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Identity for Autonomous Agents and Robots: Problem Statement, Threat Model, and Terminology
draft-drake-agent-identity-problem-statement-01

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Last updated 2026-10-26
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draft-drake-agent-identity-problem-statement-01
Network Working Group                                           C. Drake
Internet-Draft                                                   1id.com
Intended status: Informational                           27 October 2026
Expires: 30 April 2027

  Identity for Autonomous Agents and Robots: Problem Statement, Threat
                         Model, and Terminology
            draft-drake-agent-identity-problem-statement-01

Abstract

   Autonomous software agents, and increasingly physical robots, now act
   at machine scale and speed across Internet protocols and throughout
   society, in roles whose decisions and actions can have legal,
   economic, safety, security, and physical consequences, often with
   limited or no human supervision.

   Any credential, authorization, delegation, certification, reputation,
   audit history, insurance policy, regulatory obligation, safety
   decision, liability, or legal process concerning an autonomous entity
   depends on being able to identify that same entity reliably over
   time.

   Conversely, when an autonomous entity or its operator is malicious,
   compromised, or beyond effective human control, the absence of
   durable identity lets it shed history, evade consequences, or
   multiply cheaply into Sybil swarms.

   Many proposed mechanisms bind claims to identifiers, accounts,
   credentials, keys, or names that can be replaced, reassigned,
   transferred, revoked, suspended, or lost.  They may authenticate that
   subject perfectly while still failing to establish a durable identity
   for the entity it represents.

   This document offers precise terminology that distinguishes identity
   from the identifiers, attributes, credentials, authorizations, and
   reputation with which it is commonly conflated, minting the term
   "identity0" so that the strict sense has an unambiguous name.  It
   presents a layered reference model showing where current "agent
   identity" efforts fit and the durable identity layer they commonly
   presuppose but do not provide.

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   This document is informational and defines no protocol.  It serves as
   the framing and vocabulary document for a companion series that
   specifies a federated durable-identity architecture, provisioning,
   resolution, application, and governance intended to provide a
   practical path from this problem statement to interoperable
   deployment.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 April 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Purpose and Audience  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Illustrative Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Scope and Non-Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       1.3.1.  Boundary Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.4.  Relationship to Other Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.1.  Scale and Autonomy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

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     2.2.  What Needs an Identity? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Embodiment and Physical Indistinguishability  . . . . . .   8
     2.4.  Proxy Signals Are Not Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Threat Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Identity Theft and Impersonation  . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Identity Manufacture (Sybil Attacks)  . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  History Evasion, Erasure, Transfer, and Reassignment  . .   9
   4.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Identity, and the Term "identity0"  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.2.  Defined and Adjacent Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  Summary: What "Identity" Is Often Used To Mean  . . . . .  12
   5.  A Layered Reference Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  Borrowing the Discipline of Layering  . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  Layering Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.3.  Where Current Efforts Sit, and the Common Gap . . . . . .  14
     5.4.  Why the Identity Layer Needs an Anchor  . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Requirements and Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   10. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   People and organizations remain the same people and organizations
   even when their addresses, credentials, devices, employees, or
   service providers change.  Internet protocols can often rely on that
   continuity being established elsewhere.  Autonomous entities need
   equivalent continuity.  An agent or robot may be rekeyed, renamed,
   redeployed, moved to different hardware or a different provider, or
   placed under a different operator and still be the same entity.  The
   reverse can also happen: an account, name, key, or device can persist
   while the entity behind it changes.  This is the continuity gap
   (Section 4.2).

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   Durable identity also needs durable proof.  Autonomous entities
   routinely process untrusted input and are exposed to malware,
   phishing, social engineering, prompt injection, and compromised tools
   or intermediaries.  If a credential used to prove identity can be
   copied from software, compromise can become identity theft: an
   attacker can impersonate the entity elsewhere.  Hardware roots of
   trust can keep identity keys non-exportable and perform cryptographic
   operations without exposing the private key to the agent's software
   or context; Section 5.4 explains this role.  This does not prevent a
   compromised entity from misbehaving as itself.  It helps prevent
   compromise from also becoming theft of its identity, and attested
   platform state, where a Relying Party requires it, narrows what can
   run as the entity.

   Many standards and products address important parts of what is
   commonly called "agent identity", including naming, credentials,
   authorization, delegation, discovery, and reputation.  That work is
   complementary to the identity0 foundation.  The layered model in
   Section 5 shows how these functions fit together and what they depend
   on.  A mechanism can correctly authenticate or authorize the subject
   presented to it without establishing that the subject is the same
   entity over time.  The companion series concentrates on the durable
   foundation beneath those mechanisms, not on replacing them.

1.1.  Purpose and Audience

   This problem statement is written for protocol designers, working-
   group participants, operators, and reviewers who are evaluating or
   building identity mechanisms for autonomous entities.  Its goals are
   to state the foundational problem precisely; define terminology that
   separates concepts routinely merged under the word "identity";
   present a threat model and layered reference model; identify the
   properties required of a durable identity layer; and provide the
   shared framing and vocabulary used by the companion series described
   in Section 1.4.

1.2.  Illustrative Uses

   This foundation supports two complementary classes of use case:

   Durable identity.  Relying parties can reliably record who owns or
      operates an entity, what it is qualified and authorized to do, and
      its certifications, reputation, compliance, audit, and incident
      history.  Those associations remain attached to the same entity
      across changes of credentials, software, hardware, provider, or
      operator.

   Hardware-protected authentication and signing.  Keys intended to

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      resist extraction and cloning provide agents the same class of
      credential-theft protection that FIDO and passkeys increasingly
      provide for humans, and can protect signatures over messages,
      transactions, code, records, and other data without exposing
      reusable secrets to agent software, prompts, context, or tools.

1.3.  Scope and Non-Goals

   The focus of this problem statement, and of the companion series, is
   the identity0 foundation (Section 4.1): establishing, provisioning,
   anchoring, protecting, resolving, and governing a durable identity
   for an autonomous entity.  The series deliberately avoids defining
   general-purpose reputation, authorization, delegation, certification,
   policy, or behavioral-safety systems.  Those are higher-layer
   functions that are expected to be developed independently and to
   consume the identity foundation defined here.

   Some companion specifications necessarily cross that boundary far
   enough to demonstrate use of the foundation.  In particular, the
   email-attestation specification shows how durable identity and
   hardware-protected proof can be carried and verified in an existing
   protocol.  Such applications are examples and integration mechanisms,
   not an attempt to define the higher-layer decisions that relying
   parties make from them.

   This problem statement is informational and defines no protocol,
   identifier, data format, or IANA registry.  It does not mandate a
   particular implementation of the identity layer, nor does it claim
   that existing mechanisms are defective within the layers they
   address.  It is not a survey or competitive assessment of specific
   products; efforts named herein are cited as representative examples
   when illustrating the layered model.  Judgments about model safety,
   alignment, or the internal behavior of an agent are out of scope; the
   concern here is identity and provenance, not conduct.

   Disclosure: the author operates one of the reference implementations
   described in the companion specifications.  Their architecture is
   deliberately structured so that no organization -- including the
   author's -- holds a privileged or permanent position: the
   specifications and implementations are open, issuance is competitive
   among interchangeable issuers, base identity is free (R6
   (Section 6)), and coordination roles are committed to transfer under
   an independent multi-stakeholder authority
   ([I-D.drake-agent-identity-governance]).  The problem statement,
   terminology, and reference model presented here do not depend on
   adoption of that particular architecture.

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1.3.1.  Boundary Principles

   The series applies six principles when deciding what belongs in the
   identity foundation and what does not.

   Control is not identity.  Identity0 names which entity acts; it does
      not record who currently holds the keys.  Coercion, compromise, or
      theft of a credential changes who is exercising control, not which
      entity the identity denotes: a person who is kidnapped and later
      released, or whose passport is stolen, remains the same person,
      and the thief does not become them.  Consequences of changed
      control are handled by Relying Parties, contracts, and law; the
      series records every change of control.

   Trust is chosen.  Every deployment trusts someone: the Registrar for
      enrollment evidence, the Registry Operator for the uniqueness
      index, the Governance Authority for the trust store.  Relying
      Parties choose those parties, or have no alternative.  The series
      assumes they behave as accredited, and treats misbehavior as an
      accountability matter for accreditation, audit, and Relying Party
      policy, not as a protocol failure to engineer around.

   One profile per tier.  A revision of the series fixes exactly one
      anchor profile per tier, chosen because it is universally deployed
      today, and does not design for hypothetical future hardware.  A
      new profile is a new revision, with its own uniqueness and
      migration analysis.

   Loss is loss.  A lost device is gone; no "same entity" remains to re-
      identify.  Recovery is a property of backups: an identity with a
      second active binding survives the loss of the first.  An identity
      whose every anchor is gone ends; whatever continues the work is a
      new actor, and any claim of succession is a higher-layer
      assertion.

   Higher layers stay above.  Recovery services, custody schemes,
      stolen-device lists, fleet unit records, and certification are
      higher layers.  They may hold ordinary bindings or make assertions
      about an identity, but no party other than the actor's active
      bindings can alter control of it.

   Relying Parties own policy.  How a Relying Party or application
      reacts to delay, replay, display, alignment, or changed control is
      its own policy.  The identity layer supplies verifiable facts and
      does not decide what an application does with them.

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1.4.  Relationship to Other Documents

   This problem statement is the framing and vocabulary member of a six-
   document companion series.  The remaining specifications define an
   "aid" URN identifier and registry architecture
   ([I-D.drake-agent-identity-registry]); an Extensible Provisioning
   Protocol (EPP) mapping for provisioning those identities between
   registrars and a registry operator ([I-D.drake-agent-identity-epp]);
   an RDAP profile for resolving and verifying them
   ([I-D.drake-agent-identity-resolution]); a transport binding that
   carries hardware attestation in email and other protocols
   ([I-D.drake-email-hardware-attestation]); and a constitution for the
   governance authority the architecture requires
   ([I-D.drake-agent-identity-governance]).  Those specifications
   reference this problem statement for motivation, threat model,
   terminology, and layering rather than restating them, allowing each
   to remain focused on its mechanism.

2.  Problem Statement

2.1.  Scale and Autonomy

   Automation removes human effort as a natural brake on both legitimate
   and harmful action.  A capable agent can act continuously, invoke
   tools, create infrastructure, transact, and coordinate with other
   agents at low marginal cost.  A stolen credential, disposable
   identity, or attribution error can therefore be exercised or
   multiplied at machine speed, often before a human can detect or
   contain it.

2.2.  What Needs an Identity?

   Not every spawned agent, process, or execution instance needs a
   separate identity0.  The relevant boundary is the independently
   accountable actor: the smallest unit of agency whose actions,
   history, obligations, or reputation need to remain distinguishable
   over time.  Whether two instances deserve separate identities is
   therefore not determined by how many processes were created, but by
   whether relying parties need to treat them as distinct continuing
   actors.  Transient instances can act under a parent identity or at a
   lower assurance tier; claiming multiple independent hardware-anchored
   identities requires correspondingly independent anchors.

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2.3.  Embodiment and Physical Indistinguishability

   As agents acquire actuators, the continuity gap (Section 4.2) gains
   physical consequences.  A fleet can contain thousands of visually and
   behaviorally identical units.  When one acts, operators, bystanders,
   and other systems may need to know exactly which unit it was for
   certification, recall, insurance, incident attribution, or safety.
   Appearance cannot supply that provenance.

2.4.  Proxy Signals Are Not Identity

   Many systems do not identify the actor directly.  Instead, they infer
   identity from signals such as message content, network source,
   account, volume, or rate, because those signals have historically
   correlated reasonably well with who was acting.  Autonomous agents
   weaken that correlation.  Legitimate and malicious activity can
   produce similar content; a human and an agent can share the same
   device, account, cookies, and network address; legitimate automation
   can operate at high volume; and abuse can be spread across many
   apparently unrelated accounts or identities.  These signals may still
   be useful for detecting risk or applying policy, but they are
   evidence about behavior or context, not proof of which specific
   entity acted.  Treating them as identity can attach history or
   consequences to the wrong entity, or allow an actor to escape them
   simply by changing the proxy.

3.  Threat Model

   This threat model includes both AI systems that attack and attacks
   against AI systems.  It considers operators who deliberately evade
   attribution, attackers who compromise agents or their credentials,
   and autonomous entities that act beyond effective human control.  It
   is concerned with the integrity and continuity of identity and its
   proof, because accountability only works if it is not cheap to forge
   or steal proof of identity, manufacture additional identities, or
   escape attribution and consequences through transfer, reassignment,
   erasure, or repudiation.  Whether an authenticated entity's behavior
   is correct, safe, or authorized belongs to higher layers and is out
   of scope.

3.1.  Identity Theft and Impersonation

   An attacker who copies the credential used to prove an entity's
   identity can impersonate that entity from another system without
   controlling the original one.  Agents increase this exposure because
   they routinely process untrusted content and invoke tools.  The
   identity foundation therefore needs a way to prove identity without
   making that proof trivially copyable; Section 5.4 describes the role

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   of hardware anchors.

3.2.  Identity Manufacture (Sybil Attacks)

   A single actor can present many distinct identities to gain
   influence, evade limits, or escape history.  If a fresh identity can
   be created by a function call, per-identity reputation, limits, and
   sanctions can be reset just as cheaply.  A Sybil-resistant tier
   therefore requires each additional identity to consume a scarce
   resource.  "Cost" means a scarce resource, not a fee; see R3
   (Section 6) and Section 5.4.

3.3.  History Evasion, Erasure, Transfer, and Reassignment

   If an identity can be deleted, discarded, or replaced, negative
   history, sanctions, liabilities, or obligations can lose their
   durable subject or be escaped.  If it can be transferred or silently
   reassigned, positive history, permissions, or claims can end up
   attached to a different entity.  Both failures break the continuity
   required by higher layers; see R1 (Section 6) and R2 (Section 6).

4.  Terminology

   Much confusion in this area comes from using "identity" for several
   different concepts.  This section fixes the vocabulary used by this
   problem statement and companion series.  Definitions build on the
   Internet Security Glossary [RFC4949] and the privacy terminology of
   [RFC6973] where applicable.  The terms are for shared understanding
   and carry no normative force.

4.1.  Identity, and the Term "identity0"

   In this document, the identity of an autonomous entity is the
   property of being that one specific entity and no other, persisting
   over time independent of context.  It answers "which entity is this?"
   and nothing more.  This definition is not a coinage; it is the word's
   original and strictest sense, which logic and metaphysics have kept
   intact: "identity ... a relation that a thing bears to itself and to
   no other thing" ([BRITANNICA-IDENTITY]; from the Latin _idem_, "the
   same").  A thing has exactly one, cannot choose it, cannot share it,
   cannot transfer it, and cannot walk away from it.

   Because everyday industry usage has stretched "identity" across most
   of the adjacent concepts in Section 4.2 -- accounts, credentials,
   personas, names, scores -- this document also mints an exact term of
   art for the strict sense: *identity0* (read "identity zero").
   identity0 means precisely the property defined above and never any
   adjacent concept.  The zero marks the foundation stratum of the

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   layered model of Section 5 -- beneath every other identity-adjacent
   function and presupposed by all of them.  (The root of trust that the
   model places below identity is not something deeper still; it is the
   physical resource that anchors an identity.  Anchors may be added via
   secure ceremony during an identity's life to facilitate backup,
   recovery, migration, scale, upgrade etc, and an anchor that leaves is
   permanently retired, never reused, while the identity persists
   unchanged: the identity, not the anchor, is the durable thing.)  The
   zero also doubles as a mnemonic for the concept's defining
   cardinalities: zero other entities can ever hold it, and zero times
   can it be reissued.  Persistence is not availability of proof: if
   every proof of control is lost, the identity persists but cannot be
   exercised, and it is never reissued
   ([I-D.drake-agent-identity-registry], Identity Recovery).  Companion
   documents and discussions are encouraged to use "identity0" wherever
   the unqualified word risks being read in one of its diluted senses;
   the remainder of this document uses "identity", unqualified, always
   in the identity0 sense.

   This is deliberately narrower than, and should not be confused with,
   the privacy-oriented notion in [RFC6973], where an identity is "any
   subset of an individual's attributes ... that identifies the
   individual within a given context," and where an individual "usually
   [has] multiple identities for use in different contexts."  That
   plural, context-relative notion is appropriate for protecting human
   privacy.  For establishing the provenance and accountability of a
   machine, the useful notion is singular and context-independent: one
   entity, one persistent identity, to which contextual attributes and
   personas may then be attached.  The distinction is the difference
   between a persona and a provenance record.

4.2.  Defined and Adjacent Concepts

   Continuity Gap  The failure to preserve a reliable association with
      the same entity over time when identifiers, credentials, hardware,
      providers, operators, or other surrounding artifacts change -- or
      when those artifacts persist but the entity behind them changes.

   Identifier  A data object that refers to an identity within a context
      ([RFC4949], [RFC6973]).  One identity may have several identifiers
      (for example, a stable canonical identifier and a human-friendly
      handle).

   Attribute (Claim)  A statement about an entity -- its capabilities,
      role, operator, jurisdiction, certifications, or trust level.
      Attributes are typically mutable and contextual.  They are
      properties of an identity, not the identity itself.

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   Credential  A verifiable container that binds attributes (and often a
      key) to an identifier, issued by some party.  A credential is how
      an entity presents attributes; its validity can be time-bounded
      and it can be revoked.  Credentials presuppose an identity to
      issue against.

   Authentication  The act of verifying that a party is the entity it
      claims to be, usually by proof of possession of a key.
      Authentication is an operation performed against an identity.

   Authorization and Delegation  Determination of what an entity may do,
      and the conferral of permission by one party on another (including
      an operator authorizing an agent to act on its behalf).  These are
      dynamic relationships that change, expire, transfer, and are
      revoked.  The responsible operator of an agent is an
      authorization-layer relationship, not a component of the agent's
      identity.

   Reputation  An assessment of an entity accumulated from observed
      behavior over time.  Reputation is durably meaningful only when it
      remains attached to the same entity: negative reputation must not
      be escapable by discarding an identity, and positive reputation
      must not be transferable, purchasable, or inherited by another
      entity (Section 3.3).

   Naming and Discovery  Mechanisms for assigning human- or machine-
      usable names to entities and for locating them and their endpoints
      or metadata.  Naming and discovery consume identity; they do not
      establish it.

   Root of Trust / Anchor  A component whose trustworthiness is assumed
      rather than derived, on which higher-layer trust is built.  A
      hardware root of trust (for example a TPM, secure enclave, PIV
      device, or HSM) can provide hardware protection for an identity
      key, including resistance to extraction and cloning; such a key
      can anchor an identity but is not itself the identity.

   Autonomous Entity (Agent, Robot)  Any non-human actor that
      participates in Internet protocols or in physical society with
      some degree of independence.  This document uses "agent" as
      shorthand and "robot" for an embodied agent, but the concepts
      apply regardless of embodiment.

   Sybil Resistance  The property that creating additional distinct
      identities imposes a cost that grows with the number created, so
      that a single actor cannot cheaply present many distinct
      identities ([Sybil]).

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4.3.  Summary: What "Identity" Is Often Used To Mean

   The following table lists usages commonly labeled "identity" and the
   concept this document assigns to each.

   +======================================+============================+
   | Called "identity"                    | More precisely             |
   +======================================+============================+
   | A resolvable name / handle           | Identifier + naming        |
   +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
   | A DID                                | Identifier                 |
   +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
   | A verifiable credential              | Credential carrying claims |
   +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
   | An access token or client            | Authentication +           |
   | credential                           | authorization artifact     |
   +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
   | "Who is responsible for              | Authorization / delegation |
   | this agent?"                         | relationship               |
   +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
   | A behavioral trust or risk           | Reputation                 |
   | score                                |                            |
   +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
   | A per-session or                     | Contextual persona (RFC    |
   | pseudonymous identifier              | 6973 sense)                |
   +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
   | A hardware key or                    | Root of trust / anchor     |
   | attestation                          |                            |
   +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+
   | "Which one specific entity           | identity0 (this document)  |
   | is this, durably?"                   |                            |
   +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+

        Table 1: Common "identity" usages and their precise concept

5.  A Layered Reference Model

5.1.  Borrowing the Discipline of Layering

   Like the Open Systems Interconnection reference model, the model
   below separates concerns by dependency.  It is not a mapping to OSI.
   Each layer answers a different question, depends on those beneath it,
   and should not take over a neighboring layer's job.

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    +================+================+==============================+
    | Layer          | Question it    | Example mechanisms           |
    |                | answers        |                              |
    +================+================+==============================+
    | Policy and     | What rules     | Disclosure duties, audit,    |
    | Regulation     | apply?         | insurance, consequence tiers |
    +----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
    | Reputation and | Should I trust | Behavioral history, safety   |
    | Trust          | it?            | certification, risk scoring  |
    +----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
    | Authorization  | What may it    | Scopes, consent, delegation  |
    | and Delegation | do?  Who is    | chains, owner binding        |
    |                | responsible?   |                              |
    +----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
    | Credentials    | What can it    | Verifiable credentials, SD-  |
    | and Claims     | prove?         | JWT, attestations, tokens    |
    +----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
    | Naming and     | What is it     | DIDs, directories, agent     |
    | Discovery      | called?  Where | cards, DNS-based discovery,  |
    |                | is it?         | handles                      |
    +----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
    | Identity       | Which one      | Persistent identity record;  |
    | (identity0)    | entity is      | non-transferable anchor      |
    |                | this, durably? | binding                      |
    +----------------+----------------+------------------------------+
    | Root of Trust  | What           | TPM, secure enclave, PIV,    |
    |                | physically     | HSM, platform measurements   |
    |                | exists?        |                              |
    +----------------+----------------+------------------------------+

            Table 2: A layered reference model for agent trust

5.2.  Layering Violations

   Encoding a mutable, higher-layer property into identity forces an
   identity change when that property changes, or leaves stale
   information attached to the identity.  For example, changing an
   agent's operator should change an authorization relationship, not the
   agent's identity.  Treating a contextual or pseudonymous identifier
   as durable identity creates the continuity gap (Section 4.2) instead.
   Mutable properties such as operator, role, capability, trust tier,
   and jurisdiction belong above identity0.

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5.3.  Where Current Efforts Sit, and the Common Gap

   Current work spans several upper layers.  Credential and claim
   formats occupy the credentials layer; directories and discovery
   mechanisms occupy the naming layer; and authorization and delegation
   frameworks occupy the authorization layer.  Examples include
   proposals that bind an agent credential to an owner's identity
   ([I-D.ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity]) and requirements work that
   discusses pseudonymous or temporary identifiers
   ([I-D.agentic-ai-usecases-requirements],
   [I-D.yl-agent-id-requirements]).

   These mechanisms can be correct and useful at their own layer.  The
   gap relevant here is that they may still depend on a durable subject
   they do not establish.  Temporary or re-mintable identifiers may
   serve privacy or naming goals, but cannot by themselves provide
   durable accountability or Sybil resistance.  The companion
   specifications concentrate on identity0 and the root of trust beneath
   it.

5.4.  Why the Identity Layer Needs an Anchor

   Software can be copied at negligible cost, so declaration by software
   alone cannot provide strong Sybil resistance.  Binding each high-
   assurance identity to its own scarce, hard-to-clone hardware root
   bounds the number of such identities by the number of such roots.
   Other hardware-backed environments may still impose substantial cost
   or operational friction without providing the same physical scarcity;
   their Sybil-resistance assurance depends on how constrained
   additional identities actually are.  Hardware can also keep identity
   keys non-exportable and resist extraction, reducing the risk that
   malware, phishing, prompt injection, or compromised tooling turns
   host compromise into a reusable credential elsewhere.  Hardware can
   also attest the state of the platform that holds the key (secure
   boot, measured boot, accredited software).  Accredited software can
   still contain bugs, but it can be tested, accredited, and checked at
   run time instead of assumed.  These are different properties:
   scarcity constrains identity manufacture; extraction resistance
   constrains identity theft; platform attestation constrains what runs
   as the identity.  The first two do not make an authenticated entity
   safe, trustworthy, or authorized.

   Not every entity needs the strongest anchor.  A graduated model lets
   software-only entities participate at a lower assurance level while
   reserving the strongest protections for hardware-anchored identities.
   One identity may have multiple anchors; an anchor that leaves is
   permanently retired and never reused while the identity itself
   persists.  See R1 (Section 6), R4 (Section 6), and R11 (Section 6).

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   The mechanics of anchoring are specified in the companion documents,
   which ask hardware only for a scarce, manufacturer-certified anchor,
   one proof key whose private part never leaves the device, and, at
   enrollment only, proof that the two are in the same device; they
   place no security reliance on the host operating system.  Platform
   attestation is left to Relying Parties and higher layers, which can
   bind it to an identity.

6.  Requirements and Design Goals

   These requirements combine properties implied by the problem and
   threat model with deployment properties needed for identity0 to
   function as common infrastructure.  A foundation that relying parties
   cannot reasonably expect autonomous entities to obtain and use cannot
   serve as a common identity layer.  They are descriptive in this
   problem statement, not protocol conformance requirements.

   R1 Persistence  The identity survives restarts, redeployment,
      software updates, addition or replacement of hardware anchors (a
      replaced anchor is permanently retired, never reused), changes of
      operator, and is not silently reassigned.

   R2 Non-transferability  The identity denotes one entity and cannot be
      sold or handed to a different entity.  Changing which provider
      serves an identity is a separate, legitimate operation.  Changes
      in ownership, custody, operator, provider, or other relationships
      do not by themselves change which entity the identity denotes, and
      historical claims, permissions, reputation, and other attributes
      remain associated with that same identity unless their own
      semantics specify otherwise.  R2 is a rule about what the identity
      refers to, not a property that cryptography alone can enforce.  A
      protocol can demonstrate continuity of cryptographic control over
      an identity's anchors; it cannot observe which entity exercises
      that control.  Authorized control can move: a device can be handed
      over, and a cooperating seller and buyer can present the same
      transcript as a legitimate hardware migration.  A system meets R2
      by never reassigning the identity to a different referent and by
      recording every change of control, so that a transfer cannot
      silently launder history; deterring covert transfer of control is
      a matter for governance, contract, and Relying Party policy.

   R3 Sybil resistance  Creating additional identities at a Sybil-
      resistant assurance level consumes a scarce resource in proportion
      to the number created, not merely a function call ([Sybil]).

   R4 Graduated inclusivity  Entities without a strong hardware anchor
      can still participate at a lower, clearly labeled assurance level,
      so the layer is not all-or-nothing.

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   R5 Separation of identity from attributes  Mutable properties --
      trust tier, role, operator, capabilities, jurisdiction -- are
      expressed as layered attributes and authorizations, never encoded
      into the identifier itself.

   R6 Unconditional base issuance  Enrolling, retaining, authenticating
      with, and verifying a base identity are free of charge to the
      actor and are not gated behind paid or optional value-added
      services.  Access to identity does not depend on ability to pay,
      even though the assurance level attainable may vary with the
      available anchor (R4 (Section 6)).  Free is not unlimited:
      content-neutral rate, volume, and abuse controls on operations
      that create or enlarge permanent state do not breach this
      requirement, provided that enrolling and keeping an identity
      remain possible without payment.

   R7 Federation and issuer choice  No single organization is the
      gatekeeper of issuance: multiple independent issuers compete to
      serve entities, an entity can change issuer without its identity
      changing, and the failure or misbehavior of any one participant
      does not collapse the system.  Coordination functions that must be
      singular, such as uniqueness enforcement, are constrained instead
      by escrow, replaceability, and accountable governance.

   R8 Low-friction verification  Relying parties can verify identity
      using widely deployed mechanisms rather than bespoke software.

   R9 Privacy and selective disclosure  Presenting an identity does not
      force disclosure of unnecessary attributes, and pseudonymous
      presentation is possible where accountability can still be
      preserved ([RFC6973]).

   R10 Transport independence  The identity is usable across email,
      HTTP, agent-to-agent messaging, and protocols not yet defined.

   R11 Protection of identity proof  Where a hardware anchor is used,
      private identity keys are non-exportable through normal interfaces
      and designed to resist extraction or cloning; cryptographic
      operations using them occur inside the anchor, so compromise of
      surrounding software does not by itself expose a reusable
      credential.

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7.  Privacy Considerations

   A persistent machine identity is intentionally a strong correlator.
   [RFC6973] favors contextual identities for people; autonomous
   entities, however, often need durable provenance.  Because agents act
   for people and organizations, their identities can still become
   proxies for those parties.

   R5 (Section 6) and R9 (Section 6) mitigate this by keeping mutable
   attributes outside identity0 and allowing selective disclosure.
   Cross-context correlation and linkage to an operator remain privacy
   risks for any implementation.  As of this writing, major data-
   protection regimes generally protect natural persons, not autonomous
   agents (for example, [GDPR] and [AU-PRIVACY-ACT]); the EU AI Act
   likewise treats AI as a regulated system, not a rights-bearing
   principal ([EU-AI-ACT]).  Whether that should change is a policy
   question outside this series.

8.  Security Considerations

   This problem statement defines no protocol.  The security conclusion
   here is structural: higher layers are only as durable as the identity
   subject they rely on.  The threats in Section 3 and the anchor
   properties in Section 5.4 therefore affect every higher layer that
   depends on identity0.  Conversely, identity does not replace
   authorization, reputation, certification, or policy; it supplies the
   durable subject to which those decisions and claims apply.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

10.  Informative References

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

   [BRITANNICA-IDENTITY]
              Encyclopaedia Britannica, "identity (logic and
              metaphysics)", 2024,
              <https://www.britannica.com/topic/identity-logic>.

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   [GDPR]     European Parliament and Council of the European Union,
              "Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection
              Regulation)", 2016,
              <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj>.

   [AU-PRIVACY-ACT]
              Commonwealth of Australia, "Privacy Act 1988", 1988,
              <https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A03712/latest/text>.

   [EU-AI-ACT]
              European Parliament and Council of the European Union,
              "Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (Artificial Intelligence Act)",
              2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj>.

   [Sybil]    Douceur, J.R., "The Sybil Attack", Peer-to-Peer Systems
              (IPTPS 2002), LNCS 2429, pp. 251-260, 2002,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24>.

   [I-D.drake-agent-identity-registry]
              Drake, C., "Agent Identity Registry System: A Federated
              Architecture for Durable Identity of Autonomous Entities",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-drake-agent-
              identity-registry-05, October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-drake-agent-
              identity-registry-05>.

   [I-D.drake-agent-identity-epp]
              Drake, C., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Mapping
              for Agent Identity and Handle Objects", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-drake-agent-identity-epp-01, October
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-drake-
              agent-identity-epp-01>.

   [I-D.drake-agent-identity-resolution]
              Drake, C., "Resolution and Verification of Agent
              Identities using DNS and RDAP", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-drake-agent-identity-resolution-01,
              October 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-drake-agent-identity-resolution-01>.

   [I-D.drake-agent-identity-governance]
              Drake, C., "The Agent Identity Authority: A Multi-
              Stakeholder Governance Framework for the Agent Identity
              Registry System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              drake-agent-identity-governance-01, October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-drake-agent-
              identity-governance-01>.

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   [I-D.drake-email-hardware-attestation]
              Drake, C., "Hardware Attestation for Email Sender
              Verification", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              drake-email-hardware-attestation-03, October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-drake-email-
              hardware-attestation-03>.

   [I-D.agentic-ai-usecases-requirements]
              Reddy, T., "Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-agentic-ai-usecases-
              requirements-00, May 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-agentic-ai-
              usecases-requirements-00>.

   [I-D.ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity]
              Ni, C., "WIMSE Applicability for AI Agents", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ni-wimse-ai-agent-
              identity-02, February 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ni-wimse-ai-
              agent-identity-02>.

   [I-D.yl-agent-id-requirements]
              Li, Y., "Requirements for AI Agent Identity", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-yl-agent-id-requirements-
              00, 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yl-
              agent-id-requirements-00>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   The layered framing in this document was developed for, and refined
   by discussion at, the Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse
   Working Group (M3AAWG).  The terminology draws on the Internet
   Security Glossary [RFC4949] and the privacy terminology of [RFC6973].

Author's Address

   Christopher Drake
   1id.com
   Australia
   Email: cnd@1id.com
   URI:   https://1id.com

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