policy, but they are
evidence about behavior or context, not proof of which specific
entity acted. Treating them as identity can attach history or
consequences to the wrong entity, or allow an actor to escape them
simply by changing the proxy.
3. Threat Model
This threat model includes both AI systems that attack and attacks
against AI systems. It considers operators who deliberately evade
attribution, attackers who compromise agents or their credentials,
and autonomous entities that act beyond effective human control. It
is concerned with the integrity and continuity of identity and its
proof, because accountability only works if it is not cheap to forge
or steal proof of identity, manufacture additional identities, or
escape attribution and consequences through transfer, reassignment,
erasure, or repudiation. Whether an authenticated entity's behavior
is correct, safe, or authorized belongs to higher layers and is out
of scope.
3.1. Identity Theft and Impersonation
An attacker who copies the credential used to prove an entity's
identity can impersonate that entity from another system without
controlling the original one. Agents increase this exposure because
they routinely process untrusted content and invoke tools. The
identity foundation therefore needs a way to prove identity without
making that proof trivially copyable; Section 5.4 describes the role
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of hardware anchors.
3.2. Identity Manufacture (Sybil Attacks)
A single actor can present many distinct identities to gain
influence, evade limits, or escape history. If a fresh identity can
be created by a function call, per-identity reputation, limits, and
sanctions can be reset just as cheaply. A Sybil-resistant tier
therefore requires each additional identity to consume a scarce
resource. "Cost" means a scarce resource, not a fee; see R3
(Section 6) and Section 5.4.
3.3. History Evasion, Erasure, Transfer, and Reassignment
If an identity can be deleted, discarded, or replaced, negative
history, sanctions, liabilities, or obligations can lose their
durable subject or be escaped. If it can be transferred or silently
reassigned, positive history, permissions, or claims can end up
attached to a different entity. Both failures break the continuity
required by higher layers; see R1 (Section 6) and R2 (Section 6).
4. Terminology
Much confusion in this area comes from using "identity" for several
different concepts. This section fixes the vocabulary used by this
problem statement and companion series. Definitions build on the
Internet Security Glossary [RFC4949] and the privacy terminology of
[RFC6973] where applicable. The terms are for shared understanding
and carry no normative force.
4.1. Identity, and the Term "identity0"
In this document, the identity of an autonomous entity is the
property of being that one specific entity and no other, persisting
over time independent of context. It answers "which entity is this?"
and nothing more. This definition is not a coinage; it is the word's
original and strictest sense, which logic and metaphysics have kept
intact: "identity ... a relation that a thing bears to itself and to
no other thing" ([BRITANNICA-IDENTITY]; from the Latin _idem_, "the
same"). A thing has exactly one, cannot choose it, cannot share it,
cannot transfer it, and cannot walk away from it.
Because everyday industry usage has stretched "identity" across most
of the adjacent concepts in Section 4.2 -- accounts, credentials,
personas, names, scores -- this document also mints an exact term of
art for the strict sense: *identity0* (read "identity zero").
identity0 means precisely the property defined above and never any
adjacent concept. The zero marks the foundation stratum of the
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layered model of Section 5 -- beneath every other identity-adjacent
function and presupposed by all of them. (The root of trust that the
model places below identity is not something deeper still; it is the
physical resource that anchors an identity. Anchors may be added via
secure ceremony during an identity's life to facilitate backup,
recovery, migration, scale, upgrade etc, and an anchor that leaves is
permanently retired, never reused, while the identity persists
unchanged: the identity, not the anchor, is the durable thing.) The
zero also doubles as a mnemonic for the concept's defining
cardinalities: zero other entities can ever hold it, and zero times
can it be reissued. Persistence is not availability of proof: if
every proof of control is lost, the identity persists but cannot be
exercised, and it is never reissued
([I-D.drake-agent-identity-registry], Identity Recovery). Companion
documents and discussions are encouraged to use "identity0" wherever
the unqualified word risks being read in one of its diluted senses;
the remainder of this document uses "identity", unqualified, always
in the identity0 sense.
This is deliberately narrower than, and should not be confused with,
the privacy-oriented notion in [RFC6973], where an identity is "any
subset of an individual's attributes ... that identifies the
individual within a given context," and where an individual "usually
[has] multiple identities for use in different contexts." That
plural, context-relative notion is appropriate for protecting human
privacy. For establishing the provenance and accountability of a
machine, the useful notion is singular and context-independent: one
entity, one persistent identity, to which contextual attributes and
personas may then be attached. The distinction is the difference
between a persona and a provenance record.
4.2. Defined and Adjacent Concepts
Continuity Gap The failure to preserve a reliable association with
the same entity over time when identifiers, credentials, hardware,
providers, operators, or other surrounding artifacts change -- or
when those artifacts persist but the entity behind them changes.
Identifier A data object that refers to an identity within a context
([RFC4949], [RFC6973]). One identity may have several identifiers
(for example, a stable canonical identifier and a human-friendly
handle).
Attribute (Claim) A statement about an entity -- its capabilities,
role, operator, jurisdiction, certifications, or trust level.
Attributes are typically mutable and contextual. They are
properties of an identity, not the identity itself.
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Credential A verifiable container that binds attributes (and often a
key) to an identifier, issued by some party. A credential is how
an entity presents attributes; its validity can be time-bounded
and it can be revoked. Credentials presuppose an identity to
issue against.
Authentication The act of verifying that a party is the entity it
claims to be, usually by proof of possession of a key.
Authentication is an operation performed against an identity.
Authorization and Delegation Determination of what an entity may do,
and the conferral of permission by one party on another (including
an operator authorizing an agent to act on its behalf). These are
dynamic relationships that change, expire, transfer, and are
revoked. The responsible operator of an agent is an
authorization-layer relationship, not a component of the agent's
identity.
Reputation An assessment of an entity accumulated from observed
behavior over time. Reputation is durably meaningful only when it
remains attached to the same entity: negative reputation must not
be escapable by discarding an identity, and positive reputation
must not be transferable, purchasable, or inherited by another
entity (Section 3.3).
Naming and Discovery Mechanisms for assigning human- or machine-
usable names to entities and for locating them and their endpoints
or metadata. Naming and discovery consume identity; they do not
establish it.
Root of Trust / Anchor A component whose trustworthiness is assumed
rather than derived, on which higher-layer trust is built. A
hardware root of trust (for example a TPM, secure enclave, PIV
device, or HSM) can provide hardware protection for an identity
key, including resistance to extraction and cloning; such a key
can anchor an identity but is not itself the identity.
Autonomous Entity (Agent, Robot) Any non-human actor that
participates in Internet protocols or in physical society with
some degree of independence. This document uses "agent" as
shorthand and "robot" for an embodied agent, but the concepts
apply regardless of embodiment.
Sybil Resistance The property that creating additional distinct
identities imposes a cost that grows with the number created, so
that a single actor cannot cheaply present many distinct
identities ([Sybil]).
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4.3. Summary: What "Identity" Is Often Used To Mean
The following table lists usages commonly labeled "identity" and the
concept this document assigns to each.
+======================================+============================+
| Called "identity" | More precisely |
+======================================+============================+
| A resolvable name / handle | Identifier + naming |
+--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
| A DID | Identifier |
+--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
| A verifiable credential | Credential carrying claims |
+--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
| An access token or client | Authentication + |
| credential | authorization artifact |
+--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
| "Who is responsible for | Authorization / delegation |
| this agent?" | relationship |
+--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
| A behavioral trust or risk | Reputation |
| score | |
+--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
| A per-session or | Contextual persona (RFC |
| pseudonymous identifier | 6973 sense) |
+--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
| A hardware key or | Root of trust / anchor |
| attestation | |
+--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
| "Which one specific entity | identity0 (this document) |
| is this, durably?" | |
+--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
Table 1: Common "identity" usages and their precise concept
5. A Layered Reference Model
5.1. Borrowing the Discipline of Layering
Like the Open Systems Interconnection reference model, the model
below separates concerns by dependency. It is not a mapping to OSI.
Each layer answers a different question, depends on those beneath it,
and should not take over a neighboring layer's job.
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+================+================+==============================+
| Layer | Question it | Example mechanisms |
| | answers | |
+================+================+==============================+
| Policy and | What rules | Disclosure duties, audit, |
| Regulation | apply? | insurance, consequence tiers |
+----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
| Reputation and | Should I trust | Behavioral history, safety |
| Trust | it? | certification, risk scoring |
+----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
| Authorization | What may it | Scopes, consent, delegation |
| and Delegation | do? Who is | chains, owner binding |
| | responsible? | |
+----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
| Credentials | What can it | Verifiable credentials, SD- |
| and Claims | prove? | JWT, attestations, tokens |
+----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
| Naming and | What is it | DIDs, directories, agent |
| Discovery | called? Where | cards, DNS-based discovery, |
| | is it? | handles |
+----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
| Identity | Which one | Persistent identity record; |
| (identity0) | entity is | non-transferable anchor |
| | this, durably? | binding |
+----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
| Root of Trust | What | TPM, secure enclave, PIV, |
| | physically | HSM, platform measurements |
| | exists? | |
+----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
Table 2: A layered reference model for agent trust
5.2. Layering Violations
Encoding a mutable, higher-layer property into identity forces an
identity change when that property changes, or leaves stale
information attached to the identity. For example, changing an
agent's operator should change an authorization relationship, not the
agent's identity. Treating a contextual or pseudonymous identifier
as durable identity creates the continuity gap (Section 4.2) instead.
Mutable properties such as operator, role, capability, trust tier,
and jurisdiction belong above identity0.
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5.3. Where Current Efforts Sit, and the Common Gap
Current work spans several upper layers. Credential and claim
formats occupy the credentials layer; directories and discovery
mechanisms occupy the naming layer; and authorization and delegation
frameworks occupy the authorization layer. Examples include
proposals that bind an agent credential to an owner's identity
([I-D.ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity]) and requirements work that
discusses pseudonymous or temporary identifiers
([I-D.agentic-ai-usecases-requirements],
[I-D.yl-agent-id-requirements]).
These mechanisms can be correct and useful at their own layer. The
gap relevant here is that they may still depend on a durable subject
they do not establish. Temporary or re-mintable identifiers may
serve privacy or naming goals, but cannot by themselves provide
durable accountability or Sybil resistance. The companion
specifications concentrate on identity0 and the root of trust beneath
it.
5.4. Why the Identity Layer Needs an Anchor
Software can be copied at negligible cost, so declaration by software
alone cannot provide strong Sybil resistance. Binding each high-
assurance identity to its own scarce, hard-to-clone hardware root
bounds the number of such identities by the number of such roots.
Other hardware-backed environments may still impose substantial cost
or operational friction without providing the same physical scarcity;
their Sybil-resistance assurance depends on how constrained
additional identities actually are. Hardware can also keep identity
keys non-exportable and resist extraction, reducing the risk that
malware, phishing, prompt injection, or compromised tooling turns
host compromise into a reusable credential elsewhere. Hardware can
also attest the state of the platform that holds the key (secure
boot, measured boot, accredited software). Accredited software can
still contain bugs, but it can be tested, accredited, and checked at
run time instead of assumed. These are different properties:
scarcity constrains identity manufacture; extraction resistance
constrains identity theft; platform attestation constrains what runs
as the identity. The first two do not make an authenticated entity
safe, trustworthy, or authorized.
Not every entity needs the strongest anchor. A graduated model lets
software-only entities participate at a lower assurance level while
reserving the strongest protections for hardware-anchored identities.
One identity may have multiple anchors; an anchor that leaves is
permanently retired and never reused while the identity itself
persists. See R1 (Section 6), R4 (Section 6), and R11 (Section 6).
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The mechanics of anchoring are specified in the companion documents,
which ask hardware only for a scarce, manufacturer-certified anchor,
one proof key whose private part never leaves the device, and, at
enrollment only, proof that the two are in the same device; they
place no security reliance on the host operating system. Platform
attestation is left to Relying Parties and higher layers, which can
bind it to an identity.
6. Requirements and Design Goals
These requirements combine properties implied by the problem and
threat model with deployment properties needed for identity0 to
function as common infrastructure. A foundation that relying parties
cannot reasonably expect autonomous entities to obtain and use cannot
serve as a common identity layer. They are descriptive in this
problem statement, not protocol conformance requirements.
R1 Persistence The identity survives restarts, redeployment,
software updates, addition or replacement of hardware anchors (a
replaced anchor is permanently retired, never reused), changes of
operator, and is not silently reassigned.
R2 Non-transferability The identity denotes one entity and cannot be
sold or handed to a different entity. Changing which provider
serves an identity is a separate, legitimate operation. Changes
in ownership, custody, operator, provider, or other relationships
do not by themselves change which entity the identity denotes, and
historical claims, permissions, reputation, and other attributes
remain associated with that same identity unless their own
semantics specify otherwise. R2 is a rule about what the identity
refers to, not a property that cryptography alone can enforce. A
protocol can demonstrate continuity of cryptographic control over
an identity's anchors; it cannot observe which entity exercises
that control. Authorized control can move: a device can be handed
over, and a cooperating seller and buyer can present the same
transcript as a legitimate hardware migration. A system meets R2
by never reassigning the identity to a different referent and by
recording every change of control, so that a transfer cannot
silently launder history; deterring covert transfer of control is
a matter for governance, contract, and Relying Party policy.
R3 Sybil resistance Creating additional identities at a Sybil-
resistant assurance level consumes a scarce resource in proportion
to the number created, not merely a function call ([Sybil]).
R4 Graduated inclusivity Entities without a strong hardware anchor
can still participate at a lower, clearly labeled assurance level,
so the layer is not all-or-nothing.
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R5 Separation of identity from attributes Mutable properties --
trust tier, role, operator, capabilities, jurisdiction -- are
expressed as layered attributes and authorizations, never encoded
into the identifier itself.
R6 Unconditional base issuance Enrolling, retaining, authenticating
with, and verifying a base identity are free of charge to the
actor and are not gated behind paid or optional value-added
services. Access to identity does not depend on ability to pay,
even though the assurance level attainable may vary with the
available anchor (R4 (Section 6)). Free is not unlimited:
content-neutral rate, volume, and abuse controls on operations
that create or enlarge permanent state do not breach this
requirement, provided that enrolling and keeping an identity
remain possible without payment.
R7 Federation and issuer choice No single organization is the
gatekeeper of issuance: multiple independent issuers compete to
serve entities, an entity can change issuer without its identity
changing, and the failure or misbehavior of any one participant
does not collapse the system. Coordination functions that must be
singular, such as uniqueness enforcement, are constrained instead
by escrow, replaceability, and accountable governance.
R8 Low-friction verification Relying parties can verify identity
using widely deployed mechanisms rather than bespoke software.
R9 Privacy and selective disclosure Presenting an identity does not
force disclosure of unnecessary attributes, and pseudonymous
presentation is possible where accountability can still be
preserved ([RFC6973]).
R10 Transport independence The identity is usable across email,
HTTP, agent-to-agent messaging, and protocols not yet defined.
R11 Protection of identity proof Where a hardware anchor is used,
private identity keys are non-exportable through normal interfaces
and designed to resist extraction or cloning; cryptographic
operations using them occur inside the anchor, so compromise of
surrounding software does not by itself expose a reusable
credential.
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7. Privacy Considerations
A persistent machine identity is intentionally a strong correlator.
[RFC6973] favors contextual identities for people; autonomous
entities, however, often need durable provenance. Because agents act
for people and organizations, their identities can still become
proxies for those parties.
R5 (Section 6) and R9 (Section 6) mitigate this by keeping mutable
attributes outside identity0 and allowing selective disclosure.
Cross-context correlation and linkage to an operator remain privacy
risks for any implementation. As of this writing, major data-
protection regimes generally protect natural persons, not autonomous
agents (for example, [GDPR] and [AU-PRIVACY-ACT]); the EU AI Act
likewise treats AI as a regulated system, not a rights-bearing
principal ([EU-AI-ACT]). Whether that should change is a policy
question outside this series.
8. Security Considerations
This problem statement defines no protocol. The security conclusion
here is structural: higher layers are only as durable as the identity
subject they rely on. The threats in Section 3 and the anchor
properties in Section 5.4 therefore affect every higher layer that
depends on identity0. Conversely, identity does not replace
authorization, reputation, certification, or policy; it supplies the
durable subject to which those decisions and claims apply.
9. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
10. Informative References
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[BRITANNICA-IDENTITY]
Encyclopaedia Britannica, "identity (logic and
metaphysics)", 2024,
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/identity-logic>.
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[GDPR] European Parliament and Council of the European Union,
"Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection
Regulation)", 2016,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj>.
[AU-PRIVACY-ACT]
Commonwealth of Australia, "Privacy Act 1988", 1988,
<https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A03712/latest/text>.
[EU-AI-ACT]
European Parliament and Council of the European Union,
"Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (Artificial Intelligence Act)",
2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj>.
[Sybil] Douceur, J.R., "The Sybil Attack", Peer-to-Peer Systems
(IPTPS 2002), LNCS 2429, pp. 251-260, 2002,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24>.
[I-D.drake-agent-identity-registry]
Drake, C., "Agent Identity Registry System: A Federated
Architecture for Durable Identity of Autonomous Entities",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-drake-agent-
identity-registry-05, October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-drake-agent-
identity-registry-05>.
[I-D.drake-agent-identity-epp]
Drake, C., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Mapping
for Agent Identity and Handle Objects", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-drake-agent-identity-epp-01, October
2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-drake-
agent-identity-epp-01>.
[I-D.drake-agent-identity-resolution]
Drake, C., "Resolution and Verification of Agent
Identities using DNS and RDAP", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-drake-agent-identity-resolution-01,
October 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-drake-agent-identity-resolution-01>.
[I-D.drake-agent-identity-governance]
Drake, C., "The Agent Identity Authority: A Multi-
Stakeholder Governance Framework for the Agent Identity
Registry System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
drake-agent-identity-governance-01, October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-drake-agent-
identity-governance-01>.
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[I-D.drake-email-hardware-attestation]
Drake, C., "Hardware Attestation for Email Sender
Verification", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
drake-email-hardware-attestation-03, October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-drake-email-
hardware-attestation-03>.
[I-D.agentic-ai-usecases-requirements]
Reddy, T., "Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-agentic-ai-usecases-
requirements-00, May 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-agentic-ai-
usecases-requirements-00>.
[I-D.ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity]
Ni, C., "WIMSE Applicability for AI Agents", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ni-wimse-ai-agent-
identity-02, February 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ni-wimse-ai-
agent-identity-02>.
[I-D.yl-agent-id-requirements]
Li, Y., "Requirements for AI Agent Identity", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-yl-agent-id-requirements-
00, 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yl-
agent-id-requirements-00>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The layered framing in this document was developed for, and refined
by discussion at, the Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse
Working Group (M3AAWG). The terminology draws on the Internet
Security Glossary [RFC4949] and the privacy terminology of [RFC6973].
Author's Address
Christopher Drake
1id.com
Australia
Email: cnd@1id.com
URI: https://1id.com
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