Protected QUIC Initial Packets
draft-duke-quic-protected-initial-04
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Martin Duke , David Schinazi | ||
| Last updated | 2022-11-07 (Latest revision 2022-04-27) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
QUIC encrypts its Initial Packets using keys derived from well-known constants, meaning that observers can inspect the contents of these packets and successfully spoof them. This document proposes a new version of QUIC that encrypts Initial Packets more securely by leveraging a Public Key distributed via the Domain Name System (DNS) or other out-of-band system.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)