Protected QUIC Initial Packets
draft-duke-quic-protected-initial-00
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| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
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| Author | Martin Duke | ||
| Last updated | 2021-05-04 | ||
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draft-duke-quic-protected-initial-00
quic M. Duke
Internet-Draft F5 Networks, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track 4 May 2021
Expires: 5 November 2021
Protected QUIC Initial Packets
draft-duke-quic-protected-initial-00
Abstract
QUIC encrypts its Initial Packets using keys derived from well-known
constants, meaning that observers can inspect the contents of these
packets and successfully spoof them. This document proposes a new
version of QUIC that encrypts Initial Packets more securely by
leveraging a Public Key distributed via the Domain Name System (DNS)
or other out-of-band system.
Discussion of this work is encouraged to happen on the QUIC IETF
mailing list quic@ietf.org or on the GitHub repository which contains
the draft: https://github.com/martinduke/quic-version-aliasing.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 November 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Key Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Version Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Key Derivation Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Initial Packet Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.1. Encryption Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Client Packet Protection Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Server Packet Protection Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Retry Integrity Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11. Intermediaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
12. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
13. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
DISCLAIMER: This draft is a preliminary proposal with insufficient
security analysis. It should not be used in production systems.
The QUIC Initial Packet [QUIC-TRANSPORT] is encrypted using a key
derived from the Destination Connection ID in the packet cleartext
and a well-known salt (see Section 5.2 of [QUIC-TLS]). Section 7 of
that draft describes security vulnerabilities resulting from the
resulting lack of authentication.
This also has privacy implications, as observers can decrypt the
packet and inspect the contents, which contain the TLS Client Hello
and Server Hello Messages ([RFC8446]). The former contains QUIC
Transport Parameters, which reveal even more information about the
traffic.
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Furthermore, packets vulnerable to deep inspection create an
ossification vector. Intermediaries that expect the contents of
these messages to match a certain format and template might drop
packets that do not, preventing the use of new protocol extensions or
improved security protocols.
This document proposes a new version of QUIC where the client obtains
a public key generated by the server and uses it to encrypt a shared
secret, sent in the Initial packet header, that both endpoints can
then use to protect Initial packets.
This mechanism leverages the public key that would be distributed via
DNS (or other out-of-band mechanism) to support Encrypted Client
Hello [ECHO]. That design uses Hybrid Public Key Exchange (HPKE)
([HPKE] to authenticate some HPKE configuration information and the
"outer client hello" that is in plaintext, while encrypting the
"inner client hello" that contains privacy-sensitive information.
This document uses the widespread configuration that will exist if
ECHO is widely deployed, but only sends the subset of information
necessary to seed the QUIC key generation process.
This design is meant to be complimentary with QUIC Version Aliasing
[VERSION-ALIASING]. Version Aliasing does not require coordination
with DNS or costly asymmetric encryption, and also hinders
ossification of the QUIC version field. However, it does not protect
the first connection between the client and server, and can be
difficult to coordinate with intermediaries like client-facing load
balancers. This document addresses those use cases.
Unlike [ECHO], Protected Initial Packets protect the entire packet
payloads that contain the Client Hello and Server Hello, instead of
just part of the Client Hello.
The version of QUIC described in this specification is identical to
QUIC version 1 [QUIC-TRANSPORT] except where described in this
document.
2. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
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3. Key Configuration
The client obtains the Encrypted ClientHello Configuration
(ECHConfig) described in Section 4 of [ECHO], which provides the
context that allows protection of Initial packets. The ECHConfig is
available via a DNS record or other out-of- band system.
4. Version Number
The version field in long headers is TBD. Note: for interoperability
exercises, use the provisional value 0xff454900.
5. Key Derivation Labels
The labels used to derive keying material in [QUIC-TLS] change from
"quic key", "quic iv", "quic hp", and "quic ku" to "quicpi key",
"quicpi iv", "quicpi hp", and "quicpi ku", respectively.
6. Initial Packet Header
The figure below is presented in the format from [QUIC-TRANSPORT],
and adds a variable-length Encryption Context preceded by a length
field:
Initial Packet {
Header From (1) = 1,
Fixed Big (1) = 1,
Long Packet Type (2) = 0,
Reserved Bits (2),
Packet Number Length (2),
Version (32),
Destination Connection ID Length (8),
Destination Connection ID (0..160),
Source Connection ID Length (8),
Source Connection ID (0..160),
Encryption Context Length (8),
Encryption Context (..),
Token Length (i),
Token (..),
Length (i),
Packet Number (8..32),
}
Encryption Context Length: A variable-length integer specifying the
length of the encryption context, in bytes. Servers MUST set this
field to zero; a client that receives a non-zero length MUST either
discard the packet or generate a connection error of type
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
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If a client has received a valid Server Initial packet, it SHOULD set
this field to zero. Until then, clients MUST use a nonzero value.
If a client Initial packet has a zero Encryption Context Length, and
the server has not sent an Initial Packet, the server MUST either
discard the packet or generate a connection error of type
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
6.1. Encryption Context
The encryption context, if nonzero length, has the following format:
Encryption Context {
Config ID (8),
Encapsulated Secret (..),
}
The client obtains the Config ID (an 8-bit unsigned integer) from the
ECHConfig. It corresponds to a public key and Key Encapsulation
Mechanism (KEM) that are not sent over the wire.
The Encapsulated Secret is HPKE encapsulated. Its length is inferred
from the Encryption Context Length field.
7. Client Packet Protection Procedure
An client extracts the public key pkR and uses it to generate a
shared_secret:
pkR = Deserialize(ECHConfig.contents.public_key)
shared_secret, enc = Encap(pkR)
initial_secret = HKDF-Extract(shared_secret,
client_dst_connection_id || ECHConfig)
enc is the Encapsulated Secret, and is written into that subfield of
the Encryption Context Field.
The initial_secret above is used to generate client_initial_secret
and server_initial_secret as described in Section 5.2 of [QUIC-TLS].
When applying header protection, the Context Length and Encryption
Context are not Protected.
Additionally, the client bitwise-XORs the first eight octets of the
Destination Connection ID with the first eight octets of the public
key to form a 64 bit unsigned integer. This integer is added to the
packet length, modulo 2^62, and written into the packet length field
instead of the actual packet length.
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This derivation is performed once per connection. Subsequent Initial
Packets use the same keys and the same offset to the packet number,
regardless of additional Encryption Context fields or changed
connection IDs.
8. Server Packet Protection Procedure
The server reads the Config ID and Encapsulated Secret (enc) from the
Initial Packet. It looks up its private key (skR) associated with
the Config ID.
Prior to any other operations, including sending any Retry packet,
the server bitwise-XORs the first eight octets of its public key and
the destination connection ID and subtracts this from the value in
the packet length field, modulo 2^62, to find the true packet length.
Any result that exceeds the size of the received datagram indicates
with high assurance that the client's received ECHConfig does not
match the server's state, possibly due to a misconfiguration. The
probability this test results in a false negative, when an incorrect
key generates a result less than the datagram size, is typically less
than 1 in 2^51. The server MUST discard the packet and SHOULD send a
Version Negotiation packet that does not advertise the current QUIC
version, as the endpoints do not have the necessary shared state to
use QUIC Protected Initials.
Otherwise, the server generates the Initial secrets:
shared_secret = Decap(enc, skR)
initial_secret = HKDF-Extract(shared_secret,
client_dst_connection_id || ECHConfig)
The server now has sufficient context to send a Retry packet and MAY
choose to do so at this point (see Section 9). If not, it decrypts
the Initial packet.
The remainder is identical to the client procedure.
9. Retry Integrity Tag
The Retry packet is identical to QUIC version 1, except that the
secret key K and nonce N (see Sec 5.8 of [QUIC-TLS]) are derived from
the shared_secret instead of the secret provided there. Also, the
labels are as described in Section 5.
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10. Version Negotiation
Endpoints that support QUIC Protected Initials MUST support at least
one other version of QUIC (in case the endpoints cannot agree on the
ECHConfig), and therefore MUST also support
[I-D.ietf-quic-version-negotiation].
In contrast to Section 5 of that document, clients MUST be prepared
to receive a version negotiation packet that contains QUIC Protected
Initial, and then receive a second version negotiation packet that
does not, should the attempt to identify a common ECHConfig fail.
Servers MAY continue to advertise QUIC Protected Initials in its
Server Handshake Version Information, even if shared secret
extraction failed, to avoid tracking state as to which clients have
failed such extraction. This does not effect the Version Downgrade
mechanism, which is executed by servers.
Note that QUIC version 1 is not compatible with QUIC Protected
Initials, as it does not contain the information necessary to
generate subsequent Initial packets correctly. Conversely, QUIC
Protected Initials are compatible with QUIC version 1. However,
since the versions have identical properties after the Initial packet
exchange, there is little value in such a trasition.
11. Intermediaries
Intermediaries that rely on the contents of the Client Hello (e.g., a
load balancer that routes between servers with the same IP address
based on the SNI field in the Client Hello) MUST have access to the
ECHConfig and the corresponding Private Keys, as described in
Section 3.1 of [ECHO], to function properly.
12. Applicability
This version of QUIC provides no change from QUIC version 1 relating
to the capabilities available to applications. Therefore, all
Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) ([RFC7301]) codepoints
specified to operate over QUICv1 can also operate over this version
of QUIC.
13. Security and Privacy Considerations
Sections 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, and 10.6 of [ECHO] apply to QUIC Protected
Initials as well.
Sections 7.2, 7.3, 7.7, and 7.8 of [VERSION-ALIASING] are also
applicable.
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14. IANA Considerations
This document request that IANA add the following entry to the QUIC
version registry:
Value: TBD
Status: permanent
Specification: This document
Change Controller: IETF
Contact: QUIC WG
15. References
15.1. Normative References
[ECHO] Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. A. Wood, "TLS
Encrypted Client Hello", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-tls-esni-10, 8 March 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-esni-
10.txt>.
[HPKE] Barnes, R. L., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. A. Wood,
"Hybrid Public Key Encryption", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-08, 15 February 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-
08.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-quic-version-negotiation]
Schinazi, D. and E. Rescorla, "Compatible Version
Negotiation for QUIC", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-quic-version-negotiation-03, 4 February 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-quic-version-
negotiation-03.txt>.
[QUIC-TLS] Thomson, M. and S. Turner, "Using TLS to Secure QUIC",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-quic-tls-34,
14 January 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
ietf-quic-tls-34.txt>.
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[QUIC-TRANSPORT]
Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
and Secure Transport", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-quic-transport-34, 14 January 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-quic-
transport-34.txt>.
15.2. Informative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[VERSION-ALIASING]
Duke, M., "QUIC Version Aliasing", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-duke-quic-version-aliasing-04, 30
October 2020, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-duke-
quic-version-aliasing-04.txt>.
Author's Address
Martin Duke
F5 Networks, Inc.
Email: martin.h.duke@gmail.com
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